摘要：2025年4月，清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波推出英文专著《Should the World Fear China?》，针对西方社会对中国崛起的诸多疑问作出回应，在国际社会引起广泛反响。近日，美国“The Wire China”刊发了对周波的专访。在专访
2025年4月，清华大学战略与安全研究中心研究员周波推出英文专著《Should the World Fear China?》，针对西方社会对中国崛起的诸多疑问作出回应，在国际社会引起广泛反响。
近日，美国“The Wire China”刊发了对周波的专访。在专访中，周波表示，中国希望被爱戴，而非被畏惧，对中国崛起的疑惧主要源于西方，世界其他地区对中国的总体看法积极。作为一个越来越强大的国家，中国势必将承担更多国际责任。周波并就中美关系、俄乌冲突、南海争端和台湾问题表达了自己的看法。
《The Wire China》（《连线中国》）是一份每周发布的在线新闻杂志，专注于中国的商业、经济和金融事务。该杂志由原《纽约时报》上海分社记者大卫·巴博萨（David Barboza）创办。
本文由北京对话与观察者网翻译发布。
【翻译/王凡非】
《连线中国》：让我们从您书中标题所提出的问题开始：您认为世界应该惧怕中国吗？
周波：我的回答当然是否定的。展开说一下：当人们谈到对中国的恐惧时，这种情绪主要源自西方国家，这些国家在过去数百年间一直主导全球事务。中国的崛起对它们而言引发了许多疑问。
但若放眼世界其他地区，人们对中国的看法总体上是积极的。在拉丁美洲，中国的经济影响力非常显著，中美两国的影响力大致各占一半。在亚太地区，情况略显复杂，但到了去年，也是过去五年中的首次，中国的认可度略微超过美国。这是可以理解的，因为东盟已成为中国最大的贸易伙伴。当然，也有一些国家，如印度，对中国的态度更为复杂，这在很大程度上是由于2020年喜马拉雅群山中的致命冲突。
在今年的慕尼黑安全会议上，讨论的焦点是世界正走向多极化。这一趋势不可避免，西方国家需要转变其思维方式。我从不认同所谓“自由国际秩序”的概念。我认为，无论是现在还是过去，国际秩序都是由各种文化、宗教、社会制度，尤其是文明混合构成的。如果你认为自己只是这一秩序的一部分，而非全部，那么与他人共存会更容易。但如果你错误地认为全球秩序应是所谓的自由国际秩序，当你看到世界朝另一个方向发展时，你会感到失落，进而可能寻找敌人。这正是美国目前的行为。
《连线中国》：但人们看到中国与印度在喜马拉雅的冲突，或中国在南海或对台海施加的压力，便担忧中国是一个扩张主义大国，意欲改变世界秩序，而非仅仅在其中存在。
周波：您提到的这三个地方都与中国的主权相关，中国在主权问题上立场坚定。中印之间存在边境争端，这是主权问题。在南海，我们同样认为这是主权问题。至于台湾问题，超过180个国家认为台湾是中国的一部分。这与中国如何看待世界是两回事。
当美国派遣飞机或舰船进入南海，无论是进行侦察、监视，还是行使所谓的“航行自由”权利，他们认为这是在挑战中国行使海洋权利。但中国认为这些岛礁是中国领土。因此，这对中方而言是一个主权问题。
图片来源：2024年美军南海军事活动不完全报告
《连线中国》：所以，中国并非想要扩张，而是仅仅申索认为属于自己的领土；这就是中国领土雄心的界限吗？
周波：我从不认为中国是一个扩张主义大国。我不相信中国有建立势力范围的野心。即使中国有此意图，也无法成功。
让我们看看中国的周边地区，理论上这里是中国最容易建立势力范围的地方。在东北亚，朝鲜不会听从中国，特别是在核问题上。然后是东南亚，常被描述为中国的后院。南海存在多个国家与中国有领土争端；而且至少有两个美国盟友，泰国和菲律宾。那么，中国如何能将这里视为其势力范围呢？
中国拥有的是巨大的全球影响力，特别是在经济领域。正是因为中国的影响力已是全球性的，它无需效仿美国建立势力范围，因为这不仅成本高昂，而且难以维持。如果中国拥有足够的全球影响力，同时避免建立势力范围，这种方式将非常经济且具成本效益。你可以让自己完全不同于历史上的霸权国家，并受到欢迎。
如果你观察中国人民解放军，就会发现其所有海外行动均属人道主义性质，无论是维和、反海盗还是灾害救援。这是深思熟虑的政策选择，我希望解放军能继续如此。这样，你只需从事人道主义事务：这简单易行，人们会感激你。你无需拥有基地、盟友或诸如此类的东西。
《连线中国》：西方国家担心中国是一个意图推翻现有西方模式、试图让其他国家遵循其模式的大国，这种担忧是否错误？
周波：正如中国外交部长王毅在慕尼黑安全会议上指出的，中国已加入超过600项全球条约。换句话说，很难想到还有哪些条约中国尚未加入。
