摘要：《国际组织评论》（The Review of International Organizations）是一份分析政府和非政府组织运行的同行评审学术期刊，始发刊于2006年，由Springer出版。该刊涵盖整个政治经济学领域，重点关注国际组织的政策和结构。202

期刊简介

《国际组织评论》（The Review of International Organizations）是一份分析政府和非政府组织运行的同行评审学术期刊，始发刊于2006年，由Springer出版。该刊涵盖整个政治经济学领域，重点关注国际组织的政策和结构。2022年该刊影响因子为3.9，在国际关系的96种期刊中排名第12。

本期目录

1 开放的悖论：民主，金融一体化与危机

A paradox of openness: Democracies, financial integration & crisis

2 共同对手，武器运送：1920-1939年间国际军火贸易中的竞争与合作

Sharing rivals, sending weapons: Rivalry and cooperation in the international arms trade, 1920–1939

3 赋予受害者权力：专制政权为何允许个人在国际组织请愿？

Empowering your victims: Why repressive regimes allow individual petitions in international organizations

4 自由主义国际组织中的特洛伊木马？民主倒退如何破坏联合国人权理事会

Trojan horses in liberal international organizations? How democratic backsliders undermine the UNHRC

5 搭建桥梁还是加剧鸿沟？国际组织、社交媒体和两级分化

Building bridges or digging the trench? International organizations, social media, and polarized fragmentation

6 作为借款人和监管者的政府

Governments as borrowers and regulators

内容摘要

开放的悖论：民主，金融一体化与危机

题目：A paradox of openness: Democracies, financial integration & crisis

作者：Devin Case-Ruchala，北卡罗来纳大学教堂山分校政治学博士。

摘要：为什么民主国家比非民主国家更频繁地发生金融危机？本文重新审视了2008年发生的金融危机（GFC），将其作为一个重要的、有丰富信息的测试案例。文章发现，要解释21世纪初以来民主国家的金融危机易感性，研究国内体制如何内嵌于系统层面的结构中至关重要。本文介绍了共治金融联系机制，认为制度类型是全球资金流动的一个重要系统性特征。通过使用国际货币基金组织协调证券投资调查（CPLS）的潜在空间网络回归模型进行的分析，本文发现跨境证券资产投资网络的运作模式系统地由成对的民主国家所决定。同时，本文表明这种制度模式上的相互依存会影响民主国家对金融危机的易感性。本文的结论基于对强调国内因素与系统层面相互依存关系的文献研究，并为民主国家金融危机频发这一经验性难题提供了新的分析视角。

Why do democracies experience financial crises more often than non-democracies? Revisiting the 2008 Great Financial Crisis (GFC) as a significant and informative test case, I argue that considering the way domestic institutions inhere in system-level structures is important to explaining crisis susceptibility among democracies since the turn of the twenty-first century. I introduce the mechanism of co-regime financial connections in showing that regime type is an important systematic feature of global financial flows. Employing a latent space network regression model using IMF Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS), I find that the network of cross-border portfolio asset investments is systematically patterned by co-democracy pairs. I then show that this regime-patterned interdependence affects increased financial crisis susceptibility among democracies. My findings build on literature highlighting the interdependence between domestic- and system-level factors and inform an empirical puzzle regarding the prevalence of financial crises among democracies.

共同对手，武器运送：1920-1939年间国际军火贸易中的竞争与合作

题目：Sharing rivals, sending weapons: Rivalry and cooperation in the international arms trade, 1920–1939

作者：Marius Mehrl，利兹大学政治与国际关系学院讲师；Daniel Seussler，德国曼海姆评估与发展中心数据分析师；Paul W. Thurner，德国慕尼黑大学格施维斯特-肖尔政治学研究所实证政治研究与政策分析主席。

