摘要：伊万・季莫费耶夫是俄罗斯国际事务委员会的总干事。自 2015 年起，他还是瓦尔代讨论俱乐部的成员，领导该俱乐部的政治经济项目。自 2009 年起，他在莫斯科国际关系学院担任副教授。2006 年，他在莫斯科国际关系学院获得政治学博士学位。季莫费耶夫博士是 100

林家欣：特朗普关税政策：百日成果初现/Donald Trump's Tariff Policy: Results of the First Hundred Days

作者介绍

Ivan Timofeev is the Director General of the Russian International Affairs Council. Since 2015 he is also a member of Valdai Discussion Club, leading its program on political economy. He is an Associate Professor at MGIMO University since 2009.

He was awarded a doctoral degree in Political Science at MGIMO University in 2006.Dr. Timofeev is an author and co-author of more than 100 publications, issued in Russian and foreign academic press. He is a member of editorial board at the “Comparative Politics” – an academic journal on foreign policy and political science. He is one of the most prominent and most cited experts on economic sanctions in Russia.

伊万・季莫费耶夫是俄罗斯国际事务委员会的总干事。自 2015 年起，他还是瓦尔代讨论俱乐部的成员，领导该俱乐部的政治经济项目。自 2009 年起，他在莫斯科国际关系学院担任副教授。2006 年，他在莫斯科国际关系学院获得政治学博士学位。季莫费耶夫博士是 100 多篇在俄罗斯和国外学术出版物上发表的论文的作者及合著者。他是学术期刊《比较政治学》（主要研究外交政策和政治学）编委会成员。他是俄罗斯最杰出、被引用次数最多的经济制裁专家之一。

正文一：

美国贸易政策日益呈现安全化趋势，经济目标与国家安全优先事项紧密交织，从重振国内产业到打击毒品贩运，涉及面广泛。这一进程充满紧迫感，常与制裁措施相互重叠。不过，将关税与制裁混为一谈为时尚早，毕竟与贸易政策工具不同，制裁主要还是外交政策的手段。

唐纳德・特朗普第二任期伊始，最具影响力的举措之一便是全面上调美国进口关税。新政策几乎针对所有贸易伙伴，在 70 多个国家的进口商品上加征额外关税。这一激进升级被称为 “对全世界的贸易战”，标志着新政府执政百日内的又一巨大转变。然而，这些关税远不止技术性调整，背后暗藏着深思熟虑的战略，旨在重新点燃美国再工业化进程，向经济自给自足方向转变。

特朗普新贸易政策的纲领性文件是 2025 年 4 月 2 日颁布的第 14257 号行政令。其法律依据是 1977 年的《国际紧急经济权力法》（IEEPA）。特朗普因贸易失衡以及对美国不利的生产分布状况宣布进入紧急状态，而新关税就是应对这一紧急状态的工具。

目前，根据 IEEPA，美国共引入 45 项紧急状态，大部分涉及制裁运用，也就是金融与贸易限制领域措施。不过，历史上制裁多为独立工具，极少包含关税，通常涉及金融封锁、出口管制等限制。在某些情况下，关税才作为制裁补充，如美国对俄罗斯的限制措施，大规模金融制裁、出口管制等限制下，对俄罗斯钢材加征关税。总体而言，制裁政策与关税政策相对独立，特朗普基于 IEEPA 标准的新行政令，看似让制裁与关税更接近，实则二者仍是不同工具，制裁重在迫使目标国改变政治决策，关税则旨在获取经济利益及影响他国贸易政策，且新关税政策文件中明确提及追求经济利益，虽提及安全问题，但特朗普发起的关税战争还不能算作制裁工具。

该文件另一特点是有详细概念部分阐释新关税政策缘由与意义。不像其他行政令通常短小精炼，第 14257 号行政令如同全面阐述新政策的纲领。其工具性目标是回归二十世纪流行的贸易互惠原则，即双边贸易中出口与进口平衡。如今，据特朗普行政令序言，美国关税低于其他国家，甚至显著低于，且贸易伙伴还使用诸多保护主义措施，如许可限制、技术壁垒、卫生与植物卫生措施、专利体系不完善、投资壁垒、生产补贴、垄断倾向、汇率管制、税收政策及腐败等。

关税差异已成美国去工业化因素之一：其全球工业生产份额从 2001 年至 2023 年，由 28.4% 降至 17.4%。从 1997 年至 2024 年，美国丧失约 500 万工业岗位。去工业化还上升为国家安全议题。大规模向海外（显然指乌克兰）供应军事装备，暴露出美国生产能力短缺与武器库存快速补充受限。过去五年，美国贸易逆差增长 40%，2024 年达 1.2 万亿美元，这些事实构成引入紧急状态及加征关税的依据。

关税调整涉及两步：一是对所有进口美国商品征收 10% 关税；二是对附录中 70 多个国家进口商品加征额外关税，关税水平依贸易失衡程度而定。不过，新关税不适用于部分进口商品，包括 IEEPA 规定的知识产权、钢铁铝制品、汽车及零部件、铜、药品、半导体、关键矿物及能源等。

