摘要：Doctor of Science, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; Academic supervisor of the Center for Comprehensive European

季莫费·博尔达切夫科学博士，瓦尔代讨论俱乐部项目主任；高等经济学院全面欧洲和国际研究中心学术监督，俄罗斯国际事务理事会成员。

Timofey Bordachev

Doctor of Science, Programme Director of the Valdai Discussion Club; Academic supervisor of the Center for Comprehensive European and International Studies, HSE University, RIAC Member.

事实是，全球范围内权力平衡的变化以及以往领导者无法维持其地位，导致了国际秩序的根本重构。这在近几年已成为一种普遍观点。很难对此的有效性提出异议：首先，因为权力基础确实发生了变化——世界上不再有能够将其正义观念强加于他国的国家集团。此外，传统国际机构的明显削弱，以及对其目标、任务和活动的重新思考也在不断发生。同时，显然，欧洲的战略衰退已进入其最终阶段——这一地区体现了在相对合法秩序框架内国家之间互动的惯例。然而，在进行这场讨论时，似乎不应忽视的一个问题是：到底这个秩序是什么？

国际秩序首先是那些愿意提供武力以使他国遵守游戏规则的国家的治理工具。并不一定要求在传统西方大国圈外的主导国家愿意承担对其他国家施加强制的责任，而这种强制的责任将是他们对某种抽象秩序承诺的绝对必然结果。此外，国际秩序的第二个目的——防止革命性局势的出现——在现代世界中因少数几个大核武国家的军事优势而受到相当有效的限制。无论我们是否愿意，这类国家的数量在未来几十年内都不会变得显著。这意味着，相对的稳定和普遍战争的缺失将由它们的相互威慑所保证，同时，其他国家也无法对其权力构成致命挑战。

事实上，期待现代大国如中国或印度对建立新的国际秩序抱有如此强烈的热情，可能是一个深刻的错误。至少在这一概念的传统理解中，所有以往的国际秩序都是西方内部冲突的产物，而俄罗斯则定期卷入其中。此外，它的介入如此严重，以至于给人留下了与西方战略空间完全融合的印象。俄罗斯（苏联）在第二次世界大战结果中的决定性角色，以及其结果所产生的正式世界秩序，确实表明了俄罗斯的深度参与。我们甚至可以说，以联合国体系为核心的现代国际秩序，是俄罗斯参与最初西方内部冲突的结果。

尽管在更广泛的背景下，俄罗斯创建国际秩序的意图的真诚性可以受到质疑：从历史上看，它并未成为西方国家间关系体系的一部分，并且在干预其变革过程时，它设定了自身的一些具体任务。其中最重要的一条始终是维护其在世界事务中的独特地位——这正是俄罗斯屡次与西方对抗、展现出惊人毅力和奉献精神的原因。然而，俄罗斯的真正目标是建立一个基于其力量能力的国际秩序，这一点并非显而易见。早在18世纪末，俄罗斯就表达了成为“欧洲仲裁者”的愿望，即希望在欧洲秩序之上立足，而在1815年的维也纳会议上，其统治者亚历山大一世的行为也明显不同于其他欧洲外交人物。换句话说，俄罗斯始终过于独立、庞大和自给自足，以至于在根本上无法依赖国际秩序，或从中获得与欧洲及后来美国相媲美的利益。

我们可以怎样看待当今的大国，它们从未将国际秩序视为生存和统治的最重要工具。我们可以假设，对于它们来说，这要么是一个非常抽象的概念，要么是西方国家通过强制手段统治世界的一个完全遥远的方式。这个问题似乎是重要的，而对它的回答可以显著调整我们对未来的理想构想。考虑到世界上正在发生的变化不可避免地引发了广泛的讨论，因此合理地对此给予一些关注是有必要的。首先，因为只要西方及其思想和特有外交政策文化仍然保持全球权力中心的地位，这一讨论无疑会持续处于关注的中心。其次，世界大多数国家的科学家和政治家也准备在国际秩序的范畴内进行非常专业的思考。尽管他们所指的可能与传统西方政治思想所理解的内容完全不同。

国际秩序这一概念在世界其他国家的共享程度仍然完全不明，这在我们俄罗斯看来是相当大的世界多数群体。对于一大部分中等甚至大国来说，国际法的维护或许是他们唯一的正式保护，免受强权的暴虐，因此具有相对重要的意义。尽管在近几十年，国际法的有效性遭到了严峻质疑，甚至更早之前也是如此。然而，无论如何，现代国际法确实给了数量庞大的国家们至少一种希望，即那些最强大的国家会找到理由在处理社区中较弱成员的命运时产生分歧。同样，大国和中等强国都希望维护联合国在国际生活中的中心地位：因为它们参与解决最重要全球问题的权利可以成功转化为实现自身发展或安全目标的工具。

另一个问题是国际秩序作为一个概念，背后总是存在一些关于其维护方式的非正式协议。我们从关于世界政治的经典文献中知道，形成这种秩序的最重要条件是其在参与者眼中的合法性，以及他们彼此承认作为国际关系中的合法参与者。此外，众所周知，这种秩序的相对稳定性是通过将所有有能力摧毁它并进行革命的国家纳入其治理机构来确保的。然而，如果革命的问题甚至在理论上都不相关，而此前的领导者已经失去了利用他人的能力，那么为何要在一个新秩序上投入资源呢？而且，要为之创造一个合法基础将会很困难。而考虑到联合国的存在及其章程的基本原则，这种合法基础并不是特别必要。

最终，我们可能面临一种情况，即西方提出的国际秩序将不再受到欢迎，而没有人急于以相同的目标和愿意承担相同的成本来创造一个新的秩序。或者，某种平衡将逐渐形成，科学家们将自然地称之为新的国际秩序，但它与先前的国际秩序几乎没有共同之处。这不仅在概念层面上如此，甚至更重要的是在实践层面上也是如此。