摘要：一国在与其他国家交往时，必须把握国际体系的结构。这种结构的一个重要组成部分是竞争，因为竞争关系显示了一国对另一国的潜在威胁。所以，竞争关系不仅影响着一国在特定国际体系中的行为方式，还影响着一国会如何塑造和重组该体系。本文的研究主要聚焦于国家间的武器转让，同时阐明了竞争中隐藏的系统性结构如何推动各国努力与其他国家开展安全合作。直观来说，与某国存在的竞争关系会降低武器出口国向该国转让武器的意愿。但更重要的是，本文认为，特定双边关系之外的竞争关系同样发挥着重要的作用，因为潜在武器进口国对其他国家的敌意可以向武器出口国释放出安全利益方面的信息。具体而言，与同一组国家存在竞争关系将向出口国发出两国安全利益一致的信号，这能够促进双方的安全合作。如果武器出口方担心陷入困境，不想互相推诿责任，这种类型的安全合作应该采用武器转让的方式。本文使用战时主要常规武器转让的原始数据和推理网络分析模型，以验证这一理论预期。共同的竞争对手会增加两国进行武器贸易的概率，而国家之间的竞争关系则不存在任何影响。这项研究有助于了解国家间安全合作、武器贸易和网络化的国际关系。

States must navigate the structure of the international system in their relations with other states. One crucial component of this structure are rivalries as they indicate latent threat to states. Rivalries should thus influence how states behave within the given system, but also how they seek to shape and restructure it. Focusing on arms transfers, we clarify how the systemic structure implied by rivalries drives states’ efforts to engage in security cooperation with other states. Intuitively, a rivalry with another country should diminish an exporter’s propensity to transfer weapons there. But what is more, we argue that rivalries outside of this focal dyad matter as a potential importer’s enmity towards other countries will reveal information about its security interests to the exporter. Specifically, sharing rivalries with the same set of countries will signal to the exporter that there is a congruence in security interests and thus facilitate security cooperation. This security cooperation should take the form of arms transfers, at least if exporters value buck-passing and fear entrapment. We test our expectations using original data on Major Conventional Weapons transfers in the Interwar years, a period where this condition likely holds, and inferential network analysis models. Sharing rivals increases two countries’ probability to trade arms whereas a rivalry between countries exhibits no effect. This research contributes to our understanding of security cooperation, the arms trade, and networked international relations.

赋予受害者权力：专制政权为何允许个人在国际组织请愿？

题目：Empowering your victims: Why repressive regimes allow individual petitions in international organizations

作者：Rachel J. Schoner，杜兰大学政治学系助理教授。

摘要：越来越多的文献解释了专制政权为何批准人权条约，然而，这些文献却未能解释为何有些政权采取额外措施授权其本国人民在国际上提出法律申诉，而为什么有些政权没有这样做。本文对联合国的个人请愿机制进行了研究，并发现，这一机制允许个人向监督人权条约的机构提出申诉。本文认为，由于欧盟是一个颇具影响力的全球性力量，同时对全球人权制度抱有持续而强烈的兴趣，因此，当专制政权向欧盟发出有关人权问题的承诺信号时，能够获得来自国际层面的激励。然而，只有在评估之后认为这一举动国内成本较低、对行政部门的制度约束较小的情况下，专制政权才会批准人权协定。为了支持这一理论，本文还发现当专制政权在贸易上依赖欧盟，同时在立法和司法方面面临较少的制度限制时，才更有可能批准《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》任择议定书，同时允许个人发起申诉。申诉结果与解释条约批准的结果情况类似，但根据专制国家对任择议定书的批准情况来看，二者之间的互动带来的影响要大得多，这意味着专制国家领导人允许个人提起申诉时所面临的成本增加。《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》（ICCPR）监督机制中的个人申诉权，是非国家行为体参与国际机构治理的一个案例，同时也是理解这一机制设计以及遵守情况的重要组成部分。