中国没有理由挑战国际体系，无论其形式如何，因为这一体系使中国受益。在过去40年中，中国的成功有诸多原因——当然，其中之一是中国人民的勤奋和努力。但中国也从西方经验中受益匪浅——技术、市场经济等等。这就是为什么中国对国际秩序的态度与俄罗斯不同。俄罗斯对这一秩序心怀不满。
谈到中国模式，你认为中国想要输出什么？中国的确向世界出口了大量产品，但如果中国想要输出其意识形态，世界上并没有多少社会主义国家会接受。我不认为西方相信中国想要输出共产主义或其体制内的社会主义。你需要给我更多线索，说明中国究竟是在什么时候、以何种方式，试图以“修正主义国家”的身份改变国际秩序。
《纽约时报》可视化报道，展现一个普通美国家庭对中国进口产品的依赖比例程度。灰色表示这一品类从中国进口率为0-20%，绿色为20%-40%，黄色为40%-60%，橙色为60%-80%，红色为80%-100%。
《连线中国》：那么，你会认为西方误解了中国的意图。但你认为中国有哪些做得不对的地方？中国是否可以做更多事情，以让其他国家对其意图和权力性质感到放心？
周波：你的问题让我想起曾参加过的一次为期两天的中美会议后的感受。双方专家参加，而会议实际上是双方在问同一个问题：“你想要什么？”我开始觉得中美关系就像一种宗教，即最简单的问题也是最复杂的问题。
根据我与人交往的经验，我基本认为，无论一个人多么成熟，其核心逻辑都源于其受教育的方式。你成长过程中形成的一套价值观会深深植根于你的思维中：不同的人眼中看到的世界并不相同。唯一的解决办法是人们更多地互动，试图理解他人的文化和价值观。
在过去40多年里，中国未在海外杀死一个外国人。那么，中国怎能被称作侵略性或胁迫性国家？有时，我认为西方试图用这些词语来讹诈中国，因为他们无法举出中国做过什么的具体例子。但反观美国——它发动了多少战争，造成了多少人死亡？
《连线中国》：中国开始更多地参与其国境之外的重大地缘政治事务。例如，中国促成了伊朗与沙特阿拉伯恢复外交关系。这种情况我们会在未来看到更多吗，特别是在中东地区？
周波：答案是肯定的。无论人们是否喜欢，这都是未来的方向。中国希望做出更多贡献，但是会以中国的方式。
近期出现了两个转折点。一个是中国外交的成功：促成沙特阿拉伯与伊朗的调解。另一个是在亚丁湾打击海盗，这使中国海军成为一支蓝水海军。这是两个转折点，一个关乎中国外交，另一个关乎中国军队。
另一个例子更具说服力。中国海军拥有一艘医疗船。多年来，这艘船一直在海外航行，为当地人民提供免费药品和治疗。这很不寻常，因为为什么要为人们提供免费医疗？我认为这表明中国希望被爱戴，而非被畏惧。
另一方面，中国将被推动而更多地参与国际事务，因为当你变得强大时，你就变得有吸引力；就像如果你是一个富人，可能会有很多穷亲戚来找你。作为一个更强大的国家，中国将不得不承担许多之前未曾预见的责任。这是作为一个大国必须付出的代价。
中国近期还有三个转折点。乌克兰战争开始后，人们立即询问中国的立场，因为中国非常重要，且与俄罗斯关系密切。第二个转折点是美国副总统万斯在慕尼黑安全会议上的演讲，其他国家对他的言论感到震惊，因此开始寻找重心。人们想要一个稳定器和锚点。第三个转折点是特朗普的关税战，因为他对每个国家都施加压力，尽管程度不同。人们当然在寻求稳定。中国似乎是唯一有实力和意愿抵御这种压力的国家。这就是为什么我认为中国的国际地位正在提升——但与此同时，其责任也在增加。
2019年11月，中国海军 “和平方舟 ”号医院船准备停靠拉瓜伊塔港路透社
《连线中国》：但一旦开始介入重大地缘政治问题，当事情出错时就有被指责的风险。中国准备好面对这种情况了吗？
周波：中国正在学习，这些都是复杂的问题。一旦介入，就无法退出。当中国开始改革开放时，邓小平说这是摸着石头过河。但现在我们正从江河进入海洋，且没有回头路。
我希望中国即使变得更强大，也能遵守一些原则，即无需寻求势力范围，使用武力时应极其谨慎，因为如果你因某种原因杀人，后来发现自己错了——就像美国在越南、伊拉克和阿富汗那样——人的生命已经失去，就无法挽回。还要坚持永不首先使用核武器的原则。如果遵循这些原则，即便不能让世界更美好，也起码能让世界更安全。
《连线中国》：你是否认同美国现在是一个衰落大国的观点？
周波：简言之，我的回答是肯定的。二战后，美国的GDP相当于世界的一半，但现在仅占四分之一。当然这是相对衰落，但幅度相当可观。
但谁是最大的“美国衰落”论者？不是中国人，而是特朗普。特朗普非常聪明地利用这一点赢得了他的第一次总统选举，他把美国描述成哀鸿遍野。然后，他还添油加醋地说要让美国再次伟大。但他现在不加区分地抨击所有国家，只是程度不同......除非感到自己正处于无望的衰落，并因此变得绝望，地球上最强大的国家怎能如此？在诞生了华盛顿和林肯的国家，居然像特朗普这样的人也能当选？这个人曾煽动人们冲击国会山，说明这个国家已变得多么分裂。
