摘要：俄罗斯和美国之间的会谈提出了特朗普政府的行动自由问题。唐纳德·特朗普总统在多大程度上受到内部制度框架的限制，他的外交成果能有多可持续？指标之一是对俄罗斯的制裁政策。它们在特别军事行动 （SMO） 开始之前和之后都被用来对付俄罗斯。它们的增加或取消分别是华盛顿升
游阳：Russian-American Talks and the US Congressional Initiatives on Sanctions（俄美会谈和美国国会的制裁倡议）
作者：Ivan Timofeev（伊万·季莫弗耶夫）
政治学博士，俄罗斯国际事务委员会主任，RIAC 成员，
现任俄罗斯国际事务理事会主任、俄罗斯国际事务委员会（RIAC）
总干事、俄瓦尔代国际辩论俱乐部项目主任
俄罗斯和美国之间的会谈提出了特朗普政府的行动自由问题。唐纳德·特朗普总统在多大程度上受到内部制度框架的限制，他的外交成果能有多可持续？指标之一是对俄罗斯的制裁政策。它们在特别军事行动 （SMO） 开始之前和之后都被用来对付俄罗斯。它们的增加或取消分别是华盛顿升级和降级行动的重要组成部分。拜登政府在 SMO 开始后，奉行对莫斯科的积极制裁政策。然而，唐纳德·特朗普在就职典礼后没有使用它们。在现任总统掌权期间，唯一能够影响其制裁决定的有效力量是美国国会。因此，出现了以下问题：国会究竟如何看待白宫目前对俄罗斯的制裁政策，以及政府两个分支之间是否存在紧张关系的先决条件，类似于奥巴马政府和国会之间在伊朗核协议上存在的紧张关系。
在美国历史上的大部分时间里，总统和他的政府在外交政策中发挥了决定性的作用。除了广泛的宪法权力外，行政部门在国际事务的专业知识和信息方面也享有领导地位。政府消息灵通，包括专业官僚，而国会没有这样的机会。这种情况在 20 世纪的最后 25 年开始发生变化，当时国会开始声称在国际事务中发挥更积极的作用。在实施制裁方面，总统的权力在一定程度上受到限制，包括 1977 年《国际紧急经济权力法》（IEEPA）。该法律规定了总统就国际议程上的特定问题宣布紧急状态和实施制裁的权力。关于外交政策问题的立法活动、加强行政部门问责制的尝试以及在与行政部门谈判时使用预算权的力度都得到了加强。尽管总统在国际事务和制裁实施方面保留了高度的自主权，但在某些问题上，国会建立了“法律网”。制裁在联邦立法中是固定的，总统不能随心所欲地解除制裁。政府的两个分支倾向于在国际问题上合作，但在某些问题上，国会试图发挥制约作用。因此，立法者对伊拉克和阿富汗战争表现出越来越大的怀疑。他们积极抵制伊朗核协议，为协议的实施创造了问责工具。2012 年通过的《马格尼茨基法案》使巴拉克·奥巴马 （Barack Obama） 对俄罗斯的外交变得复杂。
在 2014 年乌克兰危机的背景下，国会在遏制俄罗斯方面与奥巴马政府达成一致。奥巴马关于与克里米亚和顿巴斯事件有关的紧急状态的行政命令以及随后的制裁得到了《支持乌克兰主权、完整、民主和经济稳定法案》（SSIDES） 和《乌克兰自由支持法案》（UFSA） 的支持。2017 年，在人们猜测特朗普总统持有“亲俄”立场的情况下，国会通过了《通过制裁对抗美国对手法案》（CAATSA）。它编纂了奥巴马的行政命令，规定了解除对俄罗斯个人制裁的限制，并引入了新的限制。特朗普没有抵制这项新立法，但他也没有表现出实施它的热情。在特朗普认为对自己很重要的问题上，他自己也推动了对俄罗斯的制裁。因此，他积极支持通过《保护欧洲能源安全法案》（PEESA） 及其后续版本，旨在使北溪 2 号项目复杂化，并为美国能源资源在欧洲市场上创造更有利的条件。
乔·拜登 （Joe Biden） 通过建立对莫斯科制裁的新法律机制，在俄罗斯方面与国会保持一定距离。2021 年 4 月 15 日的第 14024 号行政命令没有通过国会，这意味着它给政府留下了更多的行动自由。然而，在 SMO 开始前夕和之后，两个分支机构都采取了一致的行动。国会在政治信号方面发挥了积极作用，提出了一些可能对俄罗斯实施制裁的法案。行动开始后，立法者并没有表现出过分的热情，让行政部门自由活动。然而，随着时间的推移，一些限制性措施确实获得了立法效力。这些措施包括暂停进口俄罗斯能源、暂停正常贸易关系、威胁对俄罗斯黄金买家实施制裁、禁止进口铀以及没收俄罗斯主权资产的法律机制。在一般的限制措施中，这些制裁只占一小部分。
唐纳德·特朗普于 2025 年重返白宫后，美国外交试图和平解决乌克兰问题。一个相对较弱但仍然不寻常的积极信号，在过去三年中是不可想象的，那就是华盛顿在 2025 年 2 月 24 日 SMO 开始周年纪念日逃避制裁，而其他盟友则实施了制裁。尽管国会仍然是共和党人，但人们可以预期民主党人，也许还有一些共和党人会反对特朗普的温和。
然而，在实践中，这种反对意见尚未得到遵守。国会在俄罗斯问题上没有表现出太多活动，即使是在法案层面也是如此。自 2025 年初以来，即在不到五个月的时间里，国会两院已经提出了五项法案，暗示对俄罗斯实施制裁。相比之下，有 10 项针对中国的法案和 7 项针对伊朗的法案。我们只谈论实施制裁的法案，而不是报告这些法案。在俄罗斯方面，共和党人和民主党人共同提出了四项法案。只有一个是由民主党人提出的。这与长期以来的做法相吻合，当时反俄制裁法案由两党代表提出。在中国方面，10 项法案中有 4 项是由共和党提出的，这也符合长期做法——在中国方面，共和党人更为活跃。在伊朗问题上，七项法案中有三项是纯粹的共和党法案。但应该指出的是，共和党人在制裁问题上通常比民主党人积极得多。民主党人单独提出此类法案的频率要低得多。自新年以来，他们只有 4 人，而共和党有 20 人。
