摘要：清华大学国际战略与安全研究中心研究员周波22日在《南华早报》发表评论《美国撤离之际，中国如何在欧洲安全中发挥作用》（How China could play a role in European security as the US retreats），分析了
编者按：清华大学国际战略与安全研究中心研究员周波22日在《南华早报》发表评论《美国撤离之际，中国如何在欧洲安全中发挥作用》（How China could play a role in European security as the US retreats），分析了乌克兰冲突背景下美国战略收缩对欧洲安全的冲击，探讨了中国在促成停火、维和及塑造欧洲安全格局中的潜在角色。文章指出，面对北约扩张的停滞与欧洲战略自主的困境，中国可通过集体安全保障与维和行动，在欧洲安全事务中发挥前所未有的影响力，开启地缘政治新篇章。
本文为北京对话与观察者网翻译发布，以飨读者。
【文/周波，翻译/王凡非】
尽管尘埃尚未完全落定，笼罩俄乌冲突的迷雾已开始消散。俄罗斯即将完全收复库尔斯克西部地区，并据其自身评估，控制了卢甘斯克几乎全部领土，以及顿涅茨克、扎波罗热和赫尔松地区超过七成的领土。
这也解释了为何俄罗斯总统普京并不急于接受停火协议。他意在先争取时间，确保战场上的彻底胜利，最终才着手解决冲突的根源问题。
乌克兰是无可争议的失败一方。总统泽连斯基，这位昔日的喜剧演员，将以悲剧人物的身份载入史册。乌克兰绝不会承认俄罗斯的吞并，被占领的四个地区在未来数十年可能成为俄罗斯的致命软肋，尽管如此，乌克兰将别无选择，不甘愿也只能接受俄罗斯事实上对四个地区的控制。
即便如欧盟委员会主席冯德莱恩所提议，乌克兰在2030年前加入欧盟，其加入北约的愿望看起来已无实现可能。此外，研究显示，680万乌克兰难民中，计划在战后返回家园的人不足半数。
当地时间2月24日，冯德莱恩称乌克兰有望于2030年前加入欧盟。
欧洲同样是失败的一方。其挫败更多源于俄罗斯还是美国尚无定论。美国副总统万斯在慕尼黑安全会议上对欧洲领导人的尖锐批评，令欧洲深感失望，决心加大防务投入。这一过程当然痛苦，但欧洲尚有能力负担。即使失去美国的支持，其他北约成员国也拥有充足资源，足以研发多样化的武器与作战系统。十年之内，欧洲的安全架构或将发生深刻变革。
欧洲真能实现其所标榜的战略自主吗？简而言之，不可能。只要欧盟仍依赖美国的核威慑作为北约的终极屏障，答案只能是否定的。即便英国与法国的核武库加在一起，与俄罗斯相比也无法平衡。
法国总统马克龙承诺为欧洲提供“延伸核威慑”的说法因此令人质疑。究竟有多少国家能真正相信法国的保证？据称，前法国总统戴高乐曾质疑美国是否会“为了拯救巴黎而牺牲纽约”，这一疑虑或许才是推动法国发展核武库的真正动力。
欧洲的安全取决于其与俄罗斯共存的能力。俄罗斯的势力范围已大幅萎缩，在欧洲仅剩白俄罗斯为其忠实盟友。俄罗斯不可能在常规战争中击败由32国组成的北约，也不致于会考虑对北约国家发动先发制人的核打击，因为这无疑将招致报复。
北约的扩张已近尾声。它或能苟活，却难以兴盛。首先，西方自由民主在全球的衰退削弱了北约作为其军事支柱的力量。这一趋势在美国总统特朗普的领导下可能加速，他对民主原则漠不关心。
其次，特朗普希望将欧洲安全交给欧洲人，专注于印太地区及与中国的竞争，这使北约的欧洲化不可避免，因此将加速这一联盟的衰落。
乌克兰冲突激发了世界对中国发挥更大全球作用的期待，无论是在战后还是在万斯慕尼黑演讲之后。中国提出的12点和平计划及与巴西共同推动全球南方国家支持停火，表明它愿意为结束战争作出贡献。
外交部相关公告截图
然而，中国的实质性角色可能在停火或休战达成后才能显现。这取决于两大条件：如果包括中国在内的大国需要提供集体安全保障；如果为防止俄罗斯或乌克兰违反停火需要开展维和行动。
1953年的朝鲜停战协定提供了一个范例，展示了大国支持的非正式协议可以缓解敌对状态。该协定主要由中国、美国和朝鲜谈判达成，尽管未签署正式和平条约，朝鲜冲突未再演变为上世纪50年代初的激烈战争。
维和行动需首先获得交战双方的同意。若联合国授权，中国作为安理会常任理事国中最大的部队派遣国，可以引领全球南方国家及部分非北约欧洲国家共同行动。俄罗斯将坚决反对任何北约或欧盟成员国的参与。
若这些设想成真，将是中国首次被邀请参与塑造欧洲安全格局。颇具讽刺的是，当美国谋求转向印太地区之际，中国或将深入欧洲腹地。这预示着一个新时代的开启。
以下为英文采访原文：
Even if the dust has yet to fully settle, the fog shrouding the Ukraine conflict has begun to lift. Russia is on the verge of reclaiming full control over the western reaches of Kursk and, by its own reckoning, holds nearly all of Luhansk and over 70 percent of the Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson regions.
