摘要：Deputy Director for Research at the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (IE RAS), Head of the Country Studies Departm
Vladislav Belov（弗拉迪斯拉夫·别洛夫）
俄罗斯科学院欧洲研究所（IE RAS）研究副主任、国家研究部主任、俄罗斯科学院欧洲研究所德国研究中心主任
Deputy Director for Research at the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (IE RAS), Head of the Country Studies Department, Head of the Center for German Studies at the Institute of European Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences
2024年末至2025年初，美国和欧盟及其组成实体（50个州和27个国家）的经济政治姿态出现了新的外部和内部条件。去年，主要事件发生在11月（新总统的选举，德意志联邦共和国“红绿灯”联盟的瓦解）和12月（由27名委员组成的欧盟委员会开始工作，德国提前举行议会选举）。然而，2025年1月被证明是最关键的，唐纳德·特朗普回到白宫，布鲁塞尔提出了根据马里奥·德拉吉的报告编写的“战略指南针”。指定的时期标志着跨大西洋空间两个关键角色之间战略对抗的新周期的开始。
新欧洲-大西洋经济和政治实现
雷纳·罗特福斯，尤里·科夫纳
特朗普的关税之锤和海湖庄园协议背后的战略考量
11月、12月和1月成为美欧经济和政治关系转型时代的新里程碑和新起点。华盛顿的关键内阁任命证实了特朗普重新思考美国经济优先事项的战略重点。华盛顿保护主义派系的加强具有很强的指示性。这一新政策最有影响力的缔造者之一是现任总统顾问彼得·纳瓦罗，他公开批评全球主义，主张严格重新分配全球供应链，以有利于美国制造业。同样值得注意的是特朗普第一任期的遗产——拉里·库德洛和其他“MAGA知识精英”代表的想法，他们积极推动对贸易流动的“重新控制”和植根于经济民族主义的美国再工业化。
到3月底，白宫准备了一项“互惠关税”战略——旨在“恢复国际贸易平衡”和保护国内生产商的关税制度。与此同时，特朗普支持“让美国再次富裕”（MAWA）计划，这是他的“美国优先”外交政策计划的经济版本，但强调资本和制造能力从欧盟和中国流向美国。这些措施标志着关税对抗进入了一个新阶段，可能会破坏世贸组织的原则。不出所料，这种做法在布鲁塞尔和其他欧洲国家首都引起了合理的警觉。4月2日深夜，事实证明这种焦虑是有充分理由的，特朗普发表了一份官方声明，启动了上述战略。新的关税表显示欧盟的关税被定为20%。
继7月（2024年）欧洲议会选举和行政部门组建之后，欧盟也在2024年下半年进入了制度周期的新阶段。由乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩（Ursula von der Leyen）担任主席并受到欧洲议会中间派集团影响的欧盟委员会（EC）的新组成必须立即应对来自特朗普的挑战。虽然主席和她的同事们已经提前做好了准备，但寻找适当反应的工作却大大推迟了。其中的主要原因是欧洲议会的政治分裂，强大的欧洲怀疑派的存在以及欧盟主要首都之间的协调不力。所有这些都严重阻碍了欧洲-大西洋共识的形成。
因此，在2025年第一季度，欧洲-大西洋区域新现实的轮廓已经形成。它们可以被描述为：一种对抗但不破碎的跨大西洋经济格局。在其框架内，欧盟制度正试图建立一个防御地位，而华盛顿方面则表现出对建立在保护主义基础上的经济修正主义的准备。欧洲-大西洋关系的下一阶段将在经济利益冲突和不可避免的冲突领域展开，德国在其中扮演着欧盟中心枢纽的角色。
德国：市场经济模式冲突的中心
在全球地缘经济优先事项的重塑中，德国发现自己处于两种经济和政治方式之间日益加剧的冲突的中心：美国的新保护主义和欧洲的“绿色”转型发展模式。
2023-2024年，德国工业部门呈现持续下滑，特别是在关键行业（汽车和机械工程、化工等），原因包括能源和电力成本上升、外需下降以及投资环境不确定。前几届德国政府正式支持的“绿色”转型战略，在全球生产链重新分配的背景下，在实践中被证明缺乏竞争力。
在这种背景下，华盛顿的行动——包括引入“互惠关税”和继续实施“通货膨胀减少法案”——使德国面临着进一步失去其经济堡垒竞争力的风险。德国企业，尤其是汽车和工程领域的企业，已经面临着这样的选择：要么调整自己的经济位置，以适应具有吸引力的美国司法管辖，要么放弃美国，从而失去获得关键激励和补贴的机会。从2022年开始，德国的主要企业（宝马、巴斯夫、西门子等）正在调整投资重点，不断加强美国（作为重中之重）和亚洲（主要是中国）的方向。
大约在同一时间，德国当局一直试图针对其主要的外国经济伙伴制定统一的战略对策。在第20届立法会议上，总理奥拉夫·肖尔茨对美国采取了谨慎的措辞，倾向于“安静的外交”和与前总统的“平衡关系”。然而，联邦经济事务和气候保护部长罗伯特·哈贝克（Robert habeck）积极批评了华盛顿的行动，指出了德国去工业化的风险。前财政部长林德纳（Christian Lindner）反对将大规模补贴作为德国企业支持措施的一部分，理由是需要遵守预算纪律。
