摘要：Ведомости：您认为2025年第一季度俄中贸易额下降的原因是什么？是否有人担心贸易的某些方面已经达到顶峰，可能导致贸易下滑，例如中国汽车对俄出口？您认为两国贸易伙伴关系中还有哪些尚未实现的潜力？

中文版

Ведомости：您认为2025年第一季度俄中贸易额下降的原因是什么？是否有人担心贸易的某些方面已经达到顶峰，可能导致贸易下滑，例如中国汽车对俄出口？您认为两国贸易伙伴关系中还有哪些尚未实现的潜力？

王文：我觉得，判断两国贸易是否达到顶峰，不能从一个季度的数据来找证据。过去三年，中俄贸易年均增长30%以上，达到近2500亿美元，堪称是爆炸式的增长。2025年第一季度的两国贸易下降，主要是受到汇率的影响，并不能代表着中俄贸易的未来趋势。

至于你说的中国汽车对俄的出口增速变慢，也是正常现象。毕竟，过去三年，中国汽车出口俄罗斯，几乎是从零起步，提升到占俄罗斯汽车进口总量的70%以上。未来增速变慢，也是正常现象，这并不能代表中俄贸易见顶。

但我对中俄贸易充满信心。事实上，中俄贸易在许多领域的潜力还未发挥出来。比如，在能源合作领域，随着亚马尔、北极-2等大型LNG项目的投资和长期采购，以及新管道建设，中俄能源贸易还会有巨大的增量。再比如，随着中国在俄罗斯农业投资的增加，俄罗斯农产品出口还会有较大的增量。还比如，包括航空航天、核能、新材料、生物技术领域的高科技合作。另外，随着两国本币结算的扩大以及“去美元化”基础设施的完善，中俄两国在支付领域、跨境电商和服务贸易领域的提升仍有较大的增长空间。

总之，不能因为2025年第一季度中俄贸易额的下降，就对中俄贸易的未来产生悲观的情绪。事实上，在我看来，随着两国政府部门和贸易机构的努力，中俄贸易在未来几年将很快达到3000亿美元、甚至3500亿美元的规模。

Ведомости：2024年，俄中两国总理同意加强两国间的支付基础设施建设，以促进贸易畅通。在这方面可以采取哪些措施？例如，中国银行在俄罗斯设立分支机构是否可行？加密货币支付的前景如何？建立统一的金砖国家或上合组织支付系统存在哪些障碍？

王文：加强两国间的金融基础设施合作，是落实两国元首要求的必然方向。在这一点上，我们需要有更多的信心。目前要做的是，是如何克服当下困难，增加更大的金融合作与支付规模。比如，中国四大银行（中国银行、建设银行、工商银行、农业银行）在俄都设有代表处或分行，但是受到西方二级制裁的风险影响，部分缩减了业务规模。

我相信，在未来，中国将会扩大设立专注于人民币与卢布结算的银行，规避制裁的风险。同时，两国应深化人民币-卢布直接交易的清算机制，升级CIPS和SPFS系统对接，创新支付工具与非银行渠道，比如，数字人民币、银联（UnionPay）和俄罗斯Mir支付系统的互通等等。

关于加密货币，中国明确禁止加密货币跨境支付，企业如果使用，将面临合规处罚。据我所知，俄罗斯央行方面对加密的态度也是较为反复。因此，我建议，中俄两国还是要加强法定货币的央行数字货币的深度合作与协调。

至于统一的金砖银行支付系统，目前看来，还存在不少障碍，比如，利益协调难度很大，技术整合成本较高，地缘政治风险较大，还有流动性管理较难等等。在这方面，来自印度的阻碍是最大的。因此，从短期看，双边本币结算仍是理性和务实的选择。从长远看，或许可以推动上合组织建立区域性结算公约。

总而言之，加强中俄支付基础设施需要有“技术+制度”的双轨突轨。在这方面，我们仍需要继续努力。

Ведомости：2025年4月，两国更新了《促进和保护相互投资协定草案》。您认为，中国主要对俄罗斯的哪些行业或项目感兴趣？

王文：这个相互投资的协定非常重要，将会为两国投资者提供更稳定的法律保障和更开放的市场准入条件。我以前曾多次提过，中国在俄投资仅仅占中国在全球投资额的不到1%，俄罗斯在中国投资不到中国吸引外资的0.1%。这种情况需要改变。相信随着这个协定的深化，两国相互投资会得到较快改善。