关于俄罗斯最引人注目的法案是 HR 2548，该法案提议对拒绝就乌克兰问题进行谈判的人实施制裁。参议院已提出一项类似的法案 S.1241。尽管拟议的制裁措施数量和范围都很大，但它几乎没有什么新内容。例如，第 5 条提议对俄罗斯高级官员实施制裁。但他们已经受到了阻止性的金融制裁。同一篇文章提议对与俄罗斯武装部队互动、伤害乌克兰、在俄罗斯经济战略部门工作、是“寡头”、与俄罗斯政府有关联的外国个人实施制裁、参与对美国公民造成伤害、破坏美国的诚信、规避美国制裁，以及与上述个人有关联的个人。但政府长期以来一直有解决所有这些问题的机制。
对俄罗斯金融机构的制裁也是如此（第 6 条）。大多数俄罗斯银行资产已经受到封锁制裁。这同样适用于与俄罗斯政府有关联的组织（第 7 条）。现有的机制已经允许它们被阻止。这同样适用于禁止资金进出俄罗斯（第 8 条）。在草案中，这一规范比行政部门的机制更为根本，但事实上，由于对银行的制裁，资金流动已经受到严重阻碍。禁止俄罗斯公司在美国上市显然是过度的（第 9 条），因为在目前的情况下根本无法想象。自 2022 年以来，投资禁令（第 10 条）已在行政部门的机制中生效。这同样适用于能源行业（第 11 条）。就其而言，立法层面有禁令。这同样适用于禁止与俄罗斯主权债务进行交易（第 12 条），在某种程度上——金融信息的传输（第 13 条）——SWIFT 的活动长期以来一直对美国当局透明，此类服务的主要提供商不太可能绕过制裁。禁止进口铀已被写入法律（第 14 条）。鉴于已经生效的制裁，对俄罗斯征收进口关税（第 15 条）显然是过度的。呼吁从 CAATSA 法案第 235 条的清单中实施制裁同样过分。对购买俄罗斯石油、石油产品和铀的国家征收关税的威胁（第 17 条）从该系列中脱颖而出。白宫尚未使用此类禁令，显然是出于对破坏国际市场稳定和伤害美国自身的担忧。最后，这些机制中的大多数早已存在于美国总统的法令中。它们的编纂将使制裁的降级变得复杂，但不会显着增加升级。
其余项目则不那么引人注目。S. 1490 法案提议对俄罗斯“影子”油轮船队实施制裁。白宫一直积极使用此类制裁，直到特朗普于 2025 年重新上台。H.R. 476 法案威胁对参与克里米亚大桥和隧道建设的制裁。但在这方面，白宫也长期以来一直处于领先地位。甚至 2014 年的机制也适用于这里。HR 475 法案提议对破坏扎波罗热核电站安全的制裁。但是，很难想象在已经针对广泛的俄罗斯政府组织和官员引入的限制措施的背景下，拟议的限制可以提供哪些新功能。与上述法案一样，这些法案不会给制裁制度带来任何根本性的新内容，尽管它们会使可能的降级变得复杂。
总之，值得注意的是，制裁法案的通过率通常非常低。在 2025 年的 55 项法案中，没有一项签署成为法律。只有一项法案在众议院获得通过——关于对国际刑事法院官员的制裁。其余的没有超出其中一个会议厅的介绍。更广泛的数据显示，只有不到 5% 的制裁法案获得通过。当前项目通过的可能性似乎很低。然而，应该记住，重要的不仅仅是通过问题，而且将个别话题纳入政治议程也很重要。他们可以开始过自己的生活，并在新的账单中得到发展。在唐纳德·特朗普总统任期内俄美关系的任何情况下，对莫斯科的制裁政策的立法框架将比现任总统的任期长几十年。
The talks between Russia and the US raise the question of the freedom of action of the Trump Administration. To what extent is President Donald Trump limited by internal institutional frameworks and how sustainable can the results of his diplomacy be? One of the indicators is the policy of sanctions against Russia. They were used against Russia both before and after the start of the Special Military Operation (SMO). Their increase or cancellation are an important part of Washington's actions in escalation and de-escalation, respectively. The Biden administration, after the start of the SMO, pursued an active policy of sanctions against Moscow. However, Donald Trump refrained from using them after his inauguration. While the current president is in power, the only effective force that can influence his decisions on sanctions is the US Congress. Accordingly, questions arise as to how exactly Congress views the White House’s current policy of sanctions against Russia, and whether there are preconditions for tension between the two branches of government, similar to those that existed between the Obama Administration and Congress over the Iran nuclear deal.
