摘要：战争胜利了。在德国战败后的四个月内，世界期待已久的时刻终于到来了。屠杀和破坏终于可以停止了。人类的创造力终于可以从杀戮和战斗中抽身，投入到重建一个美好的世界。
- （下文附有英文原版）
- 原文翻译整理：一派老胡言
战争胜利了。在德国战败后的四个月内，世界期待已久的时刻终于到来了。屠杀和破坏终于可以停止了。人类的创造力终于可以从杀戮和战斗中抽身，投入到重建一个美好的世界。
正因为这项任务如此艰巨，失败的后果如此可怕，大多数人面对胜利时，不仅感到深深的解脱和感激，也感到不安和敬畏。摧毁广岛和长崎的原子弹阻止了战争。但它们开启了另一件事，一个人类历史上的新时代，在这个时代，和平与战争的问题实际上关乎灭绝还是生存。在这种情况下，谁能不怀着满腔的希望和焦虑去完成缔造和平的任务呢？
从某种意义上说，欧洲和远东的和平缔造问题彼此相似。在德国和日本，盟军都必须对付一个由来已久的军事阶层，他们让日本人民走上了长期的侵略之路，并试图消除他们心中任何与帝国主义和统治无关的理想。在德国和日本，盟军都必须控制一个几乎完全服务于战争机器的工业体系；然而，这同时也是人民生活水平的主要基础。重新绘制地图、划定边界和主权，以及令人不快的势力范围问题，似乎在东方和西方都可能造成同样多的麻烦。
波茨坦会议会议纪要摘要
波茨坦条约对日本的规定明确指出，
必须永远消除那些欺骗和误导日本人民踏上征服世界的征途之人的权威和影响力。
在另一部分，这些人被称为“任性的军国主义顾问”。显然，在日本和德国都是如此。盟军意图解散总参谋部、武装部队以及军国主义者对政府的影响。这是波茨坦会议做出的一项总体决定，旨在消除一切阻碍日本人民民主倾向复兴和加强的障碍。
但除掉军国主义者是这项决定中显而易见且容易的部分。而决定天皇未来的角色则要困难得多。
这个问题在战争结束前就已十分尖锐。在第一次投降提议中，日本人要求保留天皇的主权。他们可能希望天皇继续在位，或者仅仅希望由下属签署和平协议，让天皇免于接受失败的耻辱。尽管天皇的统治存在着种种危险的民族主义神秘主义，但盟军并没有要求将君主制的消失作为投降的条件。但他们非常明智地坚持，向从拉包尔到缅甸边境所有日本士兵发出的投降书和停火呼吁必须由天皇签署，并由天皇授权执行。
天皇的继续存在与盟军坚持结束军国主义的立场如何相符？这是否与希特勒或墨索里尼的政权继续存在相提并论？天皇的存在是否必然意味着帝国主义？这一决定引发了不安，尤其是在澳大利亚。然而，可以说天皇的地位类似于维克托·伊曼纽尔国王或迈克尔国王。日本与意大利和罗马尼亚一样，没有战斗到最后。德国人由于缺乏任何宪法机制来实现权力更迭，被迫这样做。仅凭这一点，日本天皇就与法西斯头目们有所区别。
现在看来，盟军很可能会将天皇的未来地位留给日本人决定，这很合理。日本不像德国那样，没有出现摧毁一切独立政治团体、夷平一切历史遗留制度的极权主义旋风。自1940年以来，日本试图实行一党执政似乎一直不太坚定。旧政党的核心依然存在，1942年当选的国会议员——民政党和政友会——似乎保留了议会传统的意识。中国战争爆发前，其他力量也在崛起。1936年和1937年举行的大选中，社会民主党（社会大众党）的投票权增加了两倍。盟军可能会在日本找到可以替代海军上将和将军的领导人。日本人很快就开始效仿，1945年美英两国的压倒性胜利可能会让他们相信民主的价值，就像希特勒在1940年的胜利促使他们进行一党执政实验一样。政治因素可能仍然存在于日本。
然而，它的复兴自然在很大程度上取决于该国的经济生活。《波茨坦公告》规定了看似合理的经济条款。
日本应被允许保留那些能够维持其经济并允许其索取合理实物赔偿的工业，但不包括那些使其能够重新武装战争的工业。
建立对工业重新武装的控制的困难在于，正如德国的例子所证明的那样，那些可用于战争的工业往往对和平经济也至关重要。要求拥有否决一切工业生产力量的权力的控制在德国是不可能维持的。在像日本这样的国家，情况将更加艰难，因为仅仅占领日本，盟军就很难招募到足够的会说日语的军官。然而，令人高兴的是，对日本的经济控制可以通过外部进行。《波茨坦公告》将日本的主权限制在本州、北海道、九州和四国四个岛屿。他们生产的煤炭仅够维持和平时期的经济。铁矿石产量极少，品质极差。几乎没有石油。许多最有用的金属在这些岛屿上根本找不到。如果没有满洲，日本根本无法建立起军事工业。如果对向日本出口战争必需物资进行管制，就足以防止其重新武装。《波茨坦公告》保证日本获得原材料，而非控制原材料最终将允许日本参与世界贸易关系。
（日本签署投降书）
这些条款比强加给德国的动荡经济条件要理智得多。日本人民摆脱了1938年吞噬了其国民收入61%的军事工业的魔爪，有机会恢复一定程度的繁荣，并为亚洲的重建做出贡献。
日本解决争端的主要困难是领土问题。日本所有征服地和海外属地都必须移交。在某些问题上，想必不会遇到任何困难。
欧洲殖民列强将收复其在马来亚、印度支那和东印度群岛的殖民地。美国可能会宣称并接收太平洋托管岛屿，甚至硫磺岛和琉球群岛。台湾可能会归还中国，朝鲜半岛也已获得独立承诺。日本在亚洲大陆的征服归还问题上可能会出现困难。
自1931年以来，日本已占领了整个满洲、部分蒙古地区以及中国沿海的大片地区。严格恢复现状将使所有这些领土回归中国政府的管辖。但目前看来，这种直接的解决方案不太可能实现，因为目前中国有两个相互竞争的权力中心——重庆和共产党控制的延安——它们已经开始竞相接收华北和华中地区的日本投降者，并接管这些投降地区的行政管理。这种局面很容易演变成内战。
俄国的政策使本已复杂的局势雪上加霜。俄国人在远东和欧洲都显示出回归沙皇政策的迹象。1905年日俄战争前，俄国占领了整个萨哈林岛，控制着横跨满洲的中东铁路，在大连拥有一个港口，并且在整个满洲和朝鲜地区都拥有主导地位。如果他们现在要求恢复原有的地位，重庆国民政府将很难接受。而如果重庆犹豫不决，俄国人可能会在外交和推进的军队方面支持中国共产党。
在这种艰难的局势下，或许已经发现了一项交易的要素：中国政府同意接受苏联在满洲、内蒙古和新疆的统治——作为交换，中国共产党承诺不会将其地位提升到卢布林。宋子文先生在此关键时刻成功与俄国签订了友好条约。条约条款尚不清楚，但希望能够避免亚洲大陆的摩擦和进一步战乱。
然而，中俄之间的协议本身并不足以确保长期远东争端的和平结束。所有大国都对这一解决方案感兴趣。必须征求所有大国的意见。看来，尽快举行一次新的大国会议，以确保在亚洲最终达成的和平协议能够得到全面一致认可，是一个强有力的理由。
1945年8月18日《经济学人》对应本文原文内容首页
1945年8月18日《经济学人》对应本文原文内容第二页
（以下为本期英文原文）
Victory in the East