如果这个协定得到执行，那么，我相信，中国对俄罗斯的大量领域都有兴趣。最大的兴趣在于资源和能源。中国愿意投资俄罗斯的油气和矿产开发，也对俄罗斯关键矿产（比如镍、铜、钯金）的投资会非常感兴趣。

第二，中国也愿意推动对俄制造业投资的本土化。比如，中国电动车、电池材料、家电制造、半导体封闭测试等都愿意在俄罗斯投资，以贴近俄罗斯市场。

第三，对俄农业投资也将是重点。俄罗斯远东有大量肥沃的农田，中国愿意去投资种植大豆、玉米等，也愿意去投资生猪养殖场、油菜籽、水产加工等。

第四，中国还愿意参与俄罗斯基础设施的投资。比如，摩尔曼斯克港、西伯利亚大铁路、从新西伯利亚到中国新疆的铁路、跨境数据中心建设，还有边境智慧口岸建设等等。

第五，中国还愿意在新兴技术上进行投资。比如航天、核能、生物科技、制药等。

可见，中国对投资俄罗斯非常感兴趣。能否吸引更多中国投资的关键在于，要落实两国相互投资的各项法律保证，尤其俄方要尽可能地取消限制领域，并建立争端解决机制和利润汇出保障。总而言之，只要这份相互投资协定能够真正落实，两国投资将会出现井喷式的发展。

Ведомости：为了保持在全球市场的竞争优势，一些国家显著加强了对技术传播的控制。这是否会导致全球分化和竞争性技术平台的出现？例如，我们观察到西方公司在内燃机领域处于领先地位，而中国在电动机领域占据主导地位，美国在现代微处理器领域则表现出色。这些行动可能带来哪些长期后果？

王文：我曾写过一篇长篇学术论文，讲述当今世界正处在“高科技新冷战”时代，这导致高科技垄断的“区块化”现象，进而重塑全球各国的创新进程与产业竞争格局。普适性的高科技全球化进程已经终结，但区域合作式、战略互信式的双边高科技合作将改变国际关系与全球政治结构。

在我看来，未来的全球“高技术新冷战”至少会出现两大重要变化：

第一，两大极具竞争性的高科技集团将形成。一方面是以美国为主导的西方阵营，试图垄断精密制造和数字技术，推动以英伟达、谷歌等公司为代表的西方领衔企业在全球市场上的绝对垄断地位。另一方面是以“中国+俄罗斯等资源国”为代表的新兴阵营，试图打破高科技垄断，同时加大在电动化、新能源领域的做领先优势，占据更多国际市场份额。这种“高科技地缘联盟”并无助于全球创新，最终导致研发投入的碎片化和高科技的“平行宇宙”。

第二，未来高科技“区块化”必须要适应美国推出的“安全压倒市场”的霸权逻辑。美国推行的技术民族主义，有可能被欧洲、日本所效仿，进而导致高科技供应链的部分脱钩与深度割裂。比如，军事技术、量子加密技术、6G核心网技术等等。中国成为国际高科技普惠主义的重要代表。中国一直希望能够与所有国家分享高科技，进而扩大产能与各国市场规模。

对此，新兴经济体处在技术中间地带，面临着艰难的战略选择。有的国家选择两面下注，比如，印度就同时引进台积电建封装厂（美系）和比亚迪建电动车厂（中式）；有的国家则面临着美国打压，比如2024年美国商务部就迫使阿联酋G42集团撤出对华超算投资。

总之，“区块化”的高科技分裂世界需要让各个国家都要建立新的高科技生存法则。对俄罗斯而言，需要在规避西方制裁的前提下加大与中国高科技合作，通过技术隔离等方式，引进更多中国的高科技投资，与此同时，为中国输出更多资源与矿产，进而实现高科技的区块生态绑定，最终实现双赢。