The growing literature explaining why repressive regimes ratify human rights treaties fails to explain why some regimes take the additional step to delegate authority to their people to file international legal complaints while others do not. I examine individual petition mechanisms in the United Nations which allow individuals to file complaints to an overseeing treaty body. I argue that repressive regimes face international incentives to signal their commitment to the European Union, a global power with a strong and continued interest in the global human rights regime. Repressive regimes, however, only ratify agreements when they perceive low domestic costs with little institutional constraints on the executive. In support of my theory, I find that repressive regimes are more likely to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ Optional Protocol allowing individual petitions when they are trade dependent on the EU while facing lesser institutional constraints, both legislative and judicial. The results are similar to explaining treaty ratification, but the interaction is substantively larger for OP ratification among repressive countries, highlighting the increased costs repressive leaders face to allowing individual petitions. Individual standing in the overseeing body of the ICCPR is one example of non-state actor access in international institutions, which is an important component of understanding institutional design and compliance.

自由主义国际组织中的特洛伊木马？民主倒退如何破坏联合国人权理事会

题目：Trojan horses in liberal international organizations? How democratic backsliders undermine the UNHRC

作者：Anna M. Meyerrose，亚利桑那州立大学政治与全球研究学院助理教授；Irfan Nooruddin，乔治城大学外交学院亚洲研究项目的哈马德·本·哈利法·阿勒萨尼印度政治学教授。

摘要：自由主义民主面临着越来越多来自民主倒退国家的新挑战。长期以来，尽管根深蒂固的独裁者一直对既有自由主义秩序心怀不满，并试图与之抗衡，但学界对近来正在发生民主倒退的国家在国际舞台上的表现却知之甚少。本文认为，这些国家在民主倒退之前就加入了具有影响力的西方自由主义国际机构，通过利用在这些组织中的成员身份，这些国家既可以保护自己在未来免受是否遵守自由民主价值观的审查，又能够对与其不断变化的利益相冲突的西方自由主义准则表示反对。本文利用联合国人权理事会（UNHRC）2006-2021年的投票数据进行研究，发现民主倒退的国家更有可能对人权理事会点名批评特定国家的针对性决议投反对票。同时，本文使用普遍定期审议（UPR）的详细数据补充上述观点，结合回归分析和结构主题模型（STM），本文发现在对西方先进民主国家进行评估时，民主倒退国家在其普遍定期审议报告中的批判性更强，更有可能强调符合其自身利益的问题而疏于强调可能威胁其政府权力以及公民约束的问题。

Liberal democracy is facing renewed challenges from a growing group of states undergoing democratic backsliding. While entrenched autocrats have long resented and contested the established liberal order, we know far less about how newer backsliding states behave on the international stage. We argue these states, who joined prominent western liberal institutions prior to their backsliding, will use their established membership in these organizations both to protect themselves from future scrutiny regarding adherence to liberal democratic values and to oppose the prevailing western liberal norms that increasingly conflict with their evolving interests. Using voting data from the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) from 2006-2021, we show that backsliding states are more likely to vote against targeted resolutions that name and shame specific countries. We supplement this analysis with detailed data from the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) and combine regression analysis and a structural topic model (STM) to show that backsliding states are more critical in their UPR reports when evaluating advanced western democracies, and more likely to emphasize issues that align with their own interests while de-emphasizing ones that might threaten government power and control over citizens.

搭建桥梁还是加剧鸿沟？国际组织、社交媒体和两级分化

题目：Building bridges or digging the trench? International organizations, social media, and polarized fragmentation

