摘要：《国际组织》（International Organization）是一份分析政府和非政府组织运行的同行评审学术期刊、由Springer出版。该刊涵盖整个政治经济学领域，重点关注国际组织的政策和结构。2022年该刊影响因子为7.8，在国际关系的96种期刊中排名

期刊简介

《国际组织》（International Organization）是一份分析政府和非政府组织运行的同行评审学术期刊、由Springer出版。该刊涵盖整个政治经济学领域，重点关注国际组织的政策和结构。2022年该刊影响因子为7.8，在国际关系的96种期刊中排名第1。

本期目录

1 从大脑出发：推进国际关系中的威胁知觉研究

Building from the Brain: Advancing the Study of Threat Perception in International Relations

2 国际关系中的地位等级与污名转移

Status Hierarchies and Stigma Shifting in International Relations

3 和平与利益：哥伦比亚叛军分裂与冲突再起

Peace Versus Profit: Rebel Fragmentation and Conflict Resurgence in Colombia

4 全球治理中的意识形态与合法性

Ideology and Legitimacy in Global Governance

5 秘密创新

Secret Innovation

6 教育对国际贸易支持的影响：来自义务教育改革的证据

The Effect of Education on Support for International Trade: Evidence from Compulsory-Education Reforms

7 战争法和公众对外国武装人员的支持

The Laws of War and Public Support for Foreign Combatants

8 选举、战争与性别：自我选择与寻求胜利

Elections, War, and Gender: Self-Selection and the Pursuit of Victory

内容摘要

从大脑出发：推进国际关系中的威胁知觉研究

题目：Building from the Brain: Advancing the Study of Threat Perception in International Relations

作者：Marika Landau-Wells，加州大学伯克利分校政治学助理教授。

摘要：在国际关系与外交决策理论中，“威胁知觉”常常被作为因果变量。然而，草率的概念和未经检验的心理假设使人们难以理解其所产生的影响。本文提出一个统一的解决方案以应对这两个问题：将大脑的作用考虑在内。首先表明，这种方法通过提出两个截然不同的概念来解决概念化问题，它们是对现有理论的概括，且通俗易懂。这两个概念与特定的大脑水平过程相关：作为危险被感知到的威胁（即主观感受到的任何来源的危险）以及作为信号被感知到的威胁（即侦测到意图伤害的声明）。由于这两种类型的认知都发生在大脑中，对其大规模神经成像数据的捕捉就为实证检验国际关系理论中的一些心理假设提供了一种方法。本文使用来自冲突决策（伤害即成本）和胁迫（意图不确定性）相关文献中的假设，进行了两次这样的测试。本文的原始分析建立在15项基于坐标的元分析之上，包括500多项研究和11000多名受试者。结论表明，上述文献中的假设与大脑应对任何一种威胁的累积证据不一致。此外，研究中大脑层面的数据还阐明了威胁知觉对行为的影响，这些影响尚未被纳入国际关系理论中。因此，要推进对威胁认知的研究，需要基于对大脑的了解，采用一种微观的基础方法。

“Threat perception” is frequently invoked as a causal variable in theories of international relations and foreign policy decision making. Yet haphazard conceptualization and untested psychological assumptions leave its effects poorly understood. In this article, I propose a unified solution to these two related problems: taking the brain into account. I first show that this approach solves the conceptualization problem by generating two distinct concepts that generalize across existing theories, align with plain language, and are associated with specific brain-level processes: threat-as-dangerperception (subjectively apprehending danger from any source) andthreat-as-signalperception (detecting a statement of the intention to harm). Because both types of perception occur in the brain, large-scale neuroimaging data capturing these processes offer a way to empirically test some of the psychological assumptions embedded in IR theories. I conduct two such tests using assumptions from the literatures on conflict decision making (“harms are costs”) and on coercion (“intentions are inscrutable”). Based on an original analysis of fifteen coordinate-based meta-analyses comprising 500+ studies and 11,000+ subjects, I conclude that these assumptions are inconsistent with the cumulative evidence about how the brain responds to threats of either kind. Further, I show that brain-level data illuminate aspects of threat perception's impact on behavior that have not yet been integrated into IR theory. Advancing the study of threat perception thus requires a microfoundational approach that builds from what we know about the brain.

