摘要：This issue of the tweet will introduce the case analysis of the intensive reading journal article "Game Theory Research on Establi
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“喆学（77）：精读期刊论文
《绿色信贷视角下建立绿色供应链的博弈研究》
算例分析（2）”
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Today, the editor brings the
"Zhexue (77): Intensive reading of journal articles
"Game theory research on establishing a green supply chain
from the perspective of green credit"
Case analysis (2)"
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本期推文将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面介绍精读期刊论文《绿色信贷视角下建立绿色供应链的博弈研究》算例分析。
This issue of the tweet will introduce the case analysis of the intensive reading journal article "Game Theory Research on Establishing Green Supply Chain from the Perspective of Green Credit" from three aspects: Mind map, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplement.
一、思维导图（Mind Maps）
二、精读内容（Intensive reading content）
(1)不同初始状态下各参与主体的选择不同(Different choices of participants in different initial states)
初始状态对三方的策略选择有重要影响。如果政府监管力度初始值较低，即使后来加强，银行和企业也可能因为之前的压力较小而不愿意改变现状，抵制新策略的实施。
The initial state has an important impact on the strategic choices of the three parties. If the initial value of government supervision is low, even if it is strengthened later, banks and enterprises may be unwilling to change the status quo and resist the implementation of new strategies because of the previous low pressure.
相反，如果政府监管力度初始值较高，这会给银行和企业带来较大的压力，促使他们更积极地实施绿色策略，即使在政府取消监管后，他们也会倾向于继续遵守之前的规则。
On the contrary, if the initial value of government regulation is high, this will put greater pressure on banks and companies, prompting them to implement green strategies more actively. Even after the government cancels the regulation, they will tend to continue to abide by the previous rules.
在这个图中，政府群体选择监管策略的比例从0.1增长到0.6。随着政府监管力度的增加，银行群体更倾向于实施绿色信贷策略，而企业则更倾向于采取绿色供应链策略。这表明政府的监管策略对银行和企业的绿色策略选择有显著影响。
In this figure, the proportion of government groups choosing regulatory strategies increases from 0.1 to 0.6. With the increase in government supervision, banking groups are more inclined to implement green credit strategies, while enterprises are more inclined to adopt green supply chain strategies. This shows that the government's regulatory strategies have a significant impact on the green strategy choices of banks and enterprises.
(2)政府对企业的补贴和惩罚的变化对演化结果的影响(The impact of changes in government subsidies and penalties on firms on evolutionary outcomes)
在初始状态下，政府的监管策略选择比例为0.4，银行的绿色信贷策略选择比例为0.2，企业的绿色供应链策略选择比例为0.6。随着时间的推移，企业最终趋向于不采取绿色供应链策略，银行趋向于不实施绿色信贷策略，而政府则选择监管策略。
In the initial state, the government's regulatory strategy selection ratio is 0.4, the bank's green credit strategy selection ratio is 0.2, and the enterprise's green supply chain strategy selection ratio is 0.6. As time goes by, enterprises tend not to adopt green supply chain strategies, banks tend not to implement green credit strategies, and the government chooses regulatory strategies.
初始状态下，政府的监管策略选择比例为0.4，银行的绿色信贷策略选择比例为0.2，企业的绿色供应链策略选择比例为0.6。随着时间的推移，政府和银行的策略没有改变，仍然趋向于选择监管和实施绿色信贷策略。然而，企业最终趋向于采取绿色供应链策略。
In the initial state, the government's regulatory strategy selection ratio was 0.4, the bank's green credit strategy selection ratio was 0.2, and the enterprise's green supply chain strategy selection ratio was 0.6. Over time, the government and bank strategies did not change, and they still tended to choose regulation and implement green credit strategies. However, enterprises eventually tended to adopt green supply chain strategies.