Ведомости：中国通常是大型国际项目最大的一级或二级供应商；然而，许多专家认为，中国正日益寻求独立实施其自身项目，最大限度地减少其他国家的参与。这种观点的合理性如何？这是否会导致潜在合作伙伴将重点转向其他经济和技术发展中心？

王文：这个观点过于简单，也高估了目前中国在许多高科技项目上的独立实施能力，比如高端芯片制造等。

随着中国国力的提升，中国在大型国际项目中的角色出现了动态演变与调整的过程。中国并不排斥国际合作，但面临着国际市场的不确定性与美国的打压，中国倾向于采取更自主、更风险可控的合作模式。

在过去几年里，中国在大型国际项目上积累了一些经验，也汲取了不少教训。在成功“自主实施”方面，中国对外工程承包中“全产业链输出”项目占比从2016年32%升至2024年61%。尤其是2023年中国独立承建了印尼雅万高铁，更是典型的成功案例。但另一方面，中国也遭遇了惨痛的大型国际项目受阻教训，比如，墨西哥高铁项目因美国干预流产；以色列海法港项目遭美国安全审查，由此看，中国选择更自主可控的合作模式，尽可能规避地缘政治风险，就很能理解了。

在未来的国际合作伙伴选择上，中国不得不面临着一些传统合作伙伴的“去中国化”举措，比如，欧盟的《全球门户计划》希望替代中资进行巴尔干铁路的建设；印度采取“生产挂钩激励计划” 试图补贴苹果供应链迁出中国。美国推动高科技联盟的“友岸外包”等政策，也对中国未来的国际合作制造新的风险。

不过，要相信聪明的中国人以及国际社会对中国的友好程度。目前，多数国家都很欢迎中国的产能与大型项目合作。比如，中国低附加值的制造业、新能源车企等，都在许多新兴国家创造了新合作机遇。

从这个角度看，未来中国对外大型合作项目的模式将会呈现多元化的形态。有的项目会由中国完全主导，比如5G基站、特高压等；有的项目是联合开发，比如，中俄国际月球科研站项目；有的项目则只会有限参与，比如，中资参股一些国家的金融基础设施项目等。

Ведомости：在与美国贸易紧张局势加剧的背景下，中国正在加强在亚洲和欧洲的外交努力。这些市场能否抵消预期的对美出口下降？或者，它们是否会有助于建立更加多元化的供应链，或导致美国地位的削弱？

王文：亚洲和欧洲市场对中国的出口替代进程具有巨大的战略价值，但是，这引起市场的重要性因产品种类不同而呈现出较大的区别。比如，东盟市场的主力替代产品是消费电子、光伏组件等，能够抵消中国对美国出口下降的65%左右份额。欧盟市场的主力替代产品是锂电池等，能够抵消约40%；俄罗斯市场则主要是工程机械、汽车、电器等，能替代20%左右。由此看，消化出口美国市场的努力，是国内和国际共同发力。

以中国国内市场为例，我曾在某次采访中举过一个例子。中国人的私人储蓄总额约150万亿元（约20万亿美元），人均储蓄约1.5万美元。中国2024年对美国出口约5000亿美元，只要14亿中国人拿出人均约350美元，就能够消化出口美国市场的产品。从这个角度看，当前中国大力提升国内消费战略，是非常有必要的。

不过，我认为，特朗普的关税政策正在倒逼着中国加速进行供应链的全球布局，如比亚迪、华为、宁德时代等中国知名企业都在全球各国进行生产车间的投资。正如我曾在一篇《“感谢”特朗普，让中国更伟大》的文章中所说，在2028年时，中国企业的全球化程度又会上了一个台阶。

当然，我并不是轻视美国。事实上，美国在技术标准、跨境物流和资源配置领域仍存在较大的优势。要真正削弱美国地位，就必须要在这三个领域都出现实质性的“去美国化”进程。在技术标准领域，“数字人民币+CIPS跨境清算”标准、6G标准、光伏硅片标准都需要国际创新。在跨境物流领域，中欧班列、北极航道的开发与拓展也变得重要。在资源配置领域，稀土资源的开发也需要尽可能地摆脱美国霸权。

