摘要：This issue of tweets will introduce the intensive reading doctoral dissertation "Research on pricing decisions and dynamic coordin
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“喆学（78）：精读博士论文
《考虑公平偏好的竞争型绿色供应链定价决策和动态协调研究》
考虑公平关切和制造商竞争
的绿色供应链定价策略研究（2）”
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Today, the editor brings the
"Zhexue (78): Intensive reading of doctoral dissertation
"Research on pricing decision and dynamic coordination of competitive green Supply chain considering fairness preference"
Research on green supply chain pricing strategy
considering fairness concerns and manufacturer competition (2)"
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本期推文将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个方面介绍精读博士论文《考虑公平偏好的竞争型绿色供应链定价决策和动态协调研究》考虑公平关切和制造商竞争的绿色供应链定价策略研究。
This issue of tweets will introduce the intensive reading doctoral dissertation "Research on pricing decisions and dynamic coordination of competitive green supply chains considering fairness preferences" from three aspects: Mind mapping, intensive reading content, and knowledge supplement. The research on green supply chain pricing strategies considering fairness concerns and manufacturer competition.
一、思维导图（Mind Maps）
二、精读内容（Intensive reading content）
(1)考虑制造商竞争和双向公平关切的定价决策(Pricing decisions considering manufacturer competition and two-way fairness concerns)
在绿色供应链的研究中，模型FF探讨了两个具有公平意识的制造商与一个公平中立的零售商之间的互动关系。制造商的效用函数综合考虑了其利润以及与零售商和其他制造商之间的公平关切。命题3-2进一步阐述了在这种双向公平关切下，制造商和零售商的最优定价策略和利润，以及整个供应链的最优利润和制造商的效用。
In the study of green supply chain, Model FF explores the interactive relationship between two fairness-conscious manufacturers and a fair and neutral retailer. The manufacturer's utility function takes into account its profit and fairness concerns with retailers and other manufacturers. Proposition 3-2 further explains the optimal pricing strategy and profit of manufacturers and retailers under this two-way fairness concern, as well as the optimal profit of the entire supply chain and the manufacturer's utility.
推论3-3表明在模型FF中，最优交易价格、最优批发价格和最优零售价格与消费者绿色偏好呈正相关。这意味着随着消费者对绿色产品的偏好增加，这些价格也会上升。
Corollary 3-3 shows that in model FF, the optimal transaction price, the optimal wholesale price, and the optimal retail price are positively correlated with consumers’ green preferences. This means that as consumers’ preference for green products increases, these prices will also rise.
推论3-4分析了在竞争环境下，制造商的横向和纵向公平关切对市场需求、零售商利润、制造商利润和效用的影响。当消费者的绿色偏好增加时，市场需求和零售商利润也会增加。然而，在特定的竞争强度条件下，制造商的利润和效用可能会下降。这表明过度的竞争可能会损害制造商的利益。
Corollary 3-3 shows that in model FF, the optimal transaction price, the optimal wholesale price, and the optimal retail price are positively correlated with consumers’ green preferences. This means that as consumers’ preference for green products increases, these prices will also rise.
推论3-5分析了制造商的纵向和横向公平关切如何影响绿色供应链中的最优产品绿色度、批发价格和零售价格。研究显示，产品绿色度与纵向公平关切负相关，与横向公平关切正相关。在消费者绿色偏好低于特定阈值时，批发价格随纵向公平关切增加而上升，随横向公平关切增加而下降。零售价格的变化趋势与批发价格相似，且受批发价格影响。这些发现强调了制造商在制定策略时，需要平衡公平关切与消费者偏好及市场竞争。
Corollary 3-5 analyzes how manufacturers' vertical and Horizontal fairness concerns affect the optimal product greenness, wholesale price, and retail price in the green supply chain. The study shows that product greenness is negatively correlated with vertical fairness concerns and positively correlated with horizontal fairness concerns. When consumer green preferences are below a certain threshold, wholesale prices increase with increasing vertical fairness concerns and decrease with increasing horizontal fairness concerns. The trend of retail prices is similar to that of wholesale prices and is affected by wholesale prices. These findings emphasize the need for manufacturers to balance fairness concerns with consumer preferences and market competition when formulating strategies.
推论3-6揭示了制造商在横向公平关切较低时效用更高。在特定条件下，供应链总利润与横向公平关切系数η正相关，这表明在适当的横向公平关切水平下，供应链能够实现更高的总利润。这些发现强调了在供应链管理中平衡公平关切与经济效益的重要性。
Corollary 3-6 reveals that manufacturers have higher utility when horizontal fairness concerns are low. Under certain conditions, the total profit of the supply chain is positively correlated with the horizontal fairness concern coefficient η, which indicates that at an appropriate level of horizontal fairness concerns, the supply chain can achieve higher total profits. These findings emphasize the importance of balancing fairness concerns and economic benefits in supply chain management.