当政府增加对企业的补贴和惩罚时，企业选择不采取绿色供应链策略的成本增加，同时由于补贴的增加，企业选择实施绿色供应链策略的相对收益也增加。这种变化导致企业更倾向于采取绿色供应链策略，从而实现了三方的均衡策略，有利于绿色供应链的长远发展。通过调整补贴系数和惩罚额度，可以有效地引导企业和银行采取更有利于绿色供应链发展的策略。
When the government increases subsidies and penalties for enterprises, the cost of enterprises choosing not to adopt green supply chain strategies increases. At the same time, due to the increase in subsidies, the relative benefits of enterprises choosing to implement green supply chain strategies also increase. This change leads enterprises to be more inclined to adopt green supply chain strategies, thus achieving a balanced strategy for the three parties, which is conducive to the long-term development of green supply chains. By adjusting the subsidy coefficient and penalty amount, enterprises and banks can be effectively guided to adopt strategies that are more conducive to the development of green supply chains.
三、知识补充（Knowledge supplement）
补贴和惩罚的具体数值对策略选择有显著影响。根据文献，奖惩力度对政府、银行和企业的策略选择有着很大的影响。当奖惩力度很小时，这些主体可能偏向选择非绿色信贷策略；而随着奖惩力度的增大，他们更可能从非绿色行为策略转变为绿色行为策略。此外，奖惩力度越大，这些主体选择绿色行为策略的意愿也越大。
The specific values of subsidies and penalties have a significant impact on strategy selection. According to the literature, the intensity of rewards and punishments has a great impact on the strategic choices of governments, banks and enterprises. When the intensity of rewards and punishments is small, these subjects may tend to choose non-green credit strategies; as the intensity of rewards and punishments increases, they are more likely to switch from non-green behavior strategies to green behavior strategies. In addition, the greater the intensity of rewards and punishments, the greater the willingness of these subjects to choose green behavioral strategies.
具体来说，当政府增加对企业的补贴系数和惩罚系数时，企业选择不采取绿色供应链策略的成本会增加。同时，由于补贴系数的增加，企业选择实施绿色供应链策略的相对收益也会增加，这使得企业更倾向于采取绿色供应链策略。这种策略选择的转变有助于实现绿色供应链的长远发展。
Specifically, when the government increases the subsidy coefficient and penalty coefficient for enterprises, the cost of enterprises choosing not to adopt green supply chain strategies will increase. At the same time, due to the increase in subsidy coefficients, the relative benefits of enterprises choosing to implement green supply chain strategies will also increase, making enterprises more inclined to adopt green supply chain strategies. This change in strategic choice will help achieve the long-term development of green supply chains.
此外，不同惩罚力度对各博弈方策略选择的影响也很明显。当惩罚力度非常小，使用绿色信贷产生的投资花费远大于被惩罚的资金时，各博弈方可能会偏向于使用非绿色信贷手段，导致系统收敛于非绿色信贷策略。相反，当惩罚力度非常大，非绿色信贷手段的收益不足以抵扣惩罚时，各博弈方会偏向于实行绿色信贷政策，以免被惩罚高额罚金，从而系统收敛到绿色信贷策略。
In addition, the impact of different punishment intensity on the strategy selection of each player is also obvious. When the punishment intensity is very small, and the investment cost generated by using green credit is far greater than the funds punished, each player may tend to use non-green credit means, causing the system to converge to a non-green credit strategy. On the contrary, when the punishment intensity is very large and the income from non-green credit means is not enough to offset the punishment, each player will tend to implement a green credit policy to avoid being punished with a high fine, so that the system converges to a green credit strategy.
总结来说，补贴和惩罚的具体数值是影响策略选择的关键因素，适当的奖惩机制可以有效地引导企业和银行采取更有利于绿色供应链发展的策略。通过调整这些参数，可以改变最终三方的均衡策略，促进绿色供应链的实施和发展。
In summary, the specific values of subsidies and penalties are key factors affecting strategy selection. Appropriate reward and punishment mechanisms can effectively guide enterprises and banks to adopt strategies that are more conducive to the development of green supply chains. By adjusting these parameters, the final equilibrium strategy of the three parties can be changed, promoting the implementation and development of green supply chains.
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翻译：谷歌翻译
参考资料：谷歌、Chat GPT
参考文献：周永圣,梁淑慧,刘淑芹, 王珏. 绿色信贷视角下建立绿色供应链的博弈研究 [J]. 管理科学学报, 2017, 20(12): 87-98.
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来源：LearningYard学苑