在某种程度上，他有点像戈尔巴乔夫。人们形容戈尔巴乔夫是从上到下摧毁了大厦，却没有用新的建筑取而代之。特朗普也在做同样的事情，增加关税，然后再加关税，却没有考虑在美国实施之前如何让工厂到位。这完全是杂乱无章的，令人更加觉得美国正处于无望的衰落。
《连线中国》：你在书中写道，中国被问及千里之外的俄乌战争，而中国并未卷入其中。你说中国没有在支持俄罗斯，是否有点勉强？
周波：首先，中国显然不是俄罗斯的盟友。这种关系就像两条平行线。无论它们多么接近，都不会重叠成为联盟。这场战争已经证明这确实不是联盟，因为我们没有派兵与俄罗斯并肩作战，也没有向他们提供致命武器。如果我们真的提供了军事物资，不可能不被发现。
至于中国对俄罗斯的出口，你不应该将其视为任何形式的支持。这是战前就已经存在的正常贸易。不同的是，由于俄罗斯被欧洲市场拒之门外，中国出口量增加。他们不得不从中国购买更多，而中国的经济并非十分理想，因此希望增加出口，只要这不违反任何国际条约或规则。一些产品恰好具有军民两用性质，这是西方抱怨的主要原因之一。但对于两用性质的产品，你必须首先假设它是用于民用。这是常识，就像石油和天然气：如果你把它们装进军用卡车，它们就成了军事产品。但通常没人会认为天然气和石油是军事产品。
《连线中国》：但回到你一开始提到的，中国认为世界现在是多极化的，不同文明需要学会互不干涉内政：还有什么比入侵另一个国家更干涉的呢？如果中国坚持不干涉原则，为什么没有更强硬地告诉俄罗斯不应该入侵乌克兰？
周波：这是个好问题。实际上，中国以另一种更微妙的方式进行了回应。正如你所说，我们没有强硬表态，但战争爆发后，中国立即呼吁尊重主权。
这背后有其原因：我们是彼此最大的两个邻国，关系一直良好。此外，亚洲文化中似乎有一种更含蓄的表达方式。但中国几乎立即提到了尊重主权，在联合国决议中，中国多次投了弃权票，没有支持俄罗斯。
《连线中国》：但如果中国能更公开地努力约束俄罗斯，实际上这对其与欧洲和美国的关系将大有裨益。中国在这里是否错失了一个机会？
周波：这个问题值得商榷。取决于你从短期还是长期视角来看待这个问题。设想你谴责俄罗斯，你立马失去了一个朋友。虽然你可能与欧洲国家建立短期友谊，但美国不会再次与你竞争吗？这个问题无法解决，所以中国能做得最好的事情是与朋友保持良好关系。
我们非常努力地试图保持平衡。这对我们来说并不容易，因为总体而言，俄罗斯和乌克兰都是中国的朋友，而乌克兰仍然是中国的重要贸易伙伴。我曾与一位乌克兰学者交谈，他说了一些让我惊讶的话。他说：“我个人理解中国为什么这样做。如果我是你，我可能或多或少像你一样行事。”
《连线中国》：让我们转向台湾——正如你在书中写的，这是未来几年中美之间最明显的潜在冲突领域。作为一名解放军前大校，你能解释中国目前对台湾的意图是什么，以及打算如何实现其目标吗？
周波：首先，我不认为台湾问题是最大的问题。实际上，我认为南海问题更严重。为什么？因为那里更容易发生意外，例如某种碰撞引起的，虽然不一定会演变为冲突，但考虑到双方的公众舆论，可能已经足够危险。
在台湾海峡，无论发生什么，都不会由意外引发。这几乎是最不可能发生的事情，因为所有人的目光都聚焦在这个问题上。中国大陆、台湾地区或美国的任何举动都受到密切关注，每一句话都被放大和审视，所以真要有事不会是意外引发的事情。
我们的领导人谈到这个问题，仍然表示中国希望和平统一。问题在于如何实现这一目标？
首先，统一是必须的。西方可能希望两岸关系维持现状，但这不是中国的目标。中国希望和平统一。
唯一的问题是能否通过和平方式实现这一目标——这是真正的挑战。中国仍然有可能成为世界上最强大的国家、最大的经济体。而在这发展的基础上，难道中国就不能与被大多数国家承认是其一部分的台湾地区实现统一吗？
这对中国人民来说是难以理解的。目前，我们尚未失去耐心。随着中国变得更强大，它可能有两种不同的思考方式，一种是更加自信于和平统一，另一种是失去耐心，决定诉诸武力。只有这两种选择。当然，和平统一更可取。
要实现这一目标，我的答案很简单：让中国政府相信和平统一仍然是可能的。如果中国政府相信这是可能的，它就会耐心地维持现状——因为这是写入中国《反分裂国家法》中的条件之一。该法律列明了放弃非和平手段的三个条件。第一，台湾宣布独立，这无论如何是不可能的。第二，外国势力推动台湾从中国分离。我不知道有什么外国势力强大到可以做到这一点。
对我来说，真正重要的条件是第三个：即中央政府认为和平统一的所有可能性都已丧失。这就是为什么我说必须让中国相信和平统一仍然可能。要实现这一点，台湾当局和美国必须有所节制。他们必须自我克制。我们对赖清德的反应更为严厉，是因为他的言论。他基本上像分裂分子或分离主义者那样讲话，称大陆为外部势力——中国政府无法容忍这一点。