在2023-2024年期间，德国领先的行业协会（BDI， DIHK， BDA等）一直在向“红绿灯”联盟施加压力，要求扩大对实体行业的支持。在他们的专家材料中，他们提到了对他们成员的“双重压力”——来自美国的补贴和国家对中国商业“扩张主义”的支持。然而，企业和政府之间的建设性对话失败了，这是联合政府在2024年11月初垮台的原因之一。
因此，在欧洲-大西洋的背景下，欧盟的经济领导者（尽管是一个“病态的”领导者）发现自己处于非常脆弱的地位。事实上，德国的“标准”实际上已经变成了大西洋两岸经济模式冲突的战场。在欧洲，美国或欧盟采取的每一项措施都会对其经济实体的活动产生直接影响。这里有一个明显的悖论：多年来一直支持贸易自由化和全球合作的德国政治家，现在被迫在维护“世界自由主义”原则和适应当前地缘政治挑战的需要之间取得平衡。
这种适应与其说是未来的问题，不如说是现在的问题。这是基民盟/基社盟和社民党正在进行的联盟谈判的一部分。然而，对于未来的内阁成员来说，问题不再是是否做出反应，而是走哪条路，和谁一起走。在这方面，前联邦议院通过《德意志联邦共和国基本法》修正案的决定，涉及改革“债务刹车”和创建两个特别基金——基础设施基金（5000亿欧元）和国防基金（4000亿欧元）——为期10年，已成为未来政府的关键问题。这意味着各种政府项目的机会大大增加，而上述各方都在努力“抢最大的一块蛋糕”。这自然会引发冲突，加剧紧张局势。然而，目前联合政府谈判的性质似乎更倾向于妥协。新政策很可能将把重点放在“标准”的现代化和应对外部挑战上，包括特朗普4月倡议引发的全球价值链转型。
欧盟：适应战略和内部鸿沟
安德烈·科尔图诺夫：
美国新关税能否引发全球经济结构性变化？
欧盟对美国产业振兴和保护主义战略的回应既复杂又矛盾。欧盟通过引入竞争力指南针计划进入2025年，该计划包括德拉吉9月（2024年）报告中的主要建议。这份战略文件包含了关于巩固工业基础、加快数字化转型、扩大可再生能源使用、减少欧盟在关键领域对第三国依赖的总体规定。这些大多是好的意图，其效果仍然有限。
法国、意大利、西班牙和葡萄牙都积极倡导工业现代化，包括支持“绿色”和数字产业，这些国家都指出了本国产业结构的脆弱性。德国、荷兰、奥地利和北欧国家表现出更大的克制，坚持要求遵守《马斯特里赫特条约》的标准，并限制新增债务。
埃马纽埃尔·马克龙（Emmanuel Macron）将法国视为欧盟经济主权的保卫者，大力支持“购买欧洲货法案”的想法，并坚持建立类似于美国IRA的机制（例如，在招标和补贴分配方面优先考虑欧洲公司）。然而，德法两国之间存在着潜在的冲突。例如，柏林担心欧盟的活动会重复，并将支持计划的重心转移到南方国家。
波兰的行政部门近几个月来一直处于过渡阶段，它表明愿意支持欧洲的团结，同时要求为欧盟的东欧成员国制定一些补偿机制，以促进它们的工业部门。波罗的海国家和捷克共和国强调安全，增加国防开支，而不是经济支持。
欧盟正在制定关税和反补贴政策，以保护其敏感的经济部门（如电动汽车和太阳能电池板）。2024年，欧委会多次开展调查，加强了对军民两用技术的出口管制。然而，鉴于欧洲政治空间的内部分裂，这些措施并不总是得到欧盟成员国的一致支持。
在这里，出现了一个矛盾的局面：在努力与美国和中国在“地缘经济三角”中竞争的同时，欧盟继续表现出制度过载和政治惰性的迹象。欧盟委员会层面的决定执行缓慢，并面临欧盟理事会内部的反对。国家利益的分歧（例如法国和德国之间）阻碍了已经商定的措施的实施。
至于布鲁塞尔和欧盟主要国家对美国征收镜像关税的决定的反应，是保留和谨慎的，但有原则。乌尔苏拉·冯德莱恩在参加在撒马尔罕举行的国际论坛时表示，“有必要维护全球贸易规则”，强调欧盟“不会屈服于经济勒索”，但愿意进行对话。肖尔茨说，“美国采取的单边措施破坏了信任，对全球经济构成威胁。”马克龙呼吁“立即以七国集团的形式进行讨论”，而意大利总理乔治娅·梅洛尼指出，“回应应该是团结的，但不是情绪化的。”两位领导人强调，美国的措施让人们对跨大西洋经济伙伴关系的未来产生了怀疑。
因此，欧盟在被迫的经济和政治动员下进入2025年，其中全球竞争力的斗争与内部预算以及制度和政治差异相结合。欧盟是否能够利用其计划促进实际增长是一个悬而未决的问题，尤其是在美国和中国的压力越来越大的情况下。
美国：保护主义国家主义的回归
随着唐纳德·特朗普于2025年1月上台，美国的经济政策最终形成了一种严格的保护主义范式，其基石是上述“互惠关税”倡议，新政府正式将其作为“恢复公平”国际贸易的关键工具。总而言之，对美国产品征收比美国更高关税的国家自动受到“镜像关税壁垒”。特朗普和他的顾问们的这种主观逻辑（寻找合理的经济推理是错误的）取代了世贸组织的原则和规则，对合作伙伴施加了双边和多边压力，主要是欧盟成员国和中国。
纳瓦罗（Peter Navarro）和哈塞特（Kevin Hassett）重返总统经济顾问核心圈子的同时，美国对欧盟发表了更强硬的言论，暗示欧盟存在潜在的保护主义、行政壁垒和对美国公司的歧视。与此同时，美国还威胁要对进口汽车、药品和半导体征收25%的关税。
与之并行的是“让美国再次富裕”（MAWA）信条——这是特朗普第二个总统任期的经济基础。这一理论的重点是美国的再工业化，制造业能力从国外回归，加强国内需求和关键部门的自主权。到2030年，激励措施的总额预计将达到1.5万亿美元。重点领域包括电池工业、微电子、飞机、造船和绿色技术。
“美国制造”的标签再次被宣布为当前特朗普经济战略的优先事项之一。外国直接投资（包括来自欧盟的投资）在形式上受到欢迎，但受制于严格的条件。首先，这涉及到整个生产周期在美国国内的本地化，并符合技术转让要求。在这方面，国会扩大了支持国内生产的措施，包括税收优惠，优先获得联邦基础设施招标，以及为能源、微电子、造船、航空和“绿色技术”等战略部门的公司提供优惠贷款。