国际关系中的地位等级与污名转移

题目：Status Hierarchies and Stigma Shifting in International Relations

作者：金涏贤，香港城市大学国际事务助理教授。

摘要：作为社会行为体的国家如何应对污名引发的地位焦虑？本文提出“污名转移”（Stigma Shifting）的概念，这是地位焦虑国通过寻求地位较高国的认同，并与地位较低国区分开来，从而过度补偿因污名而产生的自卑感，重申其世界地位的方式。具体来说，受污国在面对其所期望融入的国家群体时，会采取寻求认同的行为，并在感到受诋毁的领域重新确立群体内地位。在将自己与不受欢迎的国家进行区分时，受污国会寻求区别，声称自己在某些领域优于这个“较弱”的群体，这些领域正是其身份焦虑的根源所在。换句话说，污名转移允许受污国扮演施污者的角色。为阐明这一概念的深度与效用，本文使用了东亚的三个不同问题领域的案例：殖民赔偿、核灾难处理与国际秩序制定。其中，日本在这三个领域都饱受诟病，但通过将污名转嫁给重要却“次要”的国家，即中国和韩国，重新确立了自身地位。总之，污名转移能够巩固世界上的地位等级体系，不仅仅是由“西方”主导的国际社会中的等级体系，还有非西方世界的地区等级体系。

How do states as social actors cope with stigma-induced status anxiety? I propose the concept of “stigma shifting” as a way in which status-anxious states overcompensate for their stigma-induced inferiority and reaffirm their place in the world: by seeking identification with higher-status states and differentiation from lower-status states. In identifying with the desired group of states, stigmatized states engage in approval-seeking behavior and reaffirm their in-group status in areas where they feel discredited. In differentiating themselves from the undesired group, stigmatized states engage in distinction-seeking behavior, claiming their superiority over this “lesser” group in areas that gave rise to their status anxiety in the first place. Stigma shifting, in other words, allows a stigmatized state to take the role of a stigmatizer. To demonstrate the concept's depth and analytical utility, I draw on the case of East Asia in three disparate issue areas: colonial redress, nuclear disaster, and international order making. Japan, stigmatized in all three areas, has reaffirmed its status by shifting the stigma onto its significant but “lesser” others: China and Korea. Ultimately, stigma shifting solidifies status hierarchies in the world—not just the hierarchy as represented by the “Western” dominance of international society but also the regional hierarchies of the non-Western world.

和平与利益：哥伦比亚叛军分裂与冲突再起

题目：Peace Versus Profit: Rebel Fragmentation and Conflict Resurgence in Colombia

作者：Frank Wyer，美国加利福尼亚州蒙特雷海军研究生院博士后研究员。

摘要：为什么和平进程中会出现叛军分裂组织？谁会选择叛逃？自2016年哥伦比亚政府与哥伦比亚武装力量（FARC）达成具有里程碑意义的和平协议以来，哥伦比亚革命武装力量的分裂组织重新在该组织曾控制的约一半领土上开始了叛乱活动。本文认为哥伦比亚革命武装力量重拾武器是一个“中层分裂”的案例，即牟利机会诱使中低层叛军指挥官建立分裂组织。本文认为，在哥伦比亚，可卡因贸易带来的利润促使地方哥伦比亚武装力量的军官愿意背弃和平协议，并使他们能够迅速动员有效的分裂组织。针对这一观点，本文提供了几条证据。首先，本文总结了分裂组织形成的年表，表明分裂的关键推动力是中低层指挥官而非高层指挥官。其次，本文发现在牟利机会最大的地区出现了分裂集团。自和平协议签署前至2020年，在哥伦比亚武装力量曾经控制的地区中，种植古柯的地区出现分裂团体的可能性比没有大规模种植古柯的地区高出百分之三十七。使用土壤和天气条件来衡量古柯种植情况时，也产生了类似结果。此外，本文还采用一种新的方式来衡量每个城市在毒品贩运中的重要性，以此表明，从理论的角度来看，对毒品贩运最为重要的地区更有可能出现哥伦比亚革命武装力量的复苏。本文还讨论了有关国家能力、地形与民众对叛军支持的争议性解释。这些发现凸显了和平建设面临的一个重要挑战：在牟利机会促使叛军从中层分裂的情况下，满足叛军领导层的政治要求是和平协议的一个必要但不充足的组成部分。