赖清德资料图来源：台湾“中时新闻网”
《连线中国》：但如果台湾人民不想成为大陆的一部分呢？
周波：我认为台湾的民意在不同情况下可能会发生变化。在台湾的立法机构中，与大陆较为亲近的国民党实际上占据微弱多数。如果他们的优势变大，台湾老百姓可能会想是谁造成了这个问题？是大陆进行的军事演习，还是台湾领导人的挑衅性言论引起的？因为后者对两岸关系的描述，已经引起了很多不满。
在新冠疫情之前，大约有150万台湾人居住在大陆，多数在上海附近。这表明人们总是会追求更好的生存和发展机会。如果他们相信大陆能提供更好的机会，他们实际上并不太在意生活在一个规则不同的社会中。他们像外国人一样生活，甚至可能比外国人更好，在福建省，大陆给予了他们很多优惠待遇。他们可以购买房产，孩子可以像其他孩子一样上幼儿园，他们的身份证也与大陆居民的非常相似。人们总是谈论中国的“大棒”，但我们也提供了不少“胡萝卜”。
《连线中国》：如果中国大陆寻求以武力统一台湾，中国是否相信美国——无论是在特朗普还是未来总统领导下——会试图“保卫”台湾？
周波：首先，到目前为止，中国政府仍然保持耐心。这一点非常明确。我们并未威胁立即开战。
我认为所有美国政府都会谈论一个中国政策，并将继续如此。但如果你持续向台湾提供越来越多先进武器，一个中国的内涵就会发生变化。这就是为什么中国政府认为美国正在掏空一个中国政策。
在美国智库中，关于对台湾是采取战略模糊还是战略清晰存在争论。当然，结果还是战略模糊，因为如果明确表示“美国必须保卫台湾”，他们将没有回旋余地。过去，模糊政策是基于实力的。战略清晰实际上会暴露美国的短板：它将显示美国不再那么强大，而且他们将不得不为“保卫台湾”付出代价。
至于美国是否会“保卫台湾”，我们不知道。我认为他们自己也没有做出决定。
越来越清楚的是，在常规战争方面，大陆的实力正在增强，这似乎也是美国人的印象。他们自己也谈到，在战争推演中，美国输给了中国——以至于有些人，如埃尔德里奇·科尔比，呼吁在台湾海峡进行核打击，因为他们在常规战争中没有任何优势。因此，我建议中国增加其核武器库。不是要与美国达到平等，而是要让美国彻底放弃在核战争中获胜的幻想。
与此同时，中国仍应坚持不首先使用核武器的政策，因为这是两个不同的问题。如果所有其他核大国都采纳“不首先使用”政策，世界会更安全。现在，如果你谈论各国减少核武器数量，那是不可行的，因为我们的起点不同。
至于盟友，我真心认为，如果台湾海峡发生战争，协助美国的国家将屈指可数。潜在盟友首先是日本，但绝大多数日本人反对与中国直接冲突。这是可以理解的。中国是一个拥有核武器的强大国家，日本为什么要与中国开战？根据兰德公司的一份报告，没人知道日本是否会加入与中国的冲突：只有在关键时刻，日本领导人才能做出决定，其他任何对其立场的描述都只是推测。
然后是澳大利亚。首先，在现阶段还不确定他们能否真正成功购买八艘核动力潜艇（根据AUKUS协议，澳大利亚将在美国和英国的支持下建造五艘新潜艇，并从美国再购买三艘）。即使他们成功了，也可能要到2035年之后。考虑到届时中国海军会变得更加强大，这八艘潜艇在与中国的战争中能有多大用处？
2025年3月16日，弗吉尼亚级快速攻击核潜艇“明尼苏达号”（SSN-783）在澳大利亚西澳大利亚州海岸的照片。路透社
接着是菲律宾。其海军基地可供美国使用，这可能非常有用，因为它们处于前线。这可能是美国最想要的，即前沿军事存在。但菲律宾人并不愚蠢。他们为美国使用这些基地设定了不同条件，例如不得储存弹药武器，不得发起攻击。
你无法再举出其他潜在盟友的例子。印度距离遥远，且总是在大国之间斡旋。如果你看看印度所在的“四方安全对话”，它并未成为一个军事联盟。
如果中美之间发生战争，这些美国盟友充其量只是半心半意，原因显而易见，所以我不认为他们会发挥很重要的作用。
《连线中国》：你提到南海发生意外事件目前更可能导致冲突。在这种情况下，中国在主张其权利时采取不那么激进的方式不是更符合其利益吗？
周波：简而言之，南海的任何冲突都只能是中美之间的，因为美国舰船靠得太近，可能会发生意外或碰撞。这更危险，因为我不知道如何解决这个问题。多年前，我曾率领中国代表团到五角大楼讨论这个问题，但我们无法达成一致，例如，如何以双方都能接受的方式适用国际海洋法，因为我们对法律的解释不同。
我个人认为，中国与其他国家，包括菲律宾在内，在南海不存在发生任何冲突的危险，这背后有诸多原因。2002年签署的《南海各方行为宣言》明确规定不得使用武力，这是中国与10个东盟国家签署的，因此存在一种谅解。
英文原文：
The Wire China: Let’s begin with the question that forms the title of your book: Should the world fear China?
