摘要：克劳德·巴菲尔德（Claude Barfield）是美国国际贸易政策研究领域权威专家，曾担任美国贸易代表办公室顾问，长期深耕国际贸易体系、世界贸易组织改革、知识产权保护及科技政策研究，尤其在中国及东亚经贸政策领域具有深厚学术积淀。其学术著作以政策洞察力见长，代

卓诚明：The Intel Challenge and Trump’s Foolhardy Plans for Semiconductor Tariffs英特尔困局与特朗普的半导体关税冒进计划

克劳德·巴菲尔德

克劳德·巴菲尔德（Claude Barfield）是美国国际贸易政策研究领域权威专家，曾担任美国贸易代表办公室顾问，长期深耕国际贸易体系、世界贸易组织改革、知识产权保护及科技政策研究，尤其在中国及东亚经贸政策领域具有深厚学术积淀。其学术著作以政策洞察力见长，代表作《贸易密码：世界经济运行法则》以通俗笔触阐释全球贸易核心机制，被国际学界广泛引用；针对中美科技博弈的前瞻性研究《电信业与华为困局：中国对美直接投资研究》更是通过解剖华为在美投资案例，精准研判跨国科技产业链竞合趋势，为政策制定者提供了重要参考依据。

Claude Barfield, a former consultant to the office of the US Trade Representative, researches international trade policy (including trade policy in China and East Asia), the World Trade Organization (WTO), intellectual property, and science and technology policy. His many books and publications include Swap: How Trade Works with Philip Levy, a concise introduction to the principles of world economics, and Telecoms and the Huawei conundrum: Chinese foreign direct investment in the United States, an AEI Economic Studies analysis that explores the case of Chinese telecom equipment maker Huawei and its commitment to long-term investment in the US.

国家冠军遭遇滑铁卢

曾被寄予厚望的美国半导体"国家标杆"英特尔正深陷发展困局。这家曾执掌全球芯片技术牛耳数十年的企业，自iPhone横空出世引发移动芯片革命后便显露疲态，更在当下人工智能训练所需的尖端算力芯片需求爆发潮中再度错失先机。

产业政策双轨并行

拜登政府与即将上任的特朗普政府均将扶持本土半导体产业视为国家安全与科技竞争的核心战略。作为政策基石的《2022芯片与科学法案》不仅划拨巨额研发资金，更向高端芯片制造领域投入390亿美元补贴。但政策红利并未扭转行业巨头英特尔的颓势——这家曾主导全球芯片市场的企业，在过去三年设计业务取得有限进展的同时，其耗资巨大的晶圆厂扩张计划严重侵蚀企业现金流，导致投资者信心持续滑坡。去年12月，就在拜登政府签署75亿美元补贴协议支持其新建晶圆厂数周后，英特尔董事会突然解雇回归仅两年的CEO帕特·基辛格，使公司陷入临时领导层真空。

战略转型十字路口

面对困局，特朗普政府需审慎布局产业政策：首要任务在于推动英特尔实施结构性改革，通过剥离晶圆制造业务实现设计能力聚焦。《华尔街日报》深度调研显示，受制于自身战略失误与半导体设计市场剧变，英特尔在双线作战中已显著落后于国内外竞争者。若能将资源集中于先进芯片设计，或可重获局部技术优势。政府则需评估后续补贴的有效性，避免陷入无底洞式财政投入。其次，若英特尔持续受困于制造端竞争，政府应加速与台积电等海外制造商签订长期合作协议，弥补未来供应链缺口。

关税政策暗藏风险

特朗普誓言对半导体加征关税的激进主张或将引发灾难性后果。当前全球90%的高端芯片产自台积电，尽管其正在推进美国建厂计划，但短期内美国仍需大量进口该类战略物资。在技术自主能力尚未形成之际，关税壁垒非但无法遏制中国技术进步，反而可能抬高本土制造业成本，削弱美国企业的全球竞争力。

The Biden administration, and now the incoming Trump administration, seem determined to support and subsidize the US semiconductor industry for competitiveness and security imperatives. A central vehicle for this semiconductor industrial policy initiative is the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022. In addition to providing substantial sums for R&D, the act provided some $39 billion to advanced semiconductor manufacturing in the US.

Despite this support, Intel’s struggles have continued, and indeed become graver. In 2022, in an attempt to regain technological prowess, the company brought back former CEO Pat Gelsinger, who had led the company before its downward spiral. Gelsinger embarked on a highly ambitious campaign not only to restore Intel’s lead in advanced chip design, but also to compete in the capital-intensive market for manufacturing chips. Over the past three years, while there has been some progress on the design side, Intel has failed to significantly beak into chip manufacturing—even as huge capital costs sapped the company’s resources and undercut investor confidence. Last December, only weeks after the Biden administration signed an agreement to supply some $7.5 billion in manufacturing subsidies for Intel for new “fab” construction, the Intel board fired Gelsinger, leaving the company with interim leadership.

That brings us to the Trump administration. Despite his jabs at the CHIPS Act, President Trump has stated his commitment to reshoring US manufacturing, particularly in strategic technologies like semiconductors (export controls will not hold China back forever).

Thus, the administration should pursue the following strategies:

First, encourage Intel leadership to hive off the chip-manufacturing segment of the company, as either a separate independent element or a totally independent one. Such a move would allow Intel to concentrate solely on advanced chip design. A recent Wall Street Journal thorough analysis showed that Intel faces strong competition from its US and foreign competitors as a result of its own failings and profound changes in the semiconductor design market. It will have a much better chance of regaining at least some of its technological superiority absent the resource-gobbling fab competition. Down the road, the administration would have to decide if further subsidies to Intel are warranted or whether this would be a fruitless and wasteful effort.

Second, should Intel continue to struggle in fab competition, despite the president’s resistance to foreign subsidies, the Trump administration should move with dispatch to sign contracts with TSMC and other manufacturers to fill the gap in future years.

Foolishly and dangerously, President Trump has vowed to put tariffs on semiconductors. TSMC manufactures 90 percent of the world’s most advanced chips and while it is investing in the United States, it will be many years before the US can cease importing these chips from the company.

来源：非常道