摘要：Ph.D. in Political Science, Deputy Director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies (CCEIS), HSE Univer

Proactive vs Reactive.Interim Resultsof the EAEU's ForeignEconomic Policy（主动 vs.被动: 欧亚经济联盟对外经济政策中期成果）

亚历山大·科罗廖夫
政治学博士，俄罗斯国立高等经济大学欧洲与国际综合研究中心（CCEIS）副主任

Alexander Korolev

Ph.D. in Political Science, Deputy Director of the Centre for Comprehensive European and International Studies (CCEIS), HSE University

主动vs.被动:欧亚经济联盟对外经济政策中期成果
第三章 原地踏步还是按计划进行?

如前所述，欧亚经济联盟目前与越南、塞尔维亚和伊朗三个国家签订了自由贸易区协议。与此同时，独联体自由贸易协定和一系列双边协议仍然有效，因此客观上应该将阿塞拜疆、塔吉克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦、土库曼斯坦、摩尔多瓦、格鲁吉亚和乌克兰也添加到上述名单中。换言之，联盟拥有一个多元化的自由贸易区协议网络。要回答该网络在多大程度上覆盖了欧亚经济联盟的对外货物贸易，有必要分析其在2022年的状况。

官方统计数据显示，现有欧亚经济联盟 (EAEU) 自由贸易协定伙伴国的份额微不足道——2022年，它们在进出口总额中分别占4%(图1、2)。根据截至2022年底的数据，以牺牲正在谈判或正在讨论的国家为代价的优惠贸易网络的潜在扩张，将使这一指标在出口方面提高约8个百分点，在进口方面提高约3个百分点。

图1.2022年各国家集团在欧亚经济联盟进口中所占份额，%

图2.2022年各国家集团在欧亚经济联盟出口中所占份额，%

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一些欧亚经济联盟成员国，主要是俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦，出口矿产资源，这些资源通常无需缴纳关税。如果将这些商品排除在分析之外，现有自由贸易协定伙伴国在欧亚经济联盟出口中的占比将升至7%，潜在伙伴国的占比保持不变，进口占比也将保持在同一水平。然而，即使在这种情况下，欧亚五国的自由贸易区协定对欧亚五国的对外贸易的覆盖范围仍然不足。

因此，现有的欧亚经济联盟自由贸易协定网络并非决定该联盟对外贸易政策的工具。与此同时，中国的作用值得一提——其出口份额是现有和潜在自由贸易伙伴的1.5倍 (图16)，而进口份额则是现有和潜在自由贸易伙伴的4倍 (图15)。
一方面，与非核心伙伴(即仅涵盖一小部分对外贸易的协议)签署首批自由贸易协定是一种常见做法。这对于检验谈判模式并塑造参与者的谈判立场至关重要。即使出现重大误判，成本也微不足道。与此同时，许多现有和潜在的欧亚经济联盟自由贸易区伙伴都是蓬勃发展的经济体，未来可能会扩大其市场。然而，值得注意的是，其中许多国家也与其他主要参与者签署了自由贸易协定。例如，越南与欧盟和韩国签署了更为复杂的自由贸易区协定，因此与欧亚企业相比，欧洲和韩国企业更有能力从越南市场的扩张中获益。

另一方面，在欧亚经济联盟运行八年期间，作为联盟对外贸易政策工具的自由贸易协定仍未取得实质性进展。首先，自2019年以来，联盟尚未签署任何新的自由贸易区协议，这表明该机制的运用存在一定程度的滞后。

停滞的主要迹象之一是大多数欧亚经济联盟成员国不愿就服务贸易进行谈判。与此同时，服务业增长更快，在发达国家和发展中国家的跨境贸易中占据着越来越重要的地位。经合组织的统计数据库显示，在德国、美国和英国等发达国家的出口中，服务业分别占增加值的51%、62%和71%，而在世界上最大的发展中国家——中国，这一指标约为38%。因此，在服务贸易优惠待遇问题上采取保守立场不仅阻碍了欧亚经济联盟融入全球经济，而且还会为经济增长和发展带来替代成本。