Zhou Bo：My answer is definitely NO, but I should explain further. When people talk about fear of China, it comes primarily from Western countries, whose global dominance has been in place for a few hundred years. Seeing China’s rise raises a lot of questions for them.
But if you look at the rest of the world, people’s opinions of China, generally speaking, are positive. In Latin America, China’s economic influence is very strong: Chinese and American influence is probably about half and half. In the Indo Pacific, the picture is a bit patchy, but last year, for the first time in at least five years, China’s approval rating prevailed over that of the United States slightly. That is understandable given that ASEAN has become the largest trading partner of China. But of course you also have countries like India, whose attitude toward China is much more complicated, largely because of the deadly brawl in the Himalayan mountains in 2020.
At this year’s Munich Security Conference, the talk was of the world moving towards multi-polarization. This trend is inevitable, and the West needs to change its mentality. I never bought this idea of a liberal international order. I believe the order now, as in the past, is a hybrid of all kinds of cultures, religions, social systems and, above all, civilizations. If you believe you’re just a part of this order, and not the whole order, then it’s easier for you to co-exist with others. But if you wrongly believe that the global order should be the liberal international order, you would feel sad when you see the world is moving in another direction, and then you would probably look for an enemy. And that’s exactly what the United States is doing.
The Wire China：But people see incidents like the clashes in the Himalayas with India, or the pressure that China places on countries in the South China Sea or on Taiwan, and they fear that China is an expansionist power that wants to change the world order, not just exist within it.
Zhou Bo：The three places you mention are associated with China’s sovereignty, and China is firm on sovereignty issues. There’s a border dispute between India and China: it is about sovereignty. In the South China Sea, we also believe it is about sovereignty. On the Taiwan issue, more than 180 countries believe it is part of China. This has nothing to do with how China looks at the world.
When the United States sends aircraft or ships to the region, either for reconnaissance, surveillance or to exercise so-called Freedom of Navigation, they believe they are challenging China’s exercise of its maritime rights. But China considers the rocks and islands to be Chinese territory. So then it becomes a question of sovereignty for China.
The Wire China: So it’s not that China wants to expand, it’s just that it is claiming what it believes belongs to it; and that is the limit of China’s territorial ambitions?
Zhou Bo：I have never believed that China is an expansionist power. I don’t believe China has any ambition to have spheres of influence. Even if China wanted that, it cannot succeed.
Let’s look at China’s periphery, where theoretically, it would be easiest for China to establish a sphere of influence. In Northeast Asia, the DPRK won’t listen to China, especially on nuclear issues. Then we come to Southeast Asia, often described as China’s backyard. We have quite a few countries that have territorial disputes with China in the South China Sea; and there are at least two American allies, Thailand and the Philippines. So how can China take that as its sphere of influence?
What China does have is huge global influence, especially in the economic field. Precisely because China’s influence is already global, it doesn’t need to follow the United States in establishing spheres of influence, which are very costly to build and very difficult to maintain. If China has enough global influence, but at the same time keeps away from having spheres of influence, this could be very affordable and cost effective. You can make yourself totally different from hegemons throughout history, and be welcomed.
If you look at the PLA, all its operations overseas are humanitarian in nature, be it peacekeeping, counter-piracy or disaster relief. This is a deliberate policy choice, and my hope is that the PLA will carry on like this. In this way you can just do humanitarian things: it’s easy, and people will be grateful to you. You don’t need to have bases, allies and all these things.
The Wire China：What about fears that China is a revisionist power that wants other countries to conform to its model. Is the West wrong to fear that?
Zhou Bo：As Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi pointed out at the Munich Security Conference, China has joined over 600 global treaties. To put it another way, it’s hard to think of any other treaties that China has not joined.
There is a good reason for China not to challenge the international system, whatever it is, because it has benefited China. In the last 40 years, there have been a number of reasons for China’s success — of course, one is the Chinese people’s diligence and industry. But China has also learned tremendously from the Western experience — technology, the market economy, and all these things. That is why the Chinese attitude towards the international order is different from Russia’s. Russia resents this order.