Why do rebel splinter groups emerge during peace processes, and who chooses to defect? Since Colombia's landmark peace agreement with the FARC in 2016, roughly half of the territory once controlled by the group has seen a resurgence of rebel activity by FARC splinter groups. I argue that the FARC's return to arms is a case of “middle-out fragmentation,” whereby opportunities for profit induce mid- or low-ranking rebel commanders to establish splinter groups. In Colombia, I argue that profits from the cocaine trade incentivized local-level FARC officers to defect from the peace agreement and allowed them to rapidly mobilize viable splinter groups. I offer several lines of evidence for this argument. I first construct a chronology of splinter group formation, which demonstrates that mid- and low-level commanders, rather than high-level commanders, were the key drivers of fragmentation. Second, I show that splinter groups emerged in areas where opportunities for profit were greatest. Among areas previously controlled by the FARC, those with coca cultivation prior to the peace agreement were up to thirty-seven percentage points more likely to see splinter groups emerge by 2020 than areas without significant production. Using soil and weather conditions to instrument for coca cultivation produces similar results. Further, I use a novel measure of how critical each municipality is to drug trafficking to show that areas that are theoretically most important for drug trafficking are also more likely to see FARC resurgence. I also address competing explanations related to state capacity, terrain, and popular support for the rebels. These findings highlight an important challenge to peacebuilding: satisfying the political demands of rebel leadership is a necessary but insufficient component of peace agreements in cases where opportunities for profit motivate fragmentation from the middle out.

全球治理中的意识形态与合法性

题目：Ideology and Legitimacy in Global Governance

作者：Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt，德国班贝格大学国际关系临时教授；Lisa Dellmuth，斯德哥尔摩大学国际关系教授，斯德哥尔摩全球治理中心联合主任；Jonas Tallberg: 斯德哥尔摩大学政治学教授，斯德哥尔摩全球治理中心联合主任。

摘要：虽然许多学者认为人们的意识形态倾向会影响他们对国际组织（IOs）合法性的看法，但研究发现对这一普遍假设的支持出奇有限。本文引入国际组织的意识形态特征，将其作为影响公民意识形态倾向与公民对国际组织合法性看法之间关系的关键因素，以解决这一难题。本文认为，从理论的角度来看，当公民认为国际组织在意识形态上更符合自己的意识形态倾向时，就会赋予国际组织更大的合法性。从实证的角度来看，本文结合来自巴西、德国、印度尼西亚和美国四个国家的的新调查证据，通过观察和和实验对这一预期进行评估。本文发现，公民确实认为国际组织具有特定的意识形态特征，这些看法系统影响了人们的意识形态倾向和其对国际组织合法性看法之间的关系。这些发现表明，政治意识形态对全球治理合法性认同的推动作用要比以往理解中的更加显著。

While many scholars expect people's ideological orientations to drive their beliefs regarding the legitimacy of international organizations (IOs), research has found surprisingly limited support for this common assumption. In this article we resolve this puzzle by introducing the perceived ideological profile of IOs as a critical factor shaping the relationship between ideological orientation and such beliefs. Theoretically, we argue that citizens accord IOs greater legitimacy when they perceive these organizations as ideologically more congruent with their own orientations. Empirically, we evaluate this expectation by combining observational and experimental analyses of new survey evidence from four countries: Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, and the United States. We find that citizens indeed perceive IOs as having particular ideological profiles and that those perceptions systematically moderate the relationship between people's ideological orientations and their sense of IOs’ legitimacy. These findings suggest that political ideology is a more powerful driver of legitimacy beliefs in global governance than previously understood.