2025年2月，作为加强投资主权的一部分，成立了投资协议审查机构间委员会，以更新外国投资者进入美国市场的条件。特别是，在投资者-国家争端解决机制（ISDS）框架内，将允许外国企业向美国提出仲裁要求的条款从协议中排除的问题成为焦点。
自2025年初以来，白宫一直在加大对包括欧盟在内的美国盟友的压力。特朗普明确指出了他的立场——“我们不再需要那些通过在本国创造盈余、在我们国家去工业化来从我们身上赚钱的合作伙伴。”
美国政府的经济和政治议程伴随着彻底修改国际贸易结构的尝试。美国实际上已经放弃了对WTO争端解决机制的参与，并正在发展平行的贸易和投资联盟，主要是与印度、巴西、越南、沙特阿拉伯和墨西哥等全球南方的个别国家。美国正在努力成为只对美国有利的全球经济结构的建筑师，而不仅仅是担保人。在这种模式下，“集体”西方的欧洲部分变成了竞争对手，而不是合作伙伴，这要么是为了适应“美国”或者退出受美国影响的经济特区。显然，这不仅是美国的全球贸易优势，而且是未来全球化规则的制定权。
欧洲的应对：在战略本能与制度犹豫之间
阿特姆·索科洛夫
坚持下去？弗里德里希•梅尔茨将把德国外交政策引向何方
迄今为止，欧盟对美国贸易保护主义卷土重来的反应是支离破碎的。尽管欧盟领导人一再声明有必要制定共同的经济和产业政策，但在实践中，各国利益仍然占主导地位，导致在重大问题上存在分歧。这完全适用于对美国倡议（关税，MAWA）的可能回应的讨论。
在制度层面，目前欧盟委员会继续创建战略自治机制，包括引入类似于美国的优先采购制度，成立主权投资基金，扩大贸易保护工具，以及加强对中国和美国的反补贴政策。然而，由于“欧洲同志”之间缺乏共识，前进仍然困难。
埃马纽埃尔·马克龙在这方面采取了最积极的立场，呼吁形成全面的经济主权和财政改革，为新的产业政策提供资金。法国认为，当前的跨大西洋挑战是“以法国方式”重塑欧盟模式的“机会之窗”。
德国则持更为谨慎的态度。当德国工业代表（尤其是汽车行业的代表）对美国的关税发出警告时，奥拉夫·肖尔茨（Olaf Scholz）领导的技术官僚政府继续以外交辞令为由，指出有必要避免贸易战。罗伯特•哈贝克（Robert Habeck）强调了维护多边贸易体系和世贸组织作用的重要性（尽管布鲁塞尔本身正越来越多地试图绕过这一结构）。
意大利和西班牙支持法国的倡议，但要求公平分配资源，并在实施财政规则方面具有灵活性。东欧国家，尤其是波兰和捷克共和国，担心工业计划可能导致资源集中在欧盟老成员国手中，巴黎和柏林的国家保护主义限制了波兰和捷克共和国的竞争机会和优势。
欧洲议会没有统一的立场，一些议员要求立即对美国做出强硬回应，包括对美国的补贴实施镜像关税和制裁。然而，议会决议不具有约束力，更多的是作为组织公众压力的信号，而不是制定任何具体战略的愿望。
截至4月初，针对“第二个特朗普”的“欧洲综合应对”还只是在制定之中。到目前为止，由于工具正在开发中，只能看出该战略的部分轮廓。然而，布鲁塞尔实施这些措施的政治意愿遇到了制度障碍和欧盟成员国经济模式的差异。在这方面，来自商业协会和行业工会的压力越来越大，因为他们要求布鲁塞尔不仅仅是空洞的声明，而是具体的保护措施和投资。
显然，欧盟又一次站在十字路口，一方面是希望实现战略自治，另一方面是担心分裂成员国之间的团结。结果将在很大程度上取决于主要国家（主要是巴黎和柏林）找到中间解决方案的能力，以及新一届欧盟委员会（European Commission）的立场。在这方面，保持怀疑的观点是非常合适的。
中国作为第三大国：战略平衡与不对称反应
在美国和欧盟的经济对抗中，中国正日益成为“第三大国”，不寻求参与冲突升级，而是利用这种情况来促进自己的利益。随着华盛顿回归开放的保护主义政策，布鲁塞尔在自治和跨大西洋忠诚之间摇摆，北京正在增加其战略灵活性，并采取同时施压和“诱惑/诱惑”的不对称政策。
中国2024-2025年的外交政策措辞强调需要多边主义、世贸组织改革以及不允许“新集团逻辑”。然而，宣言的背后是务实的步骤：加强与欧洲国家，特别是德国和法国的双边关系，在“一带一路”倡议的框架内发展欧亚大陆的物流基础设施，以及与南欧和东欧国家的新投资形式
2024年3月，北京接待了巴伐利亚总理兼基社盟主席马库斯Söder， 4月接待了总理奥拉夫·肖尔茨，6月接待了副总理罗伯特·哈贝克和数字化与交通部长沃尔克·维辛，10月接待了由副总理休伯特·艾旺格率领的巴伐利亚商业代表团。访问期间，双方还签署了绿色能源、汽车制造和高校交流等领域的合作文件。这是中国为欧洲提供另一种合作模式的一个例子；没有思想要求，但整体经济效率高。
北京也在积极回应美国限制中国贸易和投资的企图。中国的应对措施包括加大自身的补贴压力，发展出口控制机制，限制稀土材料，以及加强国内技术自主项目。因此，中国正在表明，它不仅有能力适应新的格局，而且有能力影响其参数的形成。
中国外交特别注重加强与全球南方国家的关系，提升中国作为西方主导地位的对立面的形象。这使得中国不仅将自己定位为欧盟-美国关系的参与者。冲突中，也要作为“全球仲裁者”和另类发展道路的领导者。
尽管布鲁塞尔试图收紧反补贴控制，但“中央王国”在整个2024年继续对欧洲进行直接投资。通过向欧洲经济投资，中国表明了与当地企业合作的意愿。然而，欧洲企业与中国合作的利益并不总是与欧盟委员会的政策一致。
中国不寻求在跨大西洋冲突中“火上浇油”。中国的战略可以归结为建设性地将自己的利益融入美国和欧盟之间的“关系裂痕”。北京似乎和华盛顿一样，押注于一个“分裂的欧洲”及其个别务实的合作伙伴，尤其是在欧盟的“老”工业化国家，同时寻求一个全球调解人的积极形象。