总之，化解中美贸易摩擦产生的冲击，并不容易。一方面，中国会采取同时扩大亚欧市场与国内市场的方式，实现对美国出口产品的尽可能替代；另一方面，尽可能地绿色科技、数字基建、跨境物流、资源配置等新领域，实现中欧亚的新合作以削弱美国霸权。我相信到2028年，全球生产链、技术市场结构的“去美国化”状况又会有新的变化。

Ведомости：中国在发展上合组织、金砖国家和“一带一路”等全球联盟方面发挥着重要作用。是否有可能基于这些倡议之一或一项新的倡议，建立一个拥有自身支付、贸易和交通基础设施的区域经济联盟？

王文：建立一个拥有自身支付、贸易和交通基础设施的区域经济联盟，在短期看仍是困难的。正如我此前讲的，在支付清算系统、贸易规则体系上看，这些领域仍存在一些现有机制的短板。但并不代表着我们不能往“有限替代”的方向去努力。

最可能取得积极进展的，就是“能源-交通-支付”三角机制，即通过俄罗斯能源出口的中俄本币结算、中欧班列的贸易自主与闭环特征等优势，实现欧亚经济联盟与“一带一路”区域的更多对接。

我估计，2028年前，“能源人民币结算”、“中亚陆锁国基建”等领域都会构建区域性的经济联盟，体现差异化的优势。到2035年前，在欧亚大陆有可能实现“有限经济主权联盟”，在能源、基础工业品领域实现闭环生态，但高科技、金融仍与全球体系交织。这些新的国际结构变迁主要原因就是美国霸权。从这个角度看，在未来十年，应对美国霸权，仍是许多新兴经济体的对外首要任务。

英文版

Ведомости: What do you think is behind the decline in trade turnover between Russia and China in the first quarter of 2025? Are there concerns that certain aspects of this trade have peaked, potentially leading to a downturn, such as in the export of Chinese cars to Russia? What unrealized potential do you see in our trade partnership?

Wang Wen: I think that we cannot find evidence from one quarter's data to judge whether the trade between the two countries has reached its peak. In the past three years, China-Russia trade has grown by more than 30% annually, reaching nearly 250 billion US dollars, which can be called explosive growth. The decline in trade between the two countries in the first quarter of 2025 is mainly affected by the exchange rate and does not represent the future trend of China-Russia trade.

As for the slowdown in the growth rate of China's automobile exports to Russia, it is also normal. After all, in the past three years, China's automobile exports to Russia have almost started from zero and increased to more than 70% of Russia's total automobile imports. It is also normal for the growth rate to slow down in the future, which does not mean that China-Russia trade has peaked.

But I am full of confidence in China-Russia trade. In fact, the potential of China-Russia trade in many areas has not yet been realized. For example, in the field of energy cooperation, with the investment and long-term procurement of large-scale LNG projects such as Yamal and Arctic-2, as well as the construction of new pipelines, China-Russia energy trade will have a huge increase. For another example, with the increase of China's investment in Russian agriculture, Russia's agricultural product exports will have a large increase. For example, high-tech cooperation in the fields of aerospace, nuclear energy, new materials, and biotechnology. In addition, with the expansion of local currency settlements between the two countries and the improvement of the "de-dollarization" infrastructure, China and Russia still have a lot of room for growth in the fields of payment, cross-border e-commerce, and service trade.

In short, we should not be pessimistic about the future of Sino-Russian trade just because of the decline in Sino-Russian trade volume in the first quarter of 2025. In fact, in my opinion, with the efforts of the two governments and trade agencies, Sino-Russian trade will soon reach $300 billion or even $350 billion in the next few years.

Ведомости: In 2024, the prime ministers of Russia and China agreed to enhance the payment infrastructure between the two countries to facilitate uninterrupted trade. What measures could be implemented in this regard? For example, is it feasible to establish branches of Chinese banks in Russia? What are the prospects for cryptocurrency payments? What obstacles exist in creating a unified BRICS or SCO payment system?

