晴读（31）：精读期刊论文

摘要：研究背景。回收商存在两类关键问题影响逆向供应链配置效率：一是回收商的能力禀赋属于私有信息，制造商无法知晓；二是回收商的努力行为具有不可观测性。在此前提下，研究聚焦回收渠道中双回收商存在竞争或合作关系时，制造商如何激励双回收商显示真实能力并采取最优努力行为这一机

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“晴读（31）：精读期刊论文《基于委托代理理论的逆向供应链激励机制设计与回收模式选择》的摘要”

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"Qing Du (31): Abstract of the Journal Paper Design of Incentive Mechanism and Selection of Recycling Mode in Reverse Supply Chain Based on Principal-Agent Theory"

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今天小编将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个板块为大家带来《基于委托代理理论的逆向供应链激励机制设计与回收模式选择》的摘要

一、思维导图（Mind Map）

二、内容精读（Conduct in-depth reading of the material）

1.研究背景。回收商存在两类关键问题影响逆向供应链配置效率：一是回收商的能力禀赋属于私有信息，制造商无法知晓；二是回收商的努力行为具有不可观测性。在此前提下，研究聚焦回收渠道中双回收商存在竞争或合作关系时，制造商如何激励双回收商显示真实能力并采取最优努力行为这一机制设计问题。

1. Research Background: There are two key issues with recyclers that affect the allocation efficiency of reverse supply chains. First, recyclers' capability endowments are private information, which manufacturers cannot obtain. Second, recyclers' effort behaviors are unobservable. Under this premise, the study focuses on the mechanism design problem of how manufacturers can incentivize two recyclers to reveal their true capabilities and adopt optimal effort behaviors when the two recyclers have competitive or cooperative relationships in the recycling channel.

2.研究方法。以委托代理理论为基础，构建两方面核心内容：一是由回收绩效与支付构成契约的可行配置集；二是能激励回收商显示真实能力及付出最优努力的激励相容约束。基于此，建立可同时克服逆向选择和道德风险问题的最优激励机制模型，进而探讨回收渠道竞争与合作关系对制造商最优契约安排及回收模式选择的影响机理。

2. Research Methods: Based on the principal-agent theory, two core components are constructed. First, a feasible configuration set of contracts composed of recycling performance and payment; second, incentive compatibility constraints that can encourage recyclers to reveal their true capabilities and make optimal efforts. On this basis, an optimal incentive mechanism model that can simultaneously overcome the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard is established, and further, the influence mechanism of competitive and cooperative relationships in recycling channels on manufacturers' optimal contract arrangements and recycling mode selection is explored.

3.研究结论。（1）回收绩效分享比例随合作强度增大而增大，在特定条件下，随竞争强度增大呈先增后减的趋势。（2）回收商努力水平与努力成本系数、绝对风险规避系数、市场不确定性呈负相关，与竞争强度、合作强度、努力产出系数呈正相关。（3）相较于能力信息对称的情况，能力信息不对称时，最优回收绩效分享比例和努力水平均会向下扭曲，且回收商能获取额外信息租金。（4）在特定条件下，当制造商选择能力更强的回收商时，建立合作回收渠道更有利于保障回收效率与经济效益。

3. Research Conclusions: (1) The recycling performance sharing ratio increases with the increase of cooperation intensity, and under certain conditions, it shows a trend of first increasing and then decreasing with the increase of competition intensity. (2) Recyclers' effort level is negatively correlated with the effort cost coefficient, absolute risk aversion coefficient, and market uncertainty, and positively correlated with competition intensity, cooperation intensity, and effort output coefficient. (3) Compared with the situation of symmetric capability information, when capability information is asymmetric, both the optimal recycling performance sharing ratio and effort level will be distorted downward, and recyclers can obtain additional information rent. (4) Under certain conditions, when manufacturers select recyclers with stronger capabilities, establishing a cooperative recycling channel is more conducive to ensuring recycling efficiency and economic benefits.

三、知识补充（Supplementary Knowledge）

1.逆向选择：在逆向供应链中，回收商的能力禀赋属于其私有信息，制造商难以准确知晓。这种信息不对称可能导致制造商误选能力不足的回收商，或是为筛选出优质回收商额外付出成本，进而降低整个逆向供应链的配置效率，是影响回收合作效果的重要问题之一。

1. Adverse Selection: In a reverse supply chain, recyclers' capability endowments are their private information, which manufacturers find difficult to accurately obtain. This information asymmetry may lead manufacturers to mistakenly select recyclers with insufficient capabilities or incur additional costs in screening for high-quality recyclers. Consequently, the allocation efficiency of the entire reverse supply chain is reduced, making it one of the key issues affecting the effectiveness of recycling cooperation.

2.回收渠道关系对效率的影响：回收渠道中双回收商的关系（会直接影响逆向供应链的整体效益。当回收商间合作强度提升时，双方更易共享资源、协同作业，有助于释放更高的回收潜力；而竞争强度的变化则需结合实际条件判断影响。在特定情况下，适度竞争可能激发回收商积极性，但竞争过强反而可能导致资源内耗，需通过合理机制平衡，才能保障回收效率与经济效益。

2. Impact of Recycling Channel Relationships on Efficiency: The relationship between two recyclers in the recycling channel directly affects the overall efficiency of the reverse supply chain. When the intensity of cooperation between recyclers increases, it becomes easier for both parties to share resources and collaborate on operations, which helps release greater recycling potential. However, the impact of changes in competition intensity needs to be judged based on actual conditions. Under specific circumstances, moderate competition may stimulate the enthusiasm of recyclers, but excessive competition may instead lead to resource waste. A reasonable mechanism is required to achieve balance, so as to ensure recycling efficiency and economic benefits.

3.绝对风险规避系数：用于描述回收商对风险的接受程度。系数越高，说明回收商越害怕承担风险，在面对市场不确定性（如回收量波动、物资价格变化）时，更可能选择保守策略，比如降低努力水平以减少潜在损失。这一系数会影响回收商的决策行为，进而作用于制造商的激励机制设计和整体回收效益。

3. Absolute Risk Aversion Coefficient: It is used to describe recyclers' acceptance of risk. The higher the coefficient, the more afraid recyclers are of undertaking risks. When facing market uncertainties (such as fluctuations in recycling volume and changes in material prices), recyclers are more likely to adopt conservative strategies, such as reducing their effort level to minimize potential losses. This coefficient affects the decision-making behavior of recyclers and further influences the design of manufacturers' incentive mechanisms and the overall recycling benefits.

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文案|hu

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