在这种背景下，北京的做法可以被描述为“另一个中国警告”：后退一步，前进三步，一个让步——四个新的条件；口头上是为了合作，实际上是为了重组全球经济秩序。“天上帝国”有足够的回旋余地，特别是在布鲁塞尔目前犹豫不决和华盛顿咄咄逼人的单边主义的背景下。
可能的情况和战略影响：锤子和铁砧之间的欧盟
人民币国际化战略中的中国去美元化机制。RIAC报告
随着世界进入唐纳德•特朗普（Donald Trump）第二任总统时代，它发现自己处于地缘经济和体制不稳定的状态。直到最近，欧盟还试图保持其作为全球“监管者”和多边主义守护者的角色，但它越来越不是作为一个战略参与者，而是作为一个外部参与者利益冲突的舞台，并对欧盟施加了相当大的压力。这种压力首先来自美国和中国，而欧洲“标准”的内部问题又进一步加剧了这种压力。在目前的背景下，欧盟及其短期和中期发展轨迹有三种可能的情况。
场景1：跨大西洋动员
假设外部压力继续存在，欧盟、德国和法国（首先）将最终决定推进机构整合。一个可能的触发因素是新一轮的互惠保护主义措施（作为引入报复性关税的结果），威胁到主要的欧盟出口商。在这种情况下，建立一个欧洲主权基金来支持工业项目和扩大欧洲委员会在工业和贸易政策领域的权力的想法可能会重新焕发生机。然而，这需要欧盟委员会（European Commission）方面的建设性举措，以及至少六到七个欧盟主要经济体（包括意大利、波兰和西班牙）政治机构的支持。主要的风险将是欧盟内部可能加剧的离心过程和与美国的关系恶化
场景2：分裂的欧洲
2025-2027年，欧洲空间的部分碎片化可能是最现实的。欧盟主要成员国在应对外部挑战时将倾向于采取自己的策略。德国和荷兰将维持对美国和中国的出口依赖，但将在一定程度上减少参与欧盟的集体行动。法国将专注于加强战略自治的要素，而意大利和东欧国家将倾向于在布鲁塞尔和华盛顿之间保持平衡。因此，欧盟将有机会保留其外部工具，但将失去机构协调的效率。公司的投资策略可能会变得更加以国家为导向，在欧洲形成一种“马赛克”式的经济政策。
场景3：战略三角结构
布鲁塞尔正押注于欧盟-美国内部的进一步自治。中美三角形。在这样做的过程中，它将试图把自己塑造成一个能够放大美中分歧的仲裁者。如果它对欧盟预算机制进行改革，调动其工业和国防潜力，并加强数字主权，它将能够做到这一点。如果主要欧盟国家（主要是德国和法国）的政治周期发生变化，新一代亲欧实用主义者出现，就不排除出现这种情况。从长远来看，这种情况可能是最可接受的，也是欧盟领导层及其成员国经过战略验证的道路。主要的挑战是实现高度的政治意愿和协商一致意见，以使其具有具体的内容。
着眼于特朗普第二任期所定义的战略地缘政治后果，可以强调以下几点：
-欧盟和美国之间不再有坚定不移的忠诚。跨大西洋关系正进入一个实用主义和参与者技术能力分工的阶段
-中国将利用欧盟的优柔寡断和美国的政治激进主义，加强其作为全球稳定器/调解人的角色
-欧盟面临着重新评估其产业模式、贸易政策和数字主权原则的需要，否则就有可能成为相互竞争的全球中坚力量的经济附属物
-德国作为欧盟的中坚力量，处于独特的地位。要么引领重新启动欧洲经济结构，要么被卷入美中竞争，在条款上的选择有限。
无论如何，未来的跨大西洋关系不会给美国和欧盟的经济和政治参与者带来舒适的条件。然而，它确实为欧洲重新思考其在西方集体中的全球经济和政治角色提供了机会。目前欧洲-大西洋关系中的僵局与其说是关于民族国家，不如说是关于新兴的宏观经济空间及其相互竞争的经济模式——主要生产要素以及规范、标准和发展模式的全球定义。
Late in 2024 – early 2025, new external and internal conditions for the economic-political postures of the United States and the European Union, as well as their constituent entities (50 states and 27 countries) were burgeoning. Last year, the main events took place in November (election of the new old president, collapse of the “traffic light” coalition in the Federal Republic of Germany) and December (the European Commission now made up of 27 Commissioners setting to work, early parliamentary elections ruled in Germany). However, it was January 2025 that proved most crucial, with Donald Trump returning to the White House and Brussels presenting the “Strategic Compass,” prepared based off Mario Draghi’s report. The designated period marked the beginning of a new cycle of strategic confrontation between the two key actors in the transatlantic space.