Wang Wen: Strengthening financial infrastructure cooperation between the two countries is the inevitable direction for implementing the requirements of the two heads of state. At this point, we need to have more confidence. What needs to be done now is how to overcome the current difficulties and increase the scale of financial cooperation and payment. For example, China's four major banks (Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China) have representative offices or branches in Russia, but they have been affected by the risk of secondary sanctions from the West and have partially reduced their business scale.

I believe that in the future, China will expand the establishment of banks that focus on RMB and ruble settlement to avoid the risk of sanctions. At the same time, the two countries should deepen the clearing mechanism for direct RMB-ruble transactions, upgrade the connection between the CIPS and SPFS systems, and innovate payment tools and non-bank channels, such as the interoperability of digital RMB, UnionPay and Russia's Mir payment system.

Regarding cryptocurrencies, China explicitly prohibits cross-border payments of cryptocurrencies, and companies will face compliance penalties if they use them. As far as I know, the attitude of the Russian Central Bank towards encryption is also relatively repeated. Therefore, I suggest that the two countries should strengthen in-depth cooperation and coordination on the central bank digital currency of legal tender.

As for the unified BRICS bank payment system, it seems that there are still many obstacles, such as the difficulty of interest coordination, high cost of technical integration, high geopolitical risks, and difficult liquidity management. In this regard, the biggest obstacle comes from India. Therefore, in the short term, bilateral local currency settlement is still a rational and pragmatic choice. In the long run, it may be possible to promote the establishment of a regional settlement convention by the SCO.

In short, strengthening the payment infrastructure of China and Russia requires a dual track of "technology + system". In this regard, we still need to continue our efforts.

Ведомости: In April 2025, the countries updated the draft agreement on promoting and protecting mutual investments. In your opinion, which sectors or projects in Russia would China primarily be interested in investing in?

Wang Wen: This mutual investment agreement is very important. It will provide more stable legal protection and more open market access conditions for investors from both countries. I have mentioned many times before that China's investment in Russia accounts for less than 1% of China's global investment, and Russia's investment in China accounts for less than 0.1% of China's foreign investment. This situation needs to change. I believe that with the deepening of this agreement, the mutual investment between the two countries will be improved rapidly.

If this agreement is implemented, then I believe that China will be interested in many areas in Russia. The biggest interest lies in resources and energy. China is willing to invest in Russia's oil and gas and mineral development, and is also very interested in investing in Russia's key minerals (such as nickel, copper, and palladium).

Second, China is also willing to promote the localization of investment in Russia's manufacturing industry. For example, China's electric vehicles, battery materials, home appliance manufacturing, semiconductor closed testing, etc. are all willing to invest in Russia to get closer to the Russian market.

Third, investment in Russian agriculture will also be a focus. There are a lot of fertile farmland in Russia's Far East. China is willing to invest in soybeans, corn, etc., and is also willing to invest in pig farms, rapeseed, aquatic product processing, etc.

Fourth, China is also willing to participate in Russian infrastructure investment. For example, the Port of Murmansk, the Trans-Siberian Railway, the railway from Novosibirsk to Xinjiang, China, the construction of cross-border data centers, and the construction of border smart ports, etc.

Fifth, China is also willing to invest in emerging technologies. For example, aerospace, nuclear energy, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, etc.

It can be seen that China is very interested in investing in Russia. The key to attracting more Chinese investment lies in the implementation of various legal guarantees for mutual investment between the two countries, especially the Russian side should remove restricted areas as much as possible, and establish a dispute settlement mechanism and profit remittance guarantee. In short, as long as this mutual investment agreement can be truly implemented, the investment between the two countries will see a blowout development.

Ведомости：In an effort to maintain competitive advantages in global markets, some countries have significantly tightened control over technology dissemination. Could this result in global divergence and the emergence of competing technological platforms? For instance, we observe Western companies leading in internal combustion engines, while China dominates electric motors and the U.S. excels in modern microprocessors. What might be the long-term consequences of these actions?

Wang Wen: I once wrote a long academic paper about how the world is in the era of the " high-tech new cold war", which has led to the "blocking" phenomenon of high-tech monopoly, and thus reshaped the innovation process and industrial competition pattern of countries around the world. The universal high-tech globalization process has ended, but regional cooperation and strategic mutual trust in bilateral high-tech cooperation will change international relations and the global political structure.