在加拿大和墨西哥问题上，美国保留《美加墨自由贸易协定》（USMCA）提供的优惠待遇。但特朗普曾对两国增加关税，又通过引入紧急状态应对与加拿大、墨西哥边境毒品流动，对两国商品加征 25% 关税，加拿大能源产品关税为 10%。第 14257 号行政令明确，若遭遇报复性关税，美国将收紧关税；反之，若采取纠正失衡措施，关税可调整。这种 “胡萝卜加大棒” 机制迅速生效。

“大棒” 预料之中地用于中国。特朗普第一任期就尝试纠正中美贸易平衡，第二任期伊始，中国成美国贸易政策最大自然目标。今年 2 月 1 日，特朗普签署第 14195 号行政令，与针对加拿大、墨西哥类似行政令同时发布，因中国流入美国的毒品或毒品原料引入紧急状态，将中国商品关税提高 10%。

接着，第 14256 号行政令废除此前美国邮政寄送低价值商品的豁免权。第 14257 号行政令对中国商品加征 34% 额外关税。中国相应采取对等提高关税措施。美国以第 14259 号行政令将中国商品关税提高到 84%，并依第 14256 号行政令增加邮寄低价值商品关税。面对中国新一轮对等报复性关税，美国将对中国个人关税从 84% 提高到 125%，还提高邮寄商品关税，同时对 75 个国家暂停个人关税 90 天（第 14266 号行政令）。

目前，我们仅目睹了美国关税政策大规模变革的开端。但其第一阶段已可得出至少两点结论：其一，美国贸易政策安全化趋势愈发显著，经济目标与国家安全优先事项交织，从重振国内产业到打击毒品贩运，这一方法极富紧迫感，常与制裁措施重叠。不过，将关税与制裁混为一谈仍为时过早，制裁仍是外交政策主要工具。

其二，特朗普新政策基于 “胡萝卜加大棒” 原则，初步成果显示其有效性。几乎所有被引入个人关税的国家都与美国展开谈判。对于采取报复措施的中国，美国则大幅提高关税。

关键问题是，新关税能在多大程度上助力美国工业复苏，普通商品和服务消费者又需付出何种代价。还有，鉴于中美持续相互依存，美中贸易战能升级到何种程度，这些答案很可能在特朗普总统任期内揭晓。至于俄罗斯，完全不在关税战争议程上，这主要归因于自 2022 年特别军事行动开始，俄美贸易近乎停滞，美国禁止进口俄罗斯原材料，大部分出口也遭禁止，金融制裁使银行支付瘫痪，钢铁已实行禁止性关税。

正文二：

US trade policy has become increasingly securitized, intertwining economic objectives with national security priorities—from revitalizing domestic industry to combating drug trafficking. This approach is being pursued with a sense of urgency, often overlapping with sanctions measures. However, conflating tariffs with sanctions would be premature; unlike trade policy tools, sanctions remain primarily instruments of foreign policy.

Andrey Kortunov:
Can U.S. New Tariffs Trigger Structural Changes in Global Economy?

One of the most consequential moves at the start of Donald Trump’s second term was the sweeping increase in US import tariffs. The new policy targeted nearly all trading partners, with additional duties imposed on over seventy countries. This aggressive escalation– dubbed a “trade war against the world” – marked yet another seismic shift in the administration’s first hundred days But these tariffs were more than just a technical adjustment; they signaled a deliberate strategy. Behind the measures lay a broader vision: reigniting American reindustrialization and shifting toward economic self-reliance.

The key document of Trump’s new trade policy was Executive Order 14257, dated April 2, 2025. The legal basis for it is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA). Trump declared a state of emergency due to trade imbalances and an unfavourable distribution of production for the United States. The new tariffs are an instrument for responding to this emergency.

Currently, there are 45 states of emergency in the United States, introduced pursuant to the IEEPA. Most of them involve the use of sanctions – that is, restrictive measures in the field of finance and trade. However, historically, sanctions have been used as a stand-alone tool and have rarely included tariffs. They have mostly involved blocking financial sanctions, export controls, and other restrictions. In some cases, tariffs have complemented sanctions, as was the case with the restrictive measures the US introduced against Russia: large-scale financial sanctions, export controls, transport, visa, and other restrictions were reinforced by tariffs on Russian steel. But in general, the sanctions policy and the tariff policy have existed separately from each other. Trump’s new executive Order, based on IEEPA standards, at first glance, brings sanctions and tariffs closer together. In fact, they remain different tools. Sanctions serve as a foreign policy tool aimed at forcing the target country to alter its political decision-making, whereas the goal of tariffs remains to obtain economic benefits and influence the trade policies of foreign countries. The pursuit of economic benefits is clearly stated in the document, despite the reference to security issues. Therefore, Trump’s tariff war cannot yet be considered an instrument of sanctions.