秘密创新

题目：Secret Innovation

作者：Michael F. Joseph，加州大学圣地亚哥分校政治学助理教授；Michael Poznansky，美国海军战争学院战略与作战研究系副教授，网络与创新政策研究所核心教员。

摘要：传统观点认为，开放、协作和透明的组织具有创新性。但是，一些最激进的创新如卫星、锂碘电池和互联网，却是由国家安全机构中的秘密团队构想出来的。这些组织是因为保密而更具有创新性，还是尽管保密却依然具有创新性？本文研究了公共部门创新的委托代理模型。在初始测试和原型设计阶段为研究团队提供一个秘密选项和一个公开选项。保密有助于运用成本转嫁机制推动高风险、高回报的项目度过早期阶段。在开放部门中，由于担心政治成本，管理者不会批准针对高风险、高回报的提议进行的试点研究。研究人员利用保密性，付出更高的个人成本进行试点研究，以获得支撑项目可行性的证据并赢得管理者的批准。与标准的委托代理研究结果相反，本文的研究表明，即使研究人员的偏好与管理者的偏好完全一致，他们也可能利用保密性开展研究。而即使监控不需要付出任何代价，管理者也不会监控研究人员。本文使用冷战早期的两个案例来阐明这一理论：中央情报局试图推动精神控制研究（MKULTRA）和侦查卫星的起源(CORONA)。本文为委托代理理论的政治应用以及国家安全创新、新兴技术、民主监督、中美技术辩论和大国竞争的研究做出了贡献。

Conventional wisdom holds that open, collaborative, and transparent organizations are innovative. But some of the most radical innovations—satellites, lithium-iodine batteries, the internet—were conceived by small, secretive teams in national security agencies. Are these organizations more innovative because of their secrecy, or in spite of it? We study a principal–agent model of public-sector innovation. We give research teams a secret option and a public option during the initial testing and prototyping phase. Secrecy helps advance high-risk, high-reward projects through the early phase via a cost-passing mechanism. In open institutions, managers will not approve pilot research into high-risk, high-reward ideas for fear of political costs. Researchers exploit secrecy to conduct pilot research at a higher personal cost to generate evidence that their project is viable and win their manager's approval. Contrary to standard principal–agent findings, we show that researchers may exploit secrecy even if their preferences are perfectly aligned with their manager's, and that managers do not monitor researchers even if monitoring is costless and perfect. We illustrate our theory with two cases from the early Cold War: the CIA's attempt to master mind control (MKULTRA) and the origins of the reconnaissance satellite (CORONA). We contribute to the political application of principal–agent theory and studies of national security innovation, emerging technologies, democratic oversight, the Sino–American technology debate, and great power competition.

教育对国际贸易支持的影响：来自义务教育改革的证据

题目：The Effect of Education on Support for International Trade: Evidence from Compulsory-Education Reforms

作者：Omer Solodoch，耶路撒冷希伯来大学国际关系系助理教授。

摘要：无论哪个国家和哪个时代，受教育程度最高的人对经济全球化的支持力度最大。然而，尽管对于这种相关性的来源存在长期争论，却缺乏可靠的证据将教育的因果效应和个人接受教育的非随机性分隔开来。为了解决这一根本问题，本文研究了来自18个国家提高最低离校年龄的义务教育改革案例。通过使用模糊断点回归设计，本文发现改革带来的受教育年限的增加能够大幅度且长时间地增加个人对贸易自由化的支持。通过对学校课程内容相关的新数据进行分析，本文发现学校教育带来的影响主要源于向公民灌输的包容与多元化思想，并以此减少全球化带来的文化威胁。与之相反的是，几乎没有证据表明学校教育带来的影响反映的是国际贸易的分配后果，即区分全球化的赢家与输家。

Across countries and over time, support for economic globalization is strongest among individuals with the highest levels of education. Yet despite long-lasting debates on the sources of this correlation, reliable evidence that isolates the causal effect of education from the nonrandom selection of individuals into education is lacking. To address this fundamental issue, I exploit compulsory-schooling reforms that increased the minimum school-leaving age in eighteen countries. Employing a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I find that the reform-induced added years of education substantially and durably increased support for trade liberalization. And using new data on the content of school curricula, I find that the effect of schooling largely stems from instilling tolerance and pluralism in citizens and reducing the perceived cultural threat of globalization. In contrast, there is little evidence that the effect of schooling reflects the distributive consequences of international trade, separating globalization winners and losers.