In my opinion, there will be at least two major changes in the future global "new high-tech cold war":

First, two highly competitive high-tech groups will be formed. On the one hand, the Western camp led by the United States is trying to monopolize precision manufacturing and digital technology, and promote the absolute monopoly of Western leading companies represented by companies such as Nvidia and Google in the global market. On the other hand, the emerging camp represented by "China + Russia and other resource countries" is trying to break the high-tech monopoly, while increasing its leading advantages in the fields of electrification and new energy, and occupying more international market share. This "high-tech geopolitical alliance" does not help global innovation, and ultimately leads to the fragmentation of R&D investment and the "parallel universe" of high technology.

Second, the future high-tech "blockchain" must adapt to the hegemonic logic of "security overwhelms the market" launched by the United States. The technological nationalism promoted by the United States may be imitated by Europe and Japan, leading to partial decoupling and deep division of the high-tech supply chain. For example, military technology, quantum encryption technology, 6G core network technology, etc. China has become an important representative of international high-tech inclusiveism. China has always hoped to share high technology with all countries, thereby expanding production capacity and market size of various countries.

In this regard, emerging economies are in the middle of technology and face difficult strategic choices. Some countries choose to bet on both sides. For example, India simultaneously introduced TSMC to build a packaging plant (American style) and BYD to build an electric car plant (Chinese style); some countries are facing suppression from the United States. For example, in 2024, the US Department of Commerce forced the UAE G42 Group to withdraw its supercomputing investment in China.

In short, the "blockchain" high-tech divided world requires each country to establish a new high-tech survival rule. For Russia, it needs to increase high-tech cooperation with China while avoiding Western sanctions, introduce more Chinese high-tech investment through technological isolation and other means, and at the same time export more resources and minerals to China, so as to achieve high-tech block ecological binding and ultimately achieve a win-win situation.

Ведомости: China is often the largest first- or second-tier supplier for major international projects; however, it is increasingly seeking, according to many experts, to implement its own projects independently, minimizing involvement from other countries. How justified is this perspective, and could it result in potential partners shifting their focus toward other centers of economic and technological development?

Wang Wen: This view is too simple and overestimates China's independent implementation capabilities in many high-tech projects, such as high-end chip manufacturing.

As China's national strength increases, China's role in large international projects has undergone a dynamic evolution and adjustment process. China does not reject international cooperation, but faced with the uncertainty of the international market and the suppression of the United States, China tends to adopt a more independent and risk-controlled cooperation model.

In the past few years, China has accumulated some experience in large international projects and learned a lot of lessons. In terms of successful "independent implementation", the proportion of "full industrial chain output" projects in China's overseas engineering contracting has increased from 32% in 2016 to 61% in 2024. In particular, China independently built the Jakarta-Bandung high-speed railway in Indonesia in 2023, which is a typical success case. But on the other hand, China has also suffered painful lessons from the obstruction of large international projects. For example, the Mexican high-speed rail project was aborted due to US intervention; the Israeli Haifa Port project was subject to US security review. From this point of view, it is understandable that China chooses a more independent and controllable cooperation model to avoid geopolitical risks as much as possible.

In the selection of international partners in the future, China has to face the "de-Sinicization" measures of some traditional partners. For example, the EU's "Global Gateway Plan" hopes to replace Chinese capital in the construction of the Balkan Railway; India adopts a "production-linked incentive plan" to try to subsidize Apple's supply chain to move out of China. The United States promotes policies such as "friendly shore outsourcing" of high-tech alliances, which also creates new risks for China's future international cooperation.

However, we must believe in the smart Chinese and the friendliness of the international community to China. At present, most countries welcome China's production capacity and large-scale project cooperation. For example, China's low-value-added manufacturing industry and new energy vehicle companies have created new cooperation opportunities in many emerging countries.