Another feature of the document is the detailed conceptual section explaining the reasons and meaning of the new tariff policy. Unlike many other executive orders, which are short and dry documents, Order 14257 is written in the form of a full-fledged doctrine explaining the new policy. Its instrumental goal is to return to the principle of reciprocity in trade, popular during the twentieth century which assumes a balance of exports and imports in bilateral trade relations. In other words, the volume of US imports from country X had to be compensated by the volume of US exports to this country. Currently, according to the preamble to Trump’s order, a situation has arisen where US tariffs are lower or significantly lower than those of other countries. This difference is aggravated by additional protectionist measures used by US trading partners. Among them are licensing restrictions, technical barriers in the form of excessive regulations and requirements, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, an inadequate patent system, investment barriers, production subsidies, monopolistic tendencies, exchange rate controls, tax policy, and corruption.

Vladislav Belov:
US-EU Economic and Political Conflict in the Second Trump Era

The difference in tariffs has become a factor in the deindustrialisation of the United States: its share in global industrial production from 2001 to 2023, according to the document, decreased from 28.4 to 17.4%. From 1997 to 2024, the United States lost about five million industrial jobs.

Deindustrialisation has also become a national security issue. The large-scale provision of military supplies abroad (apparently meaning Ukraine) has exposed a shortage of production capacity and limitations in the rapid replenishment of weapons stockpiles. Over the past five years, the US trade deficit has grown by 40%, reaching 1.2 trillion dollars in 2024. These facts formed the basis for the arguments for introducing a state of emergency and increasing duties.

The tariff change involves two main steps. The first is the introduction of a 10% duty on all goods imported into the United States. The second is additional individual duties on imports for more than 70 countries listed in the appendix to the order. For them, the duties vary depending on the level of the trade imbalance with the United States. However, the new tariffs do not apply to a number of imported goods. Among them are intellectual property specified in IEEPA, steel and aluminium, automobiles and their parts, copper, medicines, semiconductors, critical minerals and energy.

With respect to Canada and Mexico, the benefits provided by the United States-Canada-Mexico Free Trade Agreement (USMCA) are retained. However, Trump has previously increased duties on both countries. Moreover, this was done again through the introduction of a state of emergency in connection with the flow of drugs across the border with Canada and Mexico. Both mechanisms involved the introduction of 25% tariffs, with the exception of energy from Canada, for which the duty was 10%. Executive Order 14257 specifically stipulated that in the event of retaliatory duties, the administration would further tighten American tariffs. And vice versa, in the event of steps to correct the imbalance, the duties could be revised. This “carrot and stick” mechanism was not slow to show itself in action.

“The stick” has been expectedly used, first of all, in relation to China. Attempts to correct the trade balance between the two countries were made by Donald Trump during his first term. At the beginning of his second term, it was China that became the natural and largest target of US trade policy. On February 1 of this year, Trump signed Executive Order 14195. It was issued simultaneously with the similar, aforementioned orders for Canada and Mexico. A state of emergency was introduced in connection with the flow of drugs or raw materials for them from the PRC, and as a retaliatory measure, tariffs on Chinese goods were increased by 10%.

Rainer Rothfuss, Yuri Kofner:
Trump’s Tariff Hammer and the Strategic Calculus Behind the Mar-a-Lago Accord

Then, Executive Order 14256 repealed the previously existing exemptions for low-value goods shipped to the United States by mail. In addition, Executive Order 14257 imposed additional 34% tariffs on Chinese goods. China responded by increasing its tariffs proportionally. In response, Trump raised US tariffs to 84% (Executive Order 14259) and increased duties on low-value goods delivered by mail (previously introduced by Executive Order 14256). In response to China’s new round of proportional retaliatory actions to increase tariffs, Trump raised the individual duty on China from 84 to 125% and increased duties on low-value goods. At the same time, individual duties were suspended for 90 days for 75 countries (Executive Order 14266).

It is obvious that today we are only witnessing the beginning of large-scale changes in US tariff policy. But its first stage already allows us to draw at least two conclusions. First, US trade policy has become increasingly securitized, intertwining economic objectives with national security priorities—from revitalizing domestic industry to combating drug trafficking. This approach is being pursued with a sense of urgency, often overlapping with sanctions measures. However, conflating tariffs with sanctions would be premature; unlike trade policy tools, sanctions remain primarily instruments of foreign policy.

Second, Trump’s new course is based on a “carrot and stick” principle. The first results speak in favour of its effectiveness. Almost all countries, in relation to which individual tariffs were introduced, entered into negotiations with the US. In relation to China, which introduced retaliatory measures, Washington went for a sharp escalation of tariffs. The big question is to what extent the new tariffs will contribute to the revival of American industry and what price ordinary consumers of goods and services will have to pay.

Another question is to what extent the US-China trade war can escalate, given the continuing level of their interdependence. The answers to these questions will most likely appear within the presidential term of Donald Trump. As for Russia, it is not on the tariff war agenda at all. This is largely due to the fact that trade with the US has come to a near-standstill since the start of the Special Military Operation in 2022. The import of Russian raw materials to the US is prohibited. Most exports are also prohibited. Financial sanctions have paralyzed bank payments, and prohibitive duties are already in effect on steel.

来源：非 常道