When you come to this issue of the Chinese model, what do you imagine that China wants to export? China exports a lot of products. But if China wants to export its ideology, there aren’t many socialist countries in the world to receive it. I don’t believe the West believes that China wants to export communism or the socialism that is in its own system. You need to give me more of a clue as to when or how China has tried to change the international order as a revisionist power.
The Wire China：You would argue, then, that the West has misinterpreted China’s intentions. What do you think China’s got wrong, though? Is there more that it could be doing to reassure other countries of its intentions and of the nature of its power?
Zhou Bo：Your question reminds me of how I felt after a two-day long meeting between China and the United States. There were experts on both sides, but it was really a conference of both saying, ‘What do you want?’ I started to think this China-U.S. relationship is like a religion, where the most simple question is also the most complicated.
From my experience of interacting with people, I basically believe that no matter how sophisticated they might be, their central logic is formed from the way they are educated. You grow up with a set of values that becomes deeply rooted in your own mentality: and the world is not the same in different people’s eyes. The only solution is for people to interact more and try to understand other people’s cultures and values.
Over the last 40 years plus, China hasn’t killed a single foreigner overseas. So how can China be called aggressive or coercive? Sometimes, I believe the West tries to blackmail China by using such words, because they cannot give a tangible example of anything China has done. But then you look at the United States — how many wars has it launched and how many people have been killed?
The Wire China:China has started to become more involved in big geopolitical issues outside of its borders. An example would be the work that China did to get Iran and Saudi Arabia to restore diplomatic relations. Is this something we’re going to see more of, particularly in the Middle East?
Zhou Bo：The answer is definitely yes. And like it or not, that is the road of the future. China wants to make more of a contribution, but in its own way.
There have been two turning points recently. One is for China’s diplomacy: its success in the mediation between Saudi Arabia and the Iranians. The other is countering pirates in the Gulf of Aden, which has turned the Chinese navy into a Blue Water Navy. These are two turning points, one for China diplomacy, another for the Chinese military.
Another example is still more telling. China has a hospital ship which belongs to its navy. For decades, this ship has been sailing overseas, providing free medicine and treatments to local people. This is unusual, because, why would you provide people with free medical care? I think this tells you that China wants to be loved rather than feared.
The other thing is, China will be pushed by others to become more involved, because if you become strong, you become attractive; just like if you are a rich man, probably a lot of your poor relatives will come to you. China, as a stronger power, will have to take care of a lot of things that it did not previously envision. This is the price you have to pay as a major power.
There have been three other recent turning points for China. After the war in Ukraine started, people immediately asked where China was standing, because it’s so important, and so close to Russia. The second came after U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s speech at the Munich Security Conference: because other countries were totally stunned by what he said, they started to look for a center of gravity. People want a stabilizer and an anchor. And the third turning point is Trump’s tariff war, because he’s punching every country, although to varying degrees. People, of course, are looking for stability. And China seems to be the only country that has the strength and will to resist this kind of pressure. That is why I believe China’s international standing is growing — but at the same time, its responsibilities are also growing.
The Wire China：But once you start getting involved in big geopolitical problems, the danger is that you start to get blamed when things go wrong. Is China ready for that?
Zhou Bo：Well, China is learning, and these are complicated issues. Once you get in, you cannot walk out. When China started on its reform and opening up era, Deng Xiaoping said it was getting across the river by feeling the stones in the riverbed. But now we’re wading into the sea: there is no turning back.
I wish for China to stick to some rules, even if it becomes stronger. You don’t need to seek spheres of influence. And you should exercise maximum caution when using force, because if you kill people for this or that reason, and eventually you find you were wrong — like in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan — and people’s lives are already lost, you can’t come back. And then stick to the principle of never being the first to use nuclear weapons. These kinds of principles, if followed, can really make the world safer, if not better.
The Wire China：Do you share the view that the U.S. is now a power in decline?
Zhou Bo：My short answer is, definitely. The U.S.’s GDP was equivalent to half that of the world after the Second World War, but it now accounts for only a quarter. Of course this is a relative decline, but it is considerable.
But who is the largest declinist? It’s not the Chinese, it’s Donald Trump. Donald Trump was very smart in making use of this to win his first presidential election, describing ‘American carnage’. Then, of course, he peppered it up by saying we’ll make America great again. But his current practice of bashing all countries indiscriminately, but to a very varying degree …How can the strongest nation on Earth do that, unless it feels that it is in a hopeless decline and has become desperate. How can a man like Trump be elected in a country that has produced George Washington and Abraham Lincoln? This is the man who incited people to take on Capitol Hill. It shows how this country has become divided.
In a way, he’s a bit like Mikhail Gorbachev. People describe Gorbachev as a man who destroyed the building from the top down, without having a new building in place. Trump is doing the same thing, adding tariffs and then another tariff, without thinking about how the factories could be in place in the U.S. before he does so. It’s totally out of order and chaotic, and this adds to people’s impressions of America being in hopeless decline.
The Wire China：You write in your book that China is being asked about the Russia-Ukraine war that’s taking place thousands of miles away, in which it is not involved. Isn’t it a bit difficult to say that China isn’t supporting Russia in this war?