New Euro-Atlantic Economic and Political Realities
Rainer Rothfuss, Yuri Kofner:
Trump’s Tariff Hammer and the Strategic Calculus Behind the Mar-a-Lago Accord
November, December and January became new milestones and starting points for the era of transformation in US-EU economic and political relations. Washington’s key cabinet appointments confirmed Trump’s strategic focus on rethinking US economic priorities. The strengthening of the protectionist faction in Washington is quite indicative. One of the most influential architects of this new policy is current presidential adviser Peter Navarro, who openly criticizes globalism and advocates strict redistribution of global supply chains in favor of the U.S. manufacturing industry. Also notable is the legacy of Trump’s first term—the ideas of Larry Kudlow and other representatives of the “MAGA-intellectual elite,” who actively promoted “regaining of control” over trade flows and U.S. reindustrialization rooted in economic nationalism.
By the end of March, the White House prepared a “Reciprocal Tariffs” strategy—a tariff regime aimed at “restoring the balance in international trade” and protecting domestic producers. In parallel, Trump supported the “Make America Wealthy Again” (MAWA) initiative—an economic version of his “America First” foreign policy program, but with an emphasis on the flow of capital and manufacturing capacity from the EU and China back to the United States. These measures marked the beginning of a new phase in tariff confrontation, potentially undermining WTO principles. As expected, this approach caused justifiable alarm in Brussels and other European capitals. In the late evening of April 2, such anxiety proved well-funded, as Trump put out an official statement, launching the above-mentioned strategy. New tables presented mirror tariffs and for the EU, they were set at 20%.
After the July (2024) elections in the European Parliament (EP) and the formation of the executive branch, the EU also entered a new phase of the institutional cycle in the second half of 2024. The renewed composition of the European Commission (EC), chaired by Ursula von der Leyen and influenced by the centrist bloc of the EP, had to immediately respond to the challenges from Trump. Although the chairwoman and her colleagues had been preparing for them in advance, the search for adequate responses was significantly delayed. Among the main reasons is the political fragmentation in the EP, the presence of strong Eurosceptic factions and poor coordination between the key EU capitals. All of this has significantly hampered the shaping of the Euro-Atlantic consensus.
Thus, in the first quarter of 2025, the contours of a new reality in the Euro-Atlantic region took shape. They can be characterized as follows: a confrontational but not broken transatlantic economic landscape. Within its framework, EU institutions are trying to build a defensive position, while Washington demonstrates readiness for economic revisionism built on protectionism. The next stage of Euro-Atlantic relations will unfold in the realm of clashing economic interests and inevitable conflicts, where Germany plays the role of the European Union’s central hub.
Germany: The Epicenter of Clashing Market Economy Models
Amid the global reshaping of geoeconomic priorities, Germany finds itself at the center of a mounting collision between two economic and political approaches: U.S. neo-protectionism and the European model of “green” transformational development.
In 2023-2024, the German industrial sector continued to show a steady decline, especially in key industries (automotive and mechanical engineering, chemicals, etc.) The reasons include rising energy and electricity costs, falling external demand, and an uncertain investment environment. The “green” transition strategy, formally supported by the previous German governments, in practice turned out to be uncompetitive amid the global redistribution of production chains [1].
In this context, Washington’s actions—including the introduction of “Reciprocal Tariffs” and the continued implementation of the “Inflation Reduction Act”—keep Germany at risk of further loss of its economic stronghold’s competitiveness. German companies, especially in the automotive and engineering sectors, have already been faced with the choice of adapting their economic locations to the attractive jurisdiction of the U.S. or abandoning it, hence losing access to key incentives and subsidies. Starting in 2022, the leading German concerns (BMW, BASF, Siemens, etc.) are revising investment priorities, consistently strengthening U.S. (as a top-priority) and Asian (primarily Chinese) directions.
Around the same time, the German authorities have been trying to develop a unified strategic response regarding their main foreign economic partner. During the 20th Legislature, Chancellor Olaf Scholz used cautious rhetoric towards the U.S., preferring “quiet diplomacy” and “balanced relations” with the former president. However, Robert Habeck—Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Protection—actively criticized Washington’s actions, pointing to the risk of German deindustrialization. Former Finance Minister Christian Lindner opposed large-scale subsidies as part of Germany’s business support measures, citing the need for budget discipline.
Leading German industry trade associations (BDI, DIHK, BDA, etc.) during 2023–2024 were consistently dialed up pressure on the “traffic light” coalition to expand support for the real sector [2]. In their expert materials, they mentioned the “double pressure” on their members—both from the U.S. subsidies and state support for Chinese business “expansionism.” However, a constructive dialogue between businesses and government failed, which was one of the reasons for the coalition’s collapse in early November 2024.