战争法和公众对外国武装人员的支持

题目：The Laws of War and Public Support for Foreign Combatants

作者：Yonatan Lupu，乔治华盛顿大学政治学与国际事务副教授；Geoffrey P.R. Wallace，华盛顿大学政治学系教授。

摘要：实行民主制的大国公众是否更有可能认可遵守国际人道法（IHL）的外国武装人员？大量证据表明，有动机寻求外部合法者支持的武装人员更可能遵守国际人道法。然而，这些主张背后的关键机制——即民主大国更有可能向遵守国际人道法的武装人员提供支持，尚未得到直接检验。为了解决这一问题，本文在法国、英国和美国三个经常参与对外干预的民主制政体中进行的具有全国代表性的调查里嵌入了一系列实验。研究发现，与不遵守战争法的交战方相比，遵守战争法的交战方，无论其是政府军还是叛军，更有可能得到干预国公众的支持。在上述三个国家中，遵守国际法能使武装人员得到更多认可，也能够得到更多经济和军事干预的支持（尽管实验组中军事干预的支持率仍相对较低）。这一发现能够支撑如下观点：当武装人员寻求外部支持时，向其提供支持可以作为国际法约束武装斗争的一种机制。

Are publics in great power democracies more likely to approve of foreign armed combatants that comply with international humanitarian law (IHL)? There is a wealth of evidence that armed combatants with an incentive to seek the support of outside compliance constituencies are more likely to adhere to IHL. Yet a key mechanism underlying these claims—that people in great power democracies are more likely to support armed combatants that comply with IHL—has not been directly tested. We address this question using a series of experiments embedded in nationally representative surveys conducted in three democracies that have frequently been involved in foreign interventions: France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We find that belligerents—both governments and rebels—that comply with the laws of war are significantly more likely to garner support from publics in likely intervening countries compared to those who do not comply. In all three countries, compliance with international law caused greater approval of armed combatants as well as greater support for economic or military intervention (although support for military intervention remained relatively low in the treatment groups). This lends support to arguments that, to the extent combatants seek support from outside audiences, this can serve as a mechanism by which international law constrains armed combat.

选举、战争与性别：自我选择与寻求胜利

题目：Elections, War, and Gender: Self-Selection and the Pursuit of Victory

作者：Stephen Chaudoin，哈佛大学政府系助理教授；Sarah Hummel，哈佛大学政府系讲师

；Yon Soo Park，哈佛大学政府系博士生。

摘要：与男性领导人相比，为什么民主国家的女性领导人会在国家间冲突中投入更多的资金、装备、兵力以及其他资源？本文认为民主选举过程中的性别偏见有助于解释这种行为。由于女性参与竞选的成本常常高于男性，因此只有那些更看重赢得竞选的女性才会选择参选。在当选后，她还会投入更多资源以在冲突局势中寻求胜利。为了给这一观点提供微观基础证据，本文分析了一个在线实验室游戏中的数据。这个游戏是一个实时小组游戏，参与者选择参加竞选，进行简单的竞选活动，并在当选后代表自己的小组参加竞赛游戏。对获胜具有更高非金钱价值的女性更有可能自我选择成为候选人，在当选后，她们在群体间竞赛上投入的资源要比男性当选者更多。这些数据表明，在现实世界观察到的男女领导人间存在的差异中，选举抉择扮演着重要角色。

Why might female leaders of democratic countries commit more money, equipment, soldiers, and other resources to interstate conflicts than male leaders? We argue that gender bias in the process of democratic election helps explain this behavior. Since running for office is generally more costly for women than for men, only women who place a higher value on winning competitions will choose to run. After election, they also devote more resources to pursuing victory in conflict situations. To provide microfoundational evidence for this claim, we analyze data from an online laboratory game featuring real-time group play in which participants chose to run for election, conducted a simple campaign, and represented their group in a contest game if elected. Women with a higher nonmonetary value to winning were more likely to self-select into candidacy, and when victorious, they spent more resources on intergroup contests than male elected leaders. The data suggest that electoral selection plays an important role in observed differences between male and female leaders in the real world.

译者：管怡，国政学人编译员，澳门大学国际关系与公共政策专业硕士研究生，研究兴趣为国际冲突。

审校 | 赖永祯

排版 | 张可儿

本文源于《国际组织》，本文为公益分享，服务于科研教学，不代表本平台观点。如有疏漏，欢迎指正。

来源：国政学人