Zhou Bo：Well, first of all, China certainly is not Russia’s ally. This kind of relationship is like two lines in parallel. No matter how close they are, they won’t overlap to become an alliance. This war has already proven that this is indeed not an alliance, as we are not sending soldiers to fight with Russia, and we’re not providing them with lethal weapons. If we really were sending military supplies, it wouldn’t go uncovered.
As for exports, you should not take that as any kind of support. It’s normal trading which was already in place before the war. What is different is that China has exported more because Russia was denied access to the European market. They had to buy more from China, and as China’s economy was not really in good shape it wanted to export more, so long as it did not go against any international treaties or rules. Some of the products happen to be dual use in nature, which is one of the main reasons for Western complaints. But when something is dual use in nature, you have to assume it is for civilian use first. This is common sense, just like oil and gas: if you put them into a military truck, they are military products. But normally nobody would consider gas and oil as military products.
The Wire China：But circling back to something that you said at the start, that China views the world as multipolar now, and different civilizations need to learn not to interfere in each other’s affairs: what is more interfering than invading another country? If China is sticking to principles of non-interference, why wasn’t it more forceful in telling Russia that it shouldn’t invade Ukraine?
Zhou Bo：That’s a good question. Actually, China has mentioned Russia’s invasion in another, more subtle way. It is not forceful, as you said, but immediately after the war broke out, China called for respect for sovereignty.
There is a reason behind that: we are each other’s two largest neighbors, and have enjoyed a good relationship. And there is also an element of Asian culture, which seems to be more subtle in expression. But China did mention, almost immediately, respect for sovereignty and in UN resolutions, many times China has abstained and did not support Russia.
The Wire China：But if China could make more open efforts to rein in Russia, that could actually be a huge benefit in terms of its relations with Europe and with the United States. Is China missing an opportunity here?
Zhou Bo：That is debatable. It depends on how you are looking at this issue, from the short term or the long term perspective. Let’s imagine you condemn Russia: you lose a friend, and while you may have a short term friendship with European countries, won’t the U.S. come back to compete with you again? You won’t solve this problem, so the best thing China can do is to maintain a good relationship with its friend.
We have tried very hard to strike a balance. It’s not easy for us, because both Russia and Ukraine are basically China’s friends, and Ukraine still has China as a large trading partner. I once talked to a Ukrainian scholar, and he said something that surprised me. He said, I personally understand why China is behaving like this. If I were you, I probably would be more or less like you.
The Wire China：Let’s move on to Taiwan — as you write in your book, the most obvious potential area for actual conflict between the U.S. and China in the coming years. As an ex-colonel in the PLA, can you explain what Beijing’s intentions towards Taiwan now are, and how it intends to achieve its goals.
Zhou Bo：First of all, I don’t believe that the Taiwanese issue is the most serious issue. Actually, I believe the South China Sea is more serious. Why? Because it’s easier to see an accident occurring there, caused by some sort of collision which, while it may not spill over into conflict, may be dangerous enough, given public opinion on both sides.
In the Taiwan Strait, whatever happens, it won’t be triggered by an accident. That is almost the last thing that will happen, because everybody has their eyes on this issue. Any move from either Beijing, Taipei or Washington comes under close scrutiny. Every word is amplified and examined — it’s not something that would be triggered by accident.
Beijing, right now, still wants peaceful reunification. When our leaders talk about this issue, that is what they say. The question is, how to achieve this?
First of all, reunification is a must. It’s not a situation, as the West may hope, where the current kind of cross-Strait relationship will always be maintained. No. China wants peaceful reunification, that is for sure.
The only question is whether they can achieve this through peaceful means. That is a real challenge. It is still possible for China to become the strongest nation on earth, the largest economy. And with all this development, are we saying China cannot reunify with another part of China that is recognized by most countries in the world?
This is incomprehensible for Chinese people. Right now, we have not lost our patience. As China becomes stronger, it could think in two different ways. One way is to become more confident about peaceful reunification. The other way is it becomes more impatient, and decides it has to use force. There’s just these two options. Of course, peaceful reunification is more preferable.
To achieve that, my answer is very simple: Just let the Chinese government believe peaceful reunification is still possible. If the Chinese government believes it’s possible, then it will bear this situation with patience — because this is one of the conditions written into China’s anti-secession law. Three conditions for abandoning non-peaceful means are in that law. First, that Taiwan declares independence, which is anyway impossible. Second, that foreign forces are making efforts leading to Taiwan’s separation from China. I personally don’t know of any foreign force which is strong enough to do this.
For me, only the third condition really matters: that is if the central government believes that all possibilities for peaceful reunification have been exhausted. That is why I say we have to let China believe that peaceful reunification is still possible. And for that to happen, then the Taiwanese authorities and the United States have to behave. They have to exercise self restraint. Our response to Lai Ching-te has been more severe because of what he has said. He has basically talked like a separatist or secessionist, talking about mainland China being an external power. The Chinese government cannot bear that.
The Wire China：But what if the Taiwanese people don’t want to be part of mainland China?