Thus, the economic leader (albeit a “sick” one) of the European Union in the Euro-Atlantic context found itself in a very vulnerable position. In fact, the German “Standort” was actually turning into a battleground for conflicting transatlantic economic models—U.S. and European—where every measure taken by the U.S. or the EU is fraught with instant consequences for the activities of its economic entities. There is a clear paradox: German statesmen, who for many years have stood up for trade liberalization and global cooperation, are now forced to balance between preserving the principles of “ordoliberalism” and the need to adapt to current geopolitical challenges.
Such adaptation is not so much a problem of the future as of the present. It is being discussed as part of the ongoing coalition negotiations between the CDU/CSU and the SPD. The question, however, for the members of the future Cabinet is no longer whether to react or not, but which way to go and with whom. In this regard, the decision of the former Bundestag to adopt amendments to the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, related to the reform of the “debt brake” and the creation of two special funds—for infrastructure (500 billion euros) and defense (400 billion euros)—for 10 years, has become a crucial issue for the future government. This means a significant expansion of opportunities for various government programs, where each of the above-mentioned parties is trying to “grab the biggest piece of the pie.” Naturally, this sparks conflict and heightens tensions. However, the nature of the current coalition negotiations seems to point more towards a likely compromise. The new policy will most likely combine an emphasis on the modernization of the “Standort” and on a response to external challenges, including the transformation of global value chains caused by Trump’s April initiatives.
The European Union: Adaptation Strategies and Internal Chasms
Andrey Kortunov:
Can U.S. New Tariffs Trigger Structural Changes in Global Economy?
The European Union’s search for answers to the U.S. industrial revitalization and protectionism strategy has been complex and contradictory. The EU entered the year 2025 by introducing the Competitiveness Compass program, which included the main proposals of the September (2024) report by Draghi [3]. The strategic document contains general provisions on the consolidation of the industrial base, accelerating digital transformation, expanding the use of renewable energy sources, and reducing EU dependence on third countries in key sectors. These are mostly good intentions, the effect of which is still limited.
Industrial modernization, including the support for “green” and digital industries, is actively advocated by France, Italy, Spain and Portugal, all whom cite the vulnerability of their industrial structures. Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and the Nordic nations show more restraint, insisting on compliance with the Maastricht criteria and limiting new debt.
Emmanuel Macron views France as a guarantor of the EU’s economic sovereignty, vigorously supporting the idea of the Buy European Act and insisting on creating mechanisms similar to the U.S. IRA (e.g. giving priority to European companies in tenders and the distribution of subsidies). Nevertheless, there is a potential for conflict within the German-French tandem. For example, Berlin fears for the duplication of EU activities and shifting the center of gravity in support plans towards southern countries.
Poland, whose executive branch has been undergoing a transitional phase in recent months, demonstrates its readiness to support European solidarity, demanding at the same time the development of some compensation mechanisms for Eastern European members of the EU to promote their industrial sectors. The Baltic states and the Czech Republic emphasize security and increased defense spending over economic support.
The EU is building tariff and anti-subsidy policies to protect its own sensitive economic sectors (e.g., electric vehicles and solar panels). In 2024, the European Commission conducted several investigations and strengthened export controls on dual-use technologies. However, given the internal fragmentation of the European political space, these steps have not always enjoyed the unanimous support of EU member countries.
Here, arises a paradoxical situation: while striving to compete with the U.S. and China within the “geo-economic triangle,” the EU continues to show signs of institutional overload and political inertia. Decisions taken at the level of the European Commission face slow implementation and opposition within the EU Council. The divergence of national interests (e.g. between France and Germany) hinders the implementation of already agreed-upon measures.
As for the reaction of Brussels and key EU capitals to the U.S. decision to impose mirror tariffs, it was reserved and cautious, but principled. Ursula von der Leyen, while attending the international forum in Samarkand, stated “the need to preserve the rules of global trade,” emphasizing that the EU “will not give in to economic blackmail,” but is open to dialogue. Scholz said that “unilateral steps taken by the United States undermine trust and pose a threat to the global economy.” Macron called for “an immediate discussion in the G7 format,” while Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni noted, “the response should be united, but not emotional.” The leaders emphasized that the U.S. measures cast doubt on the future of the transatlantic economic partnership.
Thus, the EU has entered 2025 under forced economic and political mobilization, wherein the struggle for global competitiveness is coupled with internal budgetary, as well as institutional and political discrepancies. Whether the EU will be able to leverage its programs for boosting real growth is an open question, especially amid growing pressure from the U.S. and China.
The United States: The Return of a Protectionist National Doctrine
With Donald Trump’s accession to power in January 2025, the economic policy of the United States finally took shape as a rigidly protectionist paradigm, its cornerstone being the aforementioned “Reciprocal Tariffs” initiative, officially presented by the new administration as a key tool for “restoring fairness” in international trade. All in all, nations imposing higher duties on U.S. products than the U.S. does on their goods automatically receive “mirror tariff barriers.” This subjective logic of Trump and his advisers (it would be a mistake to look for sound economic reasoning) replaces the principles and rules of the WTO with bilateral and multilateral pressure being placed on partners, primarily EU member states and China.
The return of Peter Navarro and Kevin Hassett to the inner circle of the President’s economic advisers was accompanied by harder rhetoric against the EU, hinting at hidden protectionism, administrative barriers and discrimination against U.S. companies. In the meantime, threats were made to impose 25 percent tariffs on imports of automobiles, pharmaceuticals and semiconductors.
Parallelly promoted is the “Make America Wealthy Again” (MAWA) doctrine—the economic basis of Trump’s second presidential term. This doctrine is focused on U.S. reindustrialization, the return of manufacturing capacity from abroad, strengthening domestic demand and autonomy in key sectors. The total amount of incentivizing measures is estimated at USD 1.5 trillion by 2030. Key areas include the battery industry, microelectronics, aircraft, shipbuilding and green technology.