THE war is won. Within four months of Germany's final is the moment for which the world has long been waiting. Now the carnage and the destruction can cease. The creative energies of mankind can be withdrawn from slaughter and battle and be devoted to the rebuilding of a decent world.
It is because this task is so vast and the implications of failure so terrifying that most people are facing victory not only with profound relief and thankfulness, but also with a sense of uneasiness and awe. The bombs which wiped out Hiroshima and Nagasaki stopped the war. But they started something else, a new age in human history, in which the issue of peace and war is literally the issue of extermination or survival. Who can fail under those circumstances to approach the task of making peace with passionate hope and anxiety?
In a sense, the problems of peace-making in Europe and in the Far East resemble each other. In both Germany and Japan, the Allies have to deal with a military caste of long standing who have launched their people on a prolonged course of aggression and sought to remove from them any alternative ideal to that of imperialism and domination. In both Germany and Japan, the Allies have to control an industrial system which has been perverted to almost total service of the war machine; yet whichis at the same time the chief basis of the people's living standards redrawing of the map, the establishment of frontiers and sovereignties and the unhappy problem of spheres of influence seem likely to cause as much trouble in the East as in the West.
The Potsdam terms for Japan lay it down that
there must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest.
In another section, these men are referred to as "self-willed militaristic advisers." It is clear that in Japan as in Germany. the Allies intend to get rid of the General staff, the armed forces and the influence of the militarists on the Government. This is part of the general Potsdam decision toremove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.
But to get rid of the militarists is the easy and obvious part of the decision. It is much more difficult to decide what ought to be the future role of the Emperor.
This problem appeared in an acute form even before the war came to an end. In their first offer of surrender, the Japanese asked that the sovereignty of the Emperor should be left intact. They may have meant by this either that the Emperor shouldbe allowed to continue to reign or simply that the peace should be signed by a subordinate, leaving the Son of Heaven free of the stigma of having accepted defeat. The Allies have not demanded the disappearance of the monarchy as a condition of surrender, in spite of all the dangerous nationalist mysticism connected with the throne. But they have very wisely insisted that the act of surrender and the call to cease fire sent to all the Japanese fighting from Rabaul to the frontiers of Burma should be signed by the Emperor and done by his authority.