Zhou Bo：I think public opinion in Taiwan may change under different situations. In Taiwan’s legislature, the Kuomintang party, which is somewhat closer to mainland China, actually has a marginal majority. And if this kind of situation becomes more serious, the Taiwanese may think, okay, who has caused this problem? Is it the military exercises carried out by mainland China, or is it because of provocative remarks from the Taiwanese leader? A lot of complaints have been made against him because of his description of this relationship with mainland China.
Before Covid, there were about 1.5 million Taiwanese people living in mainland China, most near Shanghai. That shows people will always go for better opportunities to survive and thrive. And if they believe mainland China can offer them better opportunities, they actually don’t care that much about living in a different society where the same rules do not apply to them. They live just like foreigners, and probably better than foreigners, because in Fujian province the Chinese government has given them a lot of preferential treatment. They can buy real property. The children can go to kindergarten like other children, and their ID cards are very much like those of mainlanders. People always talk about China’s sticks, but we have offered some carrots too.
The Wire China：If mainland China did seek to take Taiwan by force, does Beijing believe that the U.S., whether it’s under Trump or a future president, would seek to defend it?
Zhou Bo：First of all, up till now the Chinese government still has patience. That is quite clear. We’re not threatening immediate war.
I think all American governments talk about the One China policy and will continue to do so. But the content of One China changes if you keep on providing Taiwan with more and more advanced weapons. That’s why the Chinese government believes the U.S. is hollowing out One China.
In American think tanks, there’s a debate as to whether they should have strategic ambiguity or strategic clarity over Taiwan. The result, of course, is ambiguity, because if it is made clear that the U.S. has to defend Taiwan, they will have no leeway. In the past, the policy of ambiguity was based upon strength. Strategic clarity would actually show the U.S.’s shortcomings: it would show that the U.S. is no longer that strong, and that they would have to spend to defend Taiwan.
As to whether the U.S. would defend Taiwan or not we don’t know. I think they haven’t made their determination either.
What is becoming clear is that in terms of conventional warfare, the mainland’s strength is growing, and this seems to be people’s impression in the U.S.. They have even talked about it themselves, about how in war games, the U.S. loses to China — to the extent that some people, like Eldridge Colby, have called for nuclear strikes in the Taiwan Strait, because they do not have any superiority in conventional warfare. So I would suggest that China increase its nuclear weapons arsenal. Not to reach parity with the U.S., but to the extent that the United States would give up for good its illusion that it can win in a nuclear war.
At the same time, China should still stick to its policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, because these are two separate issues. If all other nuclear powers adopted this ‘no first use’ policy, that would make the world safer. Right now, if you talk about countries reducing their nuclear weapons stockpiles, that is impossible, because we’re not starting at the same level.
As for allies. I truly believe that very few countries would come to America’s assistance should there be a war in the Taiwan Strait. There aren’t many potential allies: the first is Japan, but the overwhelming majority of Japanese people are against a direct conflict with China. That is understandable. China is such a powerful country with nuclear weapons. Why would Japan want to have a war with China? According to a report by Rand, nobody knows whether Japan would join or not: only at the critical moment would a Japanese leader have to decide. Any other description of their posture is just speculation.
Then we come to Australia. First of all, it is not a sure thing that they will really succeed in buying eight nuclear power summaries or not at this stage [under the AUKUS agreement, Australia is building five new submarines with the support of the U.S. and UK, and buying a further three from the U.S.]. And even if they succeeded, then it would be probably after 2035. How useful would those eight submarines be in a war with China, given how much stronger the Chinese navy might have become by then?
And then we come to the Philippines. Its naval bases could be used by the United States, which could be very useful as they are on the front line. That could be what Americans want most, the forward military presence. But Filipinos are not stupid. They have laid down different conditions for the U.S. to use these bases, such as not storing ammunition weapons, and not launching attacks.
You can’t give me another example of a potential ally. India is far away and is always maneuvering among major powers. If you look at the Quad, of which it’s a member, the Quad is not becoming a military alliance.
Should there be a war between China and the U.S., these American allies are at best half hearted, for obvious reasons, so I don’t believe they would play a very important role.
The Wire China：You talked about the risk of an incident in the South China Sea being more likely to lead to conflict right now. In that case, wouldn’t it be in China’s interests to be less aggressive in the way that it’s asserting its claims in that area?
Zhou Bo：Well, to put it briefly, any conflict in the South China Sea can only be between China and the U.S., because of American ships getting too close, so there could be an accident or a collision. It’s more dangerous because I don’t know how to resolve this issue. I led a Chinese delegation to the Pentagon to talk about this many years ago, but we could not agree, for example, on how International Maritime law could be applicable to both of us in an acceptable way, because we just have a different interpretation of the law.
I personally don’t believe there is a danger of any conflict whatsoever between China and other places, including the Philippines in the South China Sea. There are a number of reasons behind that. The Declaration of code of conduct in the South China Sea, made in 2002, has made it clear that there can be no use of force. This was signed between China and the 10 ASEAN countries. So, there is a kind of understanding there.
来源：观察者网视频