The “Made in USA” label is once again proclaimed as one of the priorities for the current Trump economic strategy. Foreign direct investments, including those from the EU, are formally welcomed, but are subject to strict conditions. First of all, this relates to the localization of the entire production cycle inside the U.S. and compliance with technology transfer requirements. In this regard, Congress has expanded measures to support domestic production, including tax incentives, priority access to federal infrastructure tenders, as well as preferential lending for companies working in strategic sectors—energy, microelectronics, shipbuilding, aviation and “green technologies.”
In February 2025, as part of reinforcing investment sovereignty, the Interagency Committee for the Review of Investment Agreements was formed to update the conditions for the access of foreign investors to the U.S. market. In particular, the issue of excluding provisions from the agreements that allow arbitration claims against the U.S. by foreign companies within the framework of the ISDS (Investor-State Dispute Settlement) mechanism came to the fore.
Since the beginning of 2025, the White House has consistently increased pressure on US allies, including the European Union. Trump has clearly designated his position—“we no longer need partners who make money on us by creating a surplus in their home jurisdictions and deindustrialization in our country.”
The economic and political agenda of the U.S. administration is accompanied by attempts to completely revise the structure of international trade. The U.S. has de facto abandoned its participation in WTO dispute settlement mechanisms and is developing parallel trade and investment alliances, mainly with individual countries of the Global South such as India, Brazil, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia and Mexico. Washington is trying to become an architect of a global economic structure favorable only to the U.S., rather than simply being a guarantor. In this model, the European part of the “collective” West turns out to be a competitor rather than a partner, which is required either to adapt to “U.S. rules” or withdraw from the economic zones under U.S influence. It is obvious that the U.S. has put at stake not only its global trade superiority, but also the right to set the rules of future globalization.
Europe’s Response: Between Strategic Instinct and Institutional Hesitance
Artem Sokolov:
Keeping It Up? Where Friedrich Merz Will Take Germany’s Foreign Policy
The European Union’s response to the return of U.S. protectionism has so far been fragmented. Although EU leaders have repeatedly stated the need for a common economic and industrial policy, national interests continue to dominate in practice, causing disagreements over major issues. This fully applies to the discussion of possible responses to the US initiatives (tariffs, MAWA).
At the institutional level, the current European Commission continues to create strategic autonomy mechanisms, including the introduction of analogues to the U.S. priority procurement system, the formation of a sovereign investment fund, the expansion of trade protection instruments, in addition to the intensification of anti-subsidy policies towards China and the U.S. However, moving forward remains difficult, also due to the lack of consensus among the “European comrades.”
Emmanuel Macron has taken the most proactive stance in this regard, calling for the formation of full-fledged economic sovereignty and fiscal reforms to finance a new industrial policy. France sees the current transatlantic challenge as a “window of opportunity” for reformatting the EU model itself “in the French way.”
Germany holds to a more cautious approach. While German industry representatives (especially in the automotive sector) are expressing alarm over U.S. tariffs, the technocratic government of Olaf Scholz continues to diplomatically cite the need to avoid a trade war. Robert Habeck emphasizes the importance of preserving the multilateral trading system and the role of the WTO (although Brussels itself is increasingly trying to circumvent this structure).
Italy and Spain support the French initiative but demand a fair distribution of resources and flexibility in the application of fiscal rules. Eastern European nations, especially Poland and the Czech Republic, are concerned that industrial programs may lead to the centralization of resources in the hands of the old EU member states, with the national protectionism of Paris and Berlin curbing the competitive chances and advantages of Poland and Czech Republic.
There is no unified position in the European Parliament, where some deputies demand an immediate and tough response to the United States, including the introduction of mirror tariffs and sanctions against U.S. subsidies. However, EP resolutions are non-binding and more often serve as a signal to organize public pressure rather than the desire to develop any specific strategy.
As of early April, the “European comprehensive response” to the “second Trump” is still only being formulated. So far, only partial outlines of the strategy can be discerned as tools are being developed. However, the political will of Brussels to implement them bumps against institutional barriers and differences in the economic models of EU member states. In this regard, the pressure from business associations and industry unions is growing, as they demand from Brussels not just empty declarations, but concrete protective measures and investments.
Clearly, the EU is once again at a crossroads between the desire for strategic autonomy and the fear of splitting the unity among its member states. The outcome will largely depend on the ability of key capitals, primarily Paris and Berlin, to find middle-ground solutions, as well as on the position of the new European Commission. In this respect, maintaining a skeptical viewpoint would be quite appropriate.
China as a Third Power: Strategic Balance and Asymmetric Response
Amid the economic confrontation between the U.S. and the EU, China is increasingly emerging as a “third power,” seeking not participation in conflict escalation, but rather to use the situation to promote its own interests. With Washington returning to open protectionism policies and Brussels oscillating between autonomy and transatlantic loyalty, Beijing is increasing its strategic flexibility and pursuing an asymmetric policy of simultaneous pressure and “temptation/seduction.”
China’s foreign policy rhetoric in 2024–2025 emphasizes the need for multilateralism, WTO reform, and the inadmissibility of “new bloc logic.” However, behind the declarations are pragmatic steps: the intensification of bilateral ties with European nations, especially Germany and France, the development of logistics infrastructure on the Eurasian continent within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as new investment formats with Southern European and Eastern European countries.