How does his continued presence square with the Allied insistence on an end to militarism? Is it comparable to the survival in office of a Hitler or a Mussolini? Does an Emperor necessarily imply imperialism? The decision has aroused uneasiness, particularly in Australia. It is, however, possible to argue that the Emperor's position resembles that of a King Victor Emmanuel or a King Michael. Japan, like Italy and Rumania, has not fought to the last. The Germans, lacking any constitutional machinery to effect a change in authority, were compelled to do so. This fact alone differentiates the Japanese Emperor from the Fascist chieftians.
It now seems likely that the Allies will, reasonably enough, leave the future status of the Emperor to the decision of the Japanese. There has not been in Japan, as in Germany, a totalitarian whirlwind destroying every independent political political grouping and flattening every institution that survived from the past. The attempt since 1940 to adopt single-party rule in Japan seems to have been very half-hearted. The nucleus of the old parties remains and the Minseito and Seiyukai members of the Diet elected in 1942 seemed to have preserved a sense of parliamentary tradition. Other forces too were coming up before the outbreak of war in China. In 1936 and 1937 general elections were held in which the Social Democrats (the Social Mass Party) trebled their voting strength. It may be that the Allies will find in Japan alternative leaders to the admirals and generals. The Japanese are quick to imitate and the crushing victory of America and Britain in 1945 may convince them of the values of democracy just as Hitler's victories in 1940 launched them into a single-party experiment. The stuff of politics may still exist in Japan.
Its revival will, however, naturally depend to a great extent on the economic life of the country. The Potsdam declaration lays down apparently reasonable economic terms.
Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and allow the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those industries which will enable her to rearm for war.
The difficulty in establishing controls against industrial re armament is as the example of Germany proves that the kind of industry that can be used for war is often vital for a peaceful economy as well. A control which demands the right to veto every force of industrial process will be impossible enough to maintain in Germany. It would be doubly so in a country like Japan for whose mere occupation the Allies will find it difficult to scrape together enough Japanese-speaking officers. Happily, however, the economic control of Japan can be done externally, The Potsdam Declaration limits Japanese sovereignty to the four islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku. They produce barely enough coal for a full peacetime economy. The output of iron ore is very small and very poor. There is virtually no oil. Many of the most useful metals are not found in the islands at all. Without Manchuria, the Japanese could not have built up a war industry at all. If controls are established on the export to Japan of materials vital to war, they will be sufficient to prevent rearmament. The Potsdam Declaration guarantees Japanaccess to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials.... Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.
There is far more sanity in these clauses than in the swingeing economic conditions imposed on Germany. The Japanese people freed of the incubus of a war industry which by 1938 was absorbing 61 per cent of their national income, have a chance of recovering a measure of prosperity and of contributing to the rebuilding of Asia.
The chief difficulties in the Japanese settlement are territorial.All Japan's conquests and overseas dependencies are to be surrendered. Over some there will presumably be no difficulty.
The European colonial Powers will recover their colonial possessions in Malaya, Indo-China and the East Indies. The United States is likely to claim and receive the Pacific Mandated islands and possibly Iwojima and the Ryukyu islands as well. Formosa will presumably be restored to China and the Koreans have been promised independence. It is over the reversion of Japanese conquests on the Asiatic mainland that difficulties may arise.
Since 1931, the Japanese have overrun all Manchuria, parts of Mongolia and large areas of coastal China. A strict return the status quo would restore all this territory to the authority of the Chinese Government. But such a straightforward solution seems at the moment unlikely, for there are now two rival and competing centres of power in China Chungking and Communist Yenan-which are already embarked on a race to receive the local Japanese surrenders in North and Central China and thus take over the administration of the surrendered areas. This is a situation that can easily degenerate into civil war.
Russian policy adds another twist to the complicated situation. The Russians are showing signs in the Far East as well s in Europe of returning to the policies of Czarism. Before the Russo-Japanese war of 1905, the Russians occupied all Sakhalin controlled the Chinese Eastern Railway across Manchuria, had a port at Dairen and were the dominant Power throughout Manchuria and Korea. If they were now to demand their old position, it would be difficult for the nationalist government at Chungking to accept it. And if Chungking hesitated, the Russians might give the support of their diplomacy and of their advancing armies to the Chinese Communists.
It may be that in this difficult situation the elements of a bargain have been discovered, the Chinese Government agreeing to accept Soviet dominance in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang-in return for an undertaking that the Chinese Communists will not be raised to Lublin status. Mr T. V. Soong has succeeded in securing a Treaty of friendship with Russia at this critical moment. Its terms are not known, but it is to be hoped that they are such as to avoid friction and further fighting on the Asiatic mainland.
Agreement between China and Russia is not, however, in itself sufficient to ensure a peaceful conclusion of the long Far Eastern struggle. All the Great Powers are interested in the settlement. All must be consulted. There would seem to be a strong case for holding a new Great Power Meeting as soon as may be to ensure that the peace which is hammered out in Asia is fully and finally agreed.
来源：小南粤事