This explains why Russian President Vladimir Putin is in no rush to embrace a ceasefire. He seeks to bide his time, securing a decisive battlefield victory before turning to address the war’s underlying causes.
Ukraine, however, emerges as the unequivocal loser. President Volodymyr Zelensky, once a comedian, will be etched in history as a tragic figure. Ukraine will never acknowledge Russia’s annexation, and the four occupied regions may yet prove to be Russia’s Achilles’ heel in the decades ahead. Still, Ukraine will have little choice but to grudgingly accept Russia’s de facto control.
Even if Ukraine joins the European Union before 2030, as suggested by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, its aspirations for NATO membership appear doomed. Moreover, studies indicate that fewer than half of the 6.8 million Ukrainian refugees plan to return home once the war concludes.
Europe, too, finds itself among the vanquished, though whether its setbacks stem more from Russia or the United States remains unclear. Following U.S. Vice President Vance’s scathing critique of European leaders at the Munich Security Conference, a disillusioned Europe has resolved to bolster its defense spending. Painful as this may be, it is within Europe’s means. Even without U.S. support, other NATO members possess ample resources to develop a wide array of weapons and combat systems. Within a decade, Europe’s security framework could undergo a profound transformation.
But can Europe ever attain its much-vaunted strategic autonomy? The answer, in short, is no—not while the EU continues to rely on American nuclear deterrence as NATO’s ultimate shield. The combined nuclear arsenals of Britain and France pale in comparison to Russia’s.
This casts doubt on French President Emmanuel Macron’s pledge to extend nuclear deterrence across Europe. How many nations truly place faith in such a guarantee? Former French President Charles de Gaulle reportedly questioned whether the U.S. would “risk New York to save Paris”—a skepticism that likely spurred France’s pursuit of its own nuclear arsenal.
Europe’s security hinges on its capacity to coexist with Russia. Russia’s sphere of influence has contracted to the point where only Belarus remains a steadfast ally in Europe. Russia lacks the capacity to defeat a 32-member NATO in conventional warfare, nor should it contemplate a preemptive nuclear strike on a NATO state, which would surely provoke retaliation.
NATO’s expansion is nearing its end. It may endure, but it will not flourish. First, the global decline of liberal democracy undermines NATO’s strength as its military arm. This erosion is likely to accelerate under U.S. President Donald Trump, who shows little regard for democratic principles.
Second, Trump’s desire to delegate Europe’s security to Europeans while focusing on the Indo-Pacific and competition with China renders NATO’s Europeanization inevitable, further hastening the alliance’s decline.
The Ukraine conflict has fueled expectations for China to assume a greater global role, both in the war’s aftermath and following Vance’s Munich address. China has signaled its willingness to contribute, as evidenced by its 12-point peace proposal and joint efforts with Brazil to rally Global South nations in support of a ceasefire.
China’s substantive role, however, may materialize only after a ceasefire or armistice is secured. This hinges on two conditions: the need for a collective security guarantee involving major powers, including China, and the requirement for peacekeeping to prevent violations of a ceasefire by either Russia or Ukraine.
The 1953 Korean armistice offers a precedent for how an informal agreement backed by great powers can de-escalate hostilities. Negotiated primarily by China, the U.S., and North Korea, the truce has prevented the Korean conflict from reverting to the intense warfare of the early 1950s, despite the absence of a formal peace treaty.
For peacekeeping to proceed, the consent of the warring parties is essential. Should the UN issue a mandate, China—the largest troop contributor among the UN Security Council’s permanent members—could lead the effort, alongside Global South nations and select non-NATO European states. Russia would categorically oppose the involvement of any NATO or EU member.
Should these scenarios unfold, it would mark the first time China is invited to shape Europe’s security landscape. The irony is striking: as the U.S. seeks to pivot to the Indo-Pacific, China may find itself drawn into the European heartland. This heralds the dawn of a new era.
来源：观察者网