It is indicative that in March 2024, Beijing hosted Bavarian Prime Minister and Chairman of the CSU Markus Söder, in April—Chancellor Olaf Scholz, in June—Vice Chancellor Robert Habeck and Minister of Digitalization and Transport Volker Wissing, and in October—a Bavarian business delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Hubert Aiwanger. The visits were accompanied by the signing of documents on cooperation in the fields of green energy, automobile manufacturing and university exchanges. This is an example of how China offers Europe an alternative cooperative model; one without ideological requirements, but with overall high economic efficiency [4].
Beijing is also actively responding to U.S. attempts to restrict Chinese trade and investment. The response includes increasing its own subsidy pressure, developing export control mechanisms, restrictions on rare earth materials, and strengthening domestic programs on technological autonomy. China is thus demonstrating that it is capable not only of adapting to the new configuration, but also of influencing the formation of its parameters.
Chinese diplomacy pays special attention to strengthening ties with the Global South, promoting Beijing’s image as the antipode of Western dominance. This allows China to position itself not just as a participant in the EU-U.S. conflict, but also as a “global arbiter” and leader of an alternative development path.
Despite Brussels’ attempts to tighten anti-subsidy controls, the “Middle Kingdom” continued making direct investments into Europe throughout 2024. By investing their capital in the European economy, China demonstrated its willingness to partner with local businesses. However, European company interests on cooperation with China do not always align with the policies of the European Commission.
China does not seek to “add fuel to the fire” of the transatlantic conflict. Its strategy comes down to constructively building its interests into the “fissures in relations” between the U.S. and the EU. It seems that Beijing, like Washington, is betting on a “divided Europe” and its individual pragmatic partners, especially in the “old” industrialized countries of the EU, while seeking a positive image of a global moderator.
In this context, Beijing’s approach can be described as “another Chinese warning”: one step back—three steps forward, one concession—four new conditions; verbally—for cooperation, practically—for the reassembly of the global economic order. The “Celestial Empire” has had enough room for maneuver, especially in the midst of Brussels’ current indecisiveness and Washington’s aggressive unilateralism.
Possible Scenarios and Strategic Implications: EU Between Hammer and Anvil
China’s De-dollarization Mechanisms within the Yuan Internationalization Strategy. RIAC Report
As the world enters the era of Donald Trump’s second presidency, it finds itself in a state of geoeconomic and institutional instability. The EU, which until recently tried to hold on to its role as global “regulator” and guardian of multilateralism, is increasingly operating not as a strategic actor, but as an arena where the interests of external players are clashing and exerting considerable pressure on the Union. This pressure comes above all from the U.S. and China, and is further exacerbated by the internal problems of the European “Standort”. In the current context, there are three possible scenarios for European Union and its development trajectories in the short and medium term.
Scenario 1: Transatlantic Mobilization
Assuming the continuation of external pressure, the EU, Germany and France—firstly—will finally decide to go forward with institutional consolidation. A possible trigger could be a new round of reciprocal protectionist measures (as a consequence of introducing retaliatory tariffs), threatening key EU exporters. In this case, the idea of creating a European Sovereignty Fund to support industrial projects and to enlarge the powers of the European Commission in the field of industrial and trade policy is likely to be brought back to life. However, this requires constructive initiatives on the part of the European Commission and the support of the political establishment from at least six to seven major EU economies, including Italy, Poland and Spain. The main risk will be the possible intensification of centrifugal processes within the EU and deterioration of its relations with the U.S.
Scenario 2: Fragmented Europe
Partial fragmentation of the European space may be most realistic in 2025-2027. Major EU member states will prefer their own tactics in responding to external challenges. Germany and the Netherlands will maintain their export dependence on the U.S. and China but will somewhat minimize their participation in the EU’s collective actions. France will focus on strengthening elements of its strategic autonomy, while Italy and Eastern European nations will prefer to balance between Brussels and Washington. As a result, the EU will have chances to preserve its external instruments but will lose efficiency in institutional coordination. Company investment strategies may become more nationally-oriented, creating in Europe a “mosaic” of its economic policies.
Scenario 3: Strategic Triangular Structure
Brussels is staking on the further autonomization within the EU-U.S.-China triangle. In doing so, it will try to cast itself as an arbiter capable of playing up the divisions between the U.S. and China. It will be able to do this if it carries out reforms in the EU budgetary mechanism, mobilizes its industrial and defense potential, and strengthens digital sovereignty. Such a scenario is not excluded if the political cycle changes in key EU countries, primarily in Germany and France, with a new generation of pro-European pragmatists emerging. Such a scenario may be the most acceptable in the long term and a strategically verified path for the EU leadership and its member states. The main challenge is to achieve a high level of political will and consensus to fill it with specific content.
With an eye on the strategic geopolitical consequences defined by Trump’s second term, the following points can be emphasized:
No longer is there an unwavering loyalty between the EU and the U.S. Transatlantic relations are entering a phase of pragmatization and division of technological competencies of its participants
China will be strengthening its role as a global stabilizer/moderator, exploiting EU indecision and U.S. political radicalism
The EU faces the need to reassess its industrial model, trade policy and digital sovereignty principles or risk becoming an economic appendage of competing global stalwarts
Germany, as a backbone of the EU, is in a unique position. Either it can lead in restarting the European economic structure or become drawn into the U.S.-China competition with limited choice on the terms.
In any case, future transatlantic relations do not promise comfortable conditions for U.S. and EU economic and political actors. However, it does open up opportunities for Europe to rethink its role within the collective West in the global economy and politics. The current standoff within Euro-Atlantic relations is less about nation states and more about emerging economic macro-spaces and their competing economic models—for main production factors and for the global definition of norms, standards and development models.
来源：非常道