From this perspective, the model of China's large-scale foreign cooperation projects in the future will present a diversified form. Some projects will be completely dominated by China, such as 5G base stations and ultra-high voltage; some projects are jointly developed, such as the China-Russia International Lunar Research Station project; some projects will only be limitedly involved, such as Chinese capital participating in financial infrastructure projects in some countries.

Ведомости：Amid rising trade tensions with the U.S., China is intensifying its diplomatic efforts in Asia and Europe. Can these markets offset the anticipated decline in exports to the U.S.? Alternatively, will they help build more diversified supply chains or lead to a softening of the U.S. position?

Wang Wen: The Asian and European markets have great strategic value for China's export substitution process, but the importance of the market varies greatly depending on the type of product. For example, the main substitute products in the ASEAN market are consumer electronics, photovoltaic components, etc., which can offset about 65% of China's export decline to the United States. The main substitute products in the EU market are lithium batteries, etc., which can offset about 40%; the Russian market is mainly engineering machinery, automobiles, electrical appliances, etc., which can replace about 20%. From this point of view, the efforts to digest exports to the US market are a joint effort of domestic and international efforts.

Taking the Chinese domestic market as an example, I once gave an example in an interview. The total private savings of Chinese people is about 150 trillion yuan (about 20 trillion US dollars), and the per capita savings is about 15,000 US dollars. China's exports to the United States in 2024 will be about 500 billion US dollars. As long as 1.4 billion Chinese people take out about 350 US dollars per capita, they can digest the products exported to the US market. From this perspective, it is very necessary for China to vigorously enhance its domestic consumption strategy at present.

However, I believe that Trump's tariff policy is forcing China to accelerate the global layout of its supply chain. Well-known Chinese companies such as BYD, Huawei, and CATL are investing in production workshops in countries around the world. As I said in an article titled "Thanks" to Trump, Make China Greater, in 2028, the degree of globalization of Chinese companies will be raised to a higher level.

Of course, I am not despising the United States. In fact, the United States still has great advantages in technical standards, cross-border logistics, and resource allocation. To truly weaken the position of the United States, there must be a substantial "de-Americanization" process in all three areas. In the field of technical standards, the "Digital RMB + CIPS Cross-border Clearing" standard, the 6G standard, and the photovoltaic silicon wafer standard all require international innovation. In the field of cross-border logistics, the development and expansion of China-Europe trains and Arctic routes have also become important. In the field of resource allocation, the development of rare earth resources also needs to get rid of American hegemony as much as possible.

In short, it is not easy to resolve the impact of Sino-US trade frictions. On the one hand, China will expand the Asian and European markets and the domestic market at the same time to replace American export products as much as possible; on the other hand, it will explore new areas such as green technology, digital infrastructure, cross-border logistics, and resource allocation as much as possible to achieve new cooperation between China, Europe and Asia to weaken US hegemony. I believe that by 2028, the "de-Americanization" of the global production chain and technology market structure will undergo new changes.

Ведомости：China plays a significant role in developing global alliances such as the SCO, BRICS, and the Belt and Road Initiative. Is there a possibility that a regional economic association with its own payment, trade, and transport infrastructure could emerge based on one of these initiatives or a new one?

Wang Wen: It is still difficult to establish a regional economic alliance with its own payment, trade and transportation infrastructure in the short term. As I said before, there are still some shortcomings in the existing mechanisms in the payment and settlement system and the trade rules system. But it does not mean that we cannot work towards "limited substitution".

The most likely to make positive progress is the "energy-transportation-payment" triangle mechanism, that is, through the advantages of China-Russia local currency settlement of Russian energy exports, trade autonomy and closed-loop characteristics of China-Europe trains, to achieve more docking between the Eurasian Economic Union and the "Belt and Road" region.

I estimate that by 2028, regional economic alliances will be built in the fields of "energy RMB settlement" and "infrastructure in landlocked countries in Central Asia", reflecting differentiated advantages. By 2035, it is possible to achieve a "limited economic sovereignty alliance" in Eurasia and achieve a closed-loop ecology in the fields of energy and basic industrial products, but high technology and finance are still intertwined with the global system. The main reason for these new international structural changes is US hegemony. From this perspective, in the next decade, responding to US hegemony will still be the top priority for many emerging economies.

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