综上所述，欧亚经济联盟现有的自由贸易区网络无论在对外贸易覆盖率方面，还是在现有协议的有效性方面都不够完善。为此，可以设想出若干未来发展联盟对外贸易活动的方案。

首先，欧亚经济联盟可能力争与中国等主要伙伴达成更先进的经贸协议。此举将为欧亚商品打开通往全球最大市场之一的大门，并促进欧亚最具竞争力的参与者融入全球生产链。与此同时，无论过渡期持续多久，全面向中国开放联盟市场都可能给各国经济带来痛苦，在某些情况下甚至是难以克服的冲击。因此，达成一项全面的欧亚经济联盟-中国自贸区协议似乎并不现实，这很可能会遭到中国方面的低调关注和大多数欧亚经济联盟成员国的反对。

摆脱这种局面的出路可能是签署类似于目前与伊朗达成的协议的临时或过渡协议。然而，这种自由贸易区模式意味着，如果一方不准备达成全面协议，优惠政策可能会被迅速撤销。因此，未来几年，中国与欧亚经济联盟达成临时共识以及就上述任何一种形式的优惠政策进行谈判的可能性几乎为零。

第二，欧亚经济联盟成员国可以转向深化现有自由贸易协定的战略。服务贸易自由化可以增强货物贸易自由化的积极效应，而更深层次的协定则可以促进各方贸易的深度和广度增长，并通过积累中间产品贸易来确保其参与全球生产链。

为了进一步推进一体化进程，最佳举措是将服务贸易和投资合作自由化的谈判权限移交给欧亚经济共同体。这将能够克服或至少削弱参与国声称此类协议不可取的立场。这一举措完全符合俄罗斯的战术和战略利益。从手段上讲，这一举措的关键目标是保持外国直接投资的流入，并创造增加投资的机会。

PROACTIVE VS REACTIVE: INTERIM RESULTS OF THE EAEU'S FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY

Chapter 3. Running in Place or Going as Planned?

As was described earlier, the EAEU currently has FTZ agreements with three countries in place - Vietnam, Serbia and Iran. In the meantime, the CIS FTAs and a number of bilateral agreements are still in force, so Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine should objectively be added to the above list. In other words, the Union has a heterogeneous network of FTZ agreements. To answer the question, to what extent this network covers the EAEU's foreign trade in goods, it is worth analyzing its state in 2022.

Official statistics show that the share of current EAEU FTA partners is insignificant - in 2022 they accounted for 4% each in imports and exports. According to the data as of the end of 2022, the potential expansion of the network of preferential deals at the expense of the states with which negotiations are underway or under discussion will increase this indicator by about 8 p. p. in exports and by about 3 p. p. in imports.

Figure1.SharesofcountrygroupsintheEAEUimportsin2022

Figure2.SharesofcountrygroupsinEAEUexportsin2022

Some EAEU member states, primarily Russia and Kazakhstan, export mineral resources, which are often not subject to duties. If to exclude these commodities from the analysis, the share of current FTA partners in the Union's exports would rise to 7%, would not change for potential partners, and would remain at the same level for imports. However, even in this case there would lack significant coverage of the Eurasian Five's foreign trade by FTZ agreements.

Thus, the current network of EAEU FTAs is not an instrument that determines the association's foreign trade policy. At the same time, the role of China is worth mentioning—its share in exports exceeds that of the current and potential FTA partners by 1.5 times, while its imports are 4 times higher.

On the one hand, concluding the first FTAs with non-core partners, i. e. agreements covering a small portion of foreign trade, is a common practice. This is necessary to test the negotiation model and to shape the negotiating position of the participants. Even in case of significant miscalculations, the scale of costs will be insignificant. In the meantime, many current and potential EAEU partners in FTZ agreements are dynamically developing economies, which in the future may lead to the expansion of their markets. However, it should be kept in mind that many of them have also signed FTAs with other major players. For example, Vietnam is a member of more elaborate FTZ agreements with the EU and South Korea, so European and Korean companies are better positioned to benefit from the expansion of the Vietnamese market than Eurasian companies.

On the other hand, during the eight years of the EAEU operation, there has still been no qualitative development of FTAs as an instrument of the association's foreign trade policy. First of all, the Union has not signed a single new FTZ agreement since 2019, which indicates certain slippage in the use of this mechanism.