作者：Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt，法兰克福歌德大学政治科学研究所教授。

摘要：国际组织（IOs）的传播部门日益通过社交媒体直接联系公民，是全球治理的重要媒介机构。社交媒体为国际组织的传播工作带来了新的挑战，如竞争激烈的注意力经济，以及网络内容策划和选择性曝光带来的受众碎片化。在这种背景下，国际组织的传播部门不得不在传播什么、如何传播的问题上艰难抉择，这加剧了国际组织的传播的信息公共性（旨在提高机构透明度）和党派政治宣传（旨在改变规范）之间的内在矛盾。如果国际组织传播的重点是宣传，那么它可能会在社交媒体上引发很大反响。然而，这一类型的宣传是失败的，因为它会助长网络传播的两极分化，而在两极分化的“回声室”中，由于国际组织传播通常被视为可靠的信息来源，这一可信度就会受到损害。通过对推特上有关《安全、有序和正常移民全球契约》（GCM）的传播内容和社交网络分析，本文验证了这一观点。值得注意的是，由于联合国全球传播部（UNDGC）运用的推特账号非但没有促进跨群体交流（“搭建桥梁”），反而因为党派转发、提及和标记（标签）等形式，在很大程度上助长了意识形态的分裂（“加剧鸿沟”）。

Communication departments of international organizations (IOs) are important intermediaries of global governance who increasingly use social media to reach out to citizens directly. Social media pose new challenges for IO communication such as a highly competitive economy of attention and the fragmentation of the audiences driven by networked curation of content and selective exposure. In this context, communication departments have to make tough choices about what to communicate and how, aggravating inherent tensions between IO communication as comprehensive public information (aimed at institutional transparency)—and partisan political advocacy (aimed at normative change). If IO communication focuses on advocacy it might garner substantial resonance on social media. Such advocacy nevertheless fails to the extent that it fosters the polarized fragmentation of networked communication and undermines the credibility of IO communication as a source of trustworthy information across polarized “echo chambers.” The paper illustrates this argument through a content and social network analysis of Twitter communication on the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM). Remarkably, instead of facilitating cross-cluster communication (“building bridges”) Twitter handles run by the United Nations Department of Global Communications (UNDGC) seem to have substantially fostered ideological fragmentation (“digging the trench”) by their way of partisan retweeting, mentioning, and (hash)tagging.

作为借款人和监管者的政府

题目：Governments as borrowers and regulators

作者：Timm Betz，圣路易斯华盛顿大学政治学系副教授；Amy Pond，University of Michigan，Associate Professor of Political Science，密歇根大学政治学副教授。

摘要：借贷能力对政府的生存至关重要。各国政府通常利用其借款人和监管者的双重身份，在金融市场上采取能够为本国债务提供特权的政策，我们将这类政策称为借贷特权。这些借贷特权促使投资者能够持有政府自己的债务，它们与审慎监管存在相似之处，却能使市场更有利于政府债务。同时，借贷特权也与金融抑制有相似之处，但抑制程度较轻，因此其与金融市场的增长相一致。本文构建了首个系统追踪各国政策实践历时性演变的跨国数据库，研究发现：当政府与全球经济的互动使财政需求增加时，如当借贷成本显示信贷渠道收紧时，当贸易自由化使得收入减少时，当固定汇率能够增加财政空间的价值时，政府就会使用借贷特权。尽管金融资产具有流动性并受到全球市场的限制，各国政府在调节国内市场以确保自身财政利益方面仍然存在一定的自由度。

The ability to borrow is important for government survival. Governments routinely resort to policies that privilege their own debt on financial markets, exploiting their dual role as borrowers and regulators. We label such policies as borrowing privileges. These borrowing privileges nudge investors to hold the government’s own debt. They share similarities with prudential regulation, but skew the market in favor of the government’s debt; and they share similarities with financial repression, but are less severe and thus consistent with the growth of financial markets. Introducing the first systematic dataset documenting the use of such policies across countries and over time, we demonstrate that governments implement borrowing privileges when their interactions with the global economy heighten fiscal needs: when borrowing costs indicate tightened access to credit, when trade liberalization undercuts revenue, and where fixed exchange rates increase the value of fiscal space. Despite the mobility of financial assets and constraints from global markets, governments retain latitude in regulating domestic markets to their own fiscal benefit.

编译：管怡，国政学人编译员，澳门大学国际关系与公共政策专业。

审校 | 赖永祯

排版 | 闫佳欣

本文源于The Review of International Organizations, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2025. 本文为公益分享，服务于科研教学，不代表本平台观点。如有疏漏，欢迎指正。

来源：国政学人