SME-SFI 学术讲座预告 20250901

摘要：Earnings conference call slides often employ visual tricks that can mislead investors, yet little is known about their prevalence

图表何以误导：

财报电话会议中的具有误导性的可视化呈现

When Charts Deceive: Misleading Visualizations in Earnings Conference Calls

讲座信息

主讲人

曹阳教授

香港理工大学

日期和时间

2025年9月5日（周五）

10:30 - 12:00

地点

会议楼II，103会议室

讲座概述

Earnings conference call slides often employ visual tricks that can mislead investors, yet little is known about their prevalence or impact. We assemble 432,003 presentation slides containing 153,331 charts from 2003–2023 and leverage GPT 4o to flag five misleading features: missing Y-axis, truncated Y-axis, dual Y axes, 3D effects, and omitted data labels. We document that over 10% of slides, and more than half of calls, include at least one such feature. Misleading visuals are concentrated in non-financial disclosures and correlate systematically with firm traits: smaller, more profitable firms use them most, while volatile firms, those under CIO oversight, or with high retail investor engagement use them least. Importantly, calls featuring misleading charts earn positive short term abnormal returns that subsequently reverse, consistent with temporary investor misperception—an effect strongest for missing Y axes in non-financial slides. These tactics are persistent over time and appear to reflect deliberate disclosure strategies rather than one‐off lapses. Our findings underscore a regulatory blind spot: visual elements in corporate presentations deserve the same scrutiny as narrative and numerical disclosures.

主讲人简介

曹阳教授

香港理工大学

曹阳是香港理工大学会计与金融学院的助理教授。在加入理大之前，他于波士顿学院获得会计学博士学位。他的研究主要关注人工智能和机器学习等新兴技术如何影响信息处理。

性别与城市：空间结构变迁与婚姻市场

Sex and the City:

Spatial Structural Changes and the Marriage Market

讲座信息

主讲人

杨宇教授

北京大学

日期和时间

地点

综合教学楼D904会议室

讲座概述

Marriage and fertility are declining globally. We study the impact of spatial structural changes on marriage matching and quantify their aggregate implications for national marriage rates. Using data from China, we first present stylized facts on the joint patterns of dramatic gender-biased spatial structural changes, persistent marital social norms, and the diverging spatial distribution of singlehood characterized by a high singles rate for females (males) in more (less) developed cities. We then build a prefecture-level spatial equilibrium model with multi-sector and multi-skill production, migration, and local marriage markets. The model reveals that, without gender-specific spatial structural changes, the singles rate would be 30% lower for average women and over 50% lower for college-educated women. The key mechanism is that spatial structural changes lead more highly educated women to sort into the service sector in more developed cities than men. However, social norms remain persistent, particularly the strong preference for hypergamy. This results in more failed marriage matches for females (males) in more (less) developed cities, thereby lowering the national marriage rate. Counterfactual analysis shows that subsidizing marriage is costly and relatively ineffective amid continuing gender-specific spatial structural changes.

主讲人简介

杨宇教授

北京大学

杨宇是北京大学光华管理学院经济学助理教授，2021年于威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校取得经济学博士学位。他的主要研究领域为劳动与空间经济学，关注人力资本、教育政策、迁移、婚姻与生育等主题。

具有探索特征的稳健合约

Robust Contracts with Exploration

讲座信息

主讲人

刘畅博士

新南威尔士大学

日期和时间

2025年9月5日 (周五)

14:00 - 15:30

地点

综合教学楼D904会议室

讲座概述

We study a two-period moral hazard problem; there are two agents, with action sets that are unknown to the principal. The principal contracts with each agent sequentially, and seeks to maximize the worst-case discounted sum of payoffs, where the worst case is over the possible action sets. The principal observes the action chosen by the first agent, and then offers a new contract to the second agent based on this knowledge, thus having the opportunity to explore in the first period. We introduce and compare three different notions of dynamic worst-case considerations. Within each notion, we define a suitable rule of updating and characterize the principal's optimal payoff guarantee. We find that linear contracts are robustly optimal not only in static settings, but also in dynamic environments with exploration.

主讲人简介