One of the main signs of stalling is the reluctance of most EAEU member states to negotiate trade in services. Meanwhile, the sector of services is growing faster and occupies an increasingly significant place in the cross-border trade of developed and developing nations. Thus, the OECD statistical databases show that in the exports of developed countries, such as Germany, the USA and the UK, services account for 51%, 62% and 71% of value added respectively, while in the world's largest developing country, namely the PRC, this indicator is about 38%. Thus, the conservative position on preferential treatment in respect of trade in services not only hinders the EAEU's integration into the global economy, but also incurs alternative costs for economic growth and development.

According to the evidence above, it becomes clear that the current FTZ network of the EAEU is not advanced either in terms of foreign trade coverage or the validity of existing agreements. In this regard, several options for the further development of the Union's foreign trade activities can be envisioned.

First, the EAEU may aim to move to a more advanced trade and economic agreement with leading partners such as China, for example. This move would open up an access for Eurasian goods to one of the world's largest markets and facilitate the integration of the most competitive Eurasian players into global production chains. At the same time, a full-fledged opening of the association's market to China could be a painful and, in some cases, insurmountable shock for national economies, regardless of how long the transition period may last. For this reason, concluding a full-fledged EAEU-China FTZ agreement seems to be an unrealistic scenario, which is likely to encounter low interest on the part of China and opposition from most EAEU member states.

A way out of this situation could be the signing of a temporary or interim agreement similar to the current deal with Iran. Yet this FTZ format implies the possibility of a rapid withdrawal of preferences, if one of the parties is not ready to move to a full-scale agreement. For this reason, the chances for an interim consensus between the PRC and the EAEU as well as negotiations on a preferential agreement in any of the above-stated variations in the years to come are close to zero.

Second, the EAEU member states could switch to a strategy of deepening the existing FTAs. Liberalization of trade in services enhances the positive effect of liberalization of trade in goods, while deeper agreements boost intensive and extensive growth of trade between the parties, ensuring their involvement in global production chains through the buildup of trade in intermediate goods.

For further development of integration, an optimal step in this direction would be the transfer of competences to the EEC to negotiate liberalization of trade in services and investment cooperation. This would allow to overcome or at least weaken the position of the participating nations making a case for the undesirability of such agreements. This initiative fully meets Russia's tactical and strategic interests. Instrumentally, the key objective of this step is preserving the inflow of foreign direct investment as well as the opportunity to increase Russian imports of critical technologies and services. Currently, the conclusion of FTAs between Russia and a number of friendly countries on investments and services outside the EAEU framework is complicated by the fears of secondary sanctions. Potential partners more scrupulously study the possibility of entering into trade negotiations with the Russian Federation, taking into account anti-Russian restrictions and figuring out the risks involved more carefully.

At the same time, the issues of expanding the powers of the Union's supranational bodies have always caused fierce disputes among the EAEU member states due to their unwillingness to partially limit their national sovereignty and, as a result, their desire to retain a monopoly on decision-making in certain areas. The geopolitical crisis of 2022 in Europe and further politicization of internal processes in the EAEU leads to the actual impossibility of implementing this measure or even discussing it. In all likelihood, negotiations on this issue will be blocked at least for several years. In this regard, the most relevant area of activity is holding coordinated bilateral negotiations on trade in services and investment cooperation with existing partners and countries which already discuss the liberalization of trade in goods without rigid bureaucratic obligations and restrictions.

The third potential area could be the conclusion by EAEU member states of single bilateral agreements with external actors in areas outside the EEC mandate. This process was kick-started relatively a long time ago: back in 2017 Armenia and the EU concluded the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement. This document covers, inter alia, trade in services and investment cooperation. Another example is the 2018 statement on the feasibility study of the Eurasian Economic Partnership Agreement between China and the Russian Federation, as well as a pre-pandemic Russian initiative to liberalize trade in services and investment with the Republic of Korea.

In the short term, given the lack of progress in expanding the existing network of FTAs and the aggravation of geopolitical tensions, this measure may seem an adequate solution, as it will contribute to strengthening the integration of the EAEU member states into the global economy. Yet in the long term it will become an obstacle to strengthening integration within the association. The conclusion of numerous bilateral agreements outside the competence of the EEC will not only lead to disparate preferential regimes in the sphere of services and investments, but will also complicate the possibility of their unification for the transfer of competences to the Commission.

来源：非常道