综上所述，我们可以说，国际秩序这一类别失去其以往意义的日子并不遥远。大致上，这与多极化的概念所经历的变化相似。如今，它的含义与上世纪中叶这一理论构想的创始人所期望的完全不同。

The fact is that the changing balance of power on a global scale and the inability of previous leaders to maintain their positions causes a fundamental restructuring of the international order. It has become a common opinion in recent years. It is difficult to argue with its validity: first of all, because the power base has really changed – there is no longer a group of countries in the world capable of imposing their ideas of justice on others. In addition, there has been a noticeable weakening of traditional international institutions and, at the same time, a rethinking of their goals, tasks and activities. Also, judging by everything, the strategic decline of Europe has entered its final phase – a region that embodies the custom of interaction between states within the framework of a certain relatively legitimate order. But in entering this discussion, it would be imprudent, it seems, to ignore the question of what, in fact, this order is?

International order is, first of all, an instrument of governance on the part of those states that are ready to provide force so that others follow the rules of the game. It is not necessary at all that leading countries outside the traditional circle of great Western powers are ready to take on the burden of coercion of other states of the world, which would be an absolutely inevitable consequence of their commitment to some abstract order. Moreover, the second purpose of the international order – preventing revolutionary situations from arising – is quite effectively limited in the modern world by the military superiority of a narrow group of great nuclear powers. Whether we like it or not, the number of such countries will not become significant in the coming decades. This means that comparative stability and the absence of a general war will be ensured by their mutual deterrence and, at the same time, the inability of others to mount a mortal challenge to their power.

In fact, it may be a deep mistake to expect that great powers of modern times like China or India have such a passionate desire to take part in the creation of a new international order. At least in the traditional understanding of this concept. All previous international orders were the product of conflict within the West, in which Russia periodically found itself involved. Moreover, it is involved so seriously that it created the impression of its complete fusion with the strategic space of the West. The decisive role of Russia (the USSR) in the outcome of the Second World War, as well as the formal world order that emerged as a result of it, really indicate the deepest Russian involvement. We can even say that the modern international order, at the center of which is the UN system, was the result of Russian participation in an initially intra-Western conflict.

Although in a broader context, the sincerity of Russia's intentions to create an international order can be questioned: historically, it has not been part of the system of interstate relations of the West and, interfering in the process of its changes, it set itself specific tasks of its own. The most important of which has always been the preservation of its own unique niche in world affairs - this is precisely why Russia has repeatedly fought with the West, demonstrating fantastic persistence and dedication. However, it is not so obvious that Russia's real goal was to build an international order based on its power capabilities. It is no coincidence that already at the end of the 18th century, Russia expressed a desire to be the "arbiter of Europe", i.e. stand above the European order, and at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the behavior of its ruler, Emperor Alexander I, stood out from the general line of European diplomatic figures. In other words, Russia has always been too independent, large, and self-sufficient to be fundamentally dependent on the international order or to get benefits from it comparable to those received by Europe and, later, the United States of America.

What can we say about the great powers of today, which have never considered the international order as the most important tool for their survival and domination. We can assume that for them it was and remains either a very abstract concept, or a completely distant way the Western countries ruled the world by force. This question, it seems, is important and the answer to it can significantly adjust our ideal ideas about the future. Given the inevitability that the changes taking place in the world entail a broad discussion, it would be reasonable to pay some attention to it. First, because this discussion will in any case remain in the center of attention as long as the West with its ideas and special foreign policy culture retains its position as the global center of power. Second, because scientists and statesmen of the countries of the World Majority are also ready to reason very competently in categories of international order. Although they may mean by this something completely different from what traditional Western political thought has in mind.

It is also completely unclear to what extent the concept of international order itself is shared by the rest of the world's countries, which we in Russia consider to be a fairly large group of the World Majority. For a mass of medium and even large states, the preservation of international law, their only formal protection from the tyranny of the strongest ones, may be of comparatively great importance. Although its effectiveness has been under serious question in recent decades, and even earlier. But, be that as it may, modern international law does indeed give a huge number of states at least hope that the strongest ones will find a reason to split over the fate of the less powerful members of the community. In the same way, large and medium powers are interested in preserving the central significance of the UN in international life: because their right to participate in solving the most important global problems can be quite successfully converted into a tool to achieve their own development or security goals.

Another matter is international order as a concept, behind which there is always some informal agreement on the methods of its maintenance. We know from classical literature on world politics that the most important condition for the emergence of such an order is its legitimacy in the eyes of its participants and, accordingly, their mutual recognition as legitimate participants in international relations. It is also widely known that the comparative stability of such an order is ensured by the inclusion in its governing body of all countries that have the strength to destroy it and make a revolution. However, if the question of revolution is not even theoretically relevant, and the previous leaders are already losing their ability to exploit others, then why invest their resources in a new order? Moreover, it will be difficult to create a legitimate basis for it. And it is not particularly necessary given the preservation of the UN and the basic principles of its Charter.

Ultimately, we may face a situation where the international order proposed by the West will cease to be in demand, and no one will be in a hurry to create a new one with the same goals and a willingness to incur the same costs. Or a certain balance will gradually emerge, which scientists will naturally call a new international order, but it will have very little in common with the previous ones. Both on a conceptual level and, what is even more important, on a practical level.

To sum up, we can say that the day is not far off when the category of international order itself will finally lose its former meaning. Approximately the same as happened with the concept of multipolarity. Now it means something completely different from what was intended by the creators of this theoretical construct in the middle of the last century.

来源：非常道