(2)决策对比分析(Comparative analysis of decision making)
根据命题3-3，制造商的纵向和横向公平关切以及消费者的绿色偏好共同影响定价决策。当制造商竞争适度且消费者偏好绿色产品时，公平行为可能提高批发和零售价格但降低产品绿色度。然而，随着竞争加剧和绿色偏好增强，制造商可能增加绿色创新投入，最终可能降低批发价格以满足市场需求，这反过来影响零售价格。
According to Proposition 3-3, manufacturers' vertical and horizontal fairness concerns and consumers' green preferences jointly influence pricing decisions. When manufacturers compete moderately and consumers prefer green products, fair behavior may increase wholesale and retail prices but reduce product greenness. However, as competition intensifies and green preferences strengthen, manufacturers may increase green innovation inputs and may eventually reduce wholesale prices to meet market demand, which in turn affects retail prices.
推论3-7指出，随着纵向公平关切程度的增加，不同模型间的最优产品绿色度差异缩小，而横向公平关切的增强则扩大这种差异。此外，纵向公平关切的加强可能导致批发和零售价格差异增大，横向公平关切则相反。这表明，公平关切行为对产品绿色度和价格差异有显著影响。
Corollary 3-7 points out that as the degree of vertical fairness concern increases, the difference in optimal product greenness between different models shrinks, while the increase in horizontal fairness concern expands this difference. In addition, the strengthening of vertical equity concerns may lead to an increase in the difference between wholesale and retail prices, while the opposite is true for horizontal equity concerns. This shows that fairness concern behavior has a significant impact on product greenness and price differences.
根据命题3-4和推论3-8，在特定条件下，模型FF中的零售商利润可能高于模型NN。零售商利润变化量与纵向公平关切程度负相关，与横向公平关切程度正相关，即纵向公平关切增加会减少利润变化量，而横向公平关切增加则增加变化量。制造商和供应链利润的比较将在算例分析中进一步探讨。
According to Proposition 3-4 and Corollary 3-8, under certain conditions, the retailer profit in Model FF may be higher than that in Model NN. The change in retailer profit is negatively correlated with the degree of vertical fairness concern and positively correlated with the degree of horizontal fairness concern, that is, an increase in vertical fairness concern will reduce the change in profit, while an increase in horizontal fairness concern will increase the change. The comparison of manufacturer and supply chain profits will be further explored in the case analysis.
三、知识补充（Knowledge supplement）
纵向和横向公平关切对供应链效率的影响是多方面的：
The impact of vertical and horizontal fairness concerns on supply chain efficiency is multifaceted:
1.公平关切与合作效率：研究表明，当零售商或供应链双方具有公平关切时，合作效率可能会在某些区间内降低。然而，通过合理设计公平关切系数，供应链成员可以提高合作效率。
1. Fairness concerns and cooperation efficiency: Studies have shown that when retailers or both sides of the supply chain have fairness concerns, cooperation efficiency may decrease within certain intervals. However, by reasonably designing the fairness concern coefficient, supply chain members can improve cooperation efficiency.
2.纵向公平关切：仅制造商关注公平时，合作效率会随着公平关切系数的增加而提高。制造商可以在合理范围内设置公平关切系数，以提升合作效率。
2. Vertical fairness concerns: When only manufacturers are concerned about fairness, cooperation efficiency will increase with the increase of the fairness concern coefficient. Manufacturers can set the fairness concern coefficient within a reasonable range to improve cooperation efficiency.
3.横向公平关切：在双渠道销售的闭环供应链中，线下零售商的横向公平偏好可以促使两零售商竞相降低零售价格，提高回收率，从而增加制造商和整个供应链系统的效用。但这种偏好也可能导致两零售商的效用降低。
3. Horizontal fairness concerns: In a closed-loop supply chain with dual-channel sales, the horizontal fairness preference of offline retailers can prompt the two retailers to compete to reduce retail prices and increase recycling rates, thereby increasing the utility of manufacturers and the entire supply chain system. However, this preference may also lead to a decrease in the utility of the two retailers.
4.供应链定价策略：在纵向供应链中，供应商或零售商的公平偏好可以通过批发价格契约得到满足，从而实现供应链利润最优和效率最高。而在横向供应链中，公平偏好的制造商通过Cournot博弈，即使批发价格契约不能满足其公平偏好，整个供应链的利润和绩效也可能显著提高。
4. Supply chain pricing strategy: In a vertical supply chain, the fairness preference of suppliers or retailers can be satisfied through wholesale price contracts, thereby achieving optimal supply chain profits and the highest efficiency. In a horizontal supply chain, manufacturers with fairness preferences can significantly improve the profits and performance of the entire supply chain through Cournot game, even if the wholesale price contract cannot meet their fairness preferences.
5.供应链协调：公平关切行为虽然可能对零售商和供应链的利润没有直接影响，但会对零售商和供应链的效用产生重要影响。公平关切系数越大，产生的影响就越大。
5. Supply chain coordination: Although fairness concerns may not have a direct impact on the profits of retailers and supply chains, they will have an important impact on the utility of retailers and supply chains. The larger the fairness concern coefficient, the greater the impact.
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翻译：谷歌翻译
参考资料：谷歌、Chat GPT
参考文献：葛根哈斯. 考虑公平偏好的竞争型绿色供应链定价决策和动态协调研究[D]. 北京科技大学, 2023.
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