For most of the history of the United States, the president and his administration have played a decisive role in foreign policy. In addition to broad constitutional powers, the executive branch has enjoyed leadership in the matter of expertise and information on international affairs. The administration was better informed and included professional bureaucrats, while Congress did not have such opportunities. The situation began to change in the last quarter of the 20th century, when Congress began to claim a more active role in international affairs. In the application of sanctions, the president's powers were somewhat limited, including by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA). The law regulated the president’s power to declare a state of emergency on a particular issue on the international agenda and to impose sanctions. Legislative activity on foreign policy issues, attempts to increase the accountability of the executive branch, and the use of budgetary powers in bargaining with the executive branch intensified. Although the president retained a high degree of autonomy in international affairs and the application of sanctions, on certain issues Congress created “webs of laws.” Sanctions were fixed in federal legislation, and the president could not lift them at his will. The two branches of government tend to cooperate on international issues, but on some issues Congress tried to play a restraining role. Thus, legislators showed growing scepticism about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. They actively resisted the Iranian nuclear deal, creating tools for accountability regarding its implementation. The adoption of the Magnitsky Act in 2012 complicated Barack Obama’s diplomacy toward Russia.
Against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, Congress showed unanimity with the Obama Administration in containing Russia. Obama’s executive orders on the state of emergency in connection with the events in Crimea and Donbass, as well as the subsequent sanctions, were supported by the Support for the Sovereignty, Integrity, Democracy, and Economic Stability of Ukraine Act (SSIDES) and the Ukraine Freedom Support Act (UFSA). In 2017, amid speculation that President Trump harboured a “pro-Russian” position, Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA). It codified Obama’s executive orders, defined restrictions on lifting sanctions on Russian individuals, and introduced new restrictions. Trump did not resist the new legislation, but he did not show zeal in implementing it either. On issues that Trump considered important to himself, he himself promoted sanctions against Russia. Thus, he actively supported the passage of the Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act (PEESA) and its subsequent version, designed to complicate the Nord Stream 2 project and create more favourable conditions for American energy resources on the European market.
Joe Biden distanced himself somewhat from Congress on the Russian front by creating a new legal mechanism for sanctions against Moscow. Executive Order 14024 of April 15, 2021, did not go through Congress, which means it left the Administration with more freedom of action. However, on the eve of and after the start of the SMO, both branches acted in concert. Congress played an active role in political signalling, introducing a number of bills with possible sanctions against Russia. After the start of the operation, legislators did not show excessive zeal, leaving the Administration room to manoeuvre. However, over time, a number of restrictive measures did acquire legislative force. These include the suspension of imports of Russian energy resources, the suspension of normal trade relations, the threat of sanctions against buyers of Russian gold, a ban on uranium imports, and a legal mechanism for the confiscation of Russian sovereign assets. In the general flow of restrictions, these sanctions constituted only a small share.
After Donald Trump returned to the White House in 2025, American diplomacy attempted a peaceful settlement of the Ukrainian issue. A relatively weak, but still unusual positive signal, unthinkable for the past three years, was Washington's evasion of sanctions on the anniversary of the start of the SMO on February 24, 2025, while other allies imposed sanctions. Despite the fact that Congress remains Republican, one could expect opposition to Trump's moderation from Democrats and, perhaps, some Republicans.
However, in practice, such opposition has not yet been observed. Congress has not shown much activity regarding Russia, even at the level of bills. Since the beginning of 2025, that is, in less than five months, five bills have been introduced in both houses of Congress implying sanctions against Russia. For comparison, there are 10 bills against China and seven bills against Iran. We are talking only about bills that impose sanctions, not about reporting on them. On the Russian front, four bills were introduced by Republicans and Democrats together. Only one was introduced by a Democrat. This corresponds to long-standing practice, when anti-Russian bills on sanctions are introduced by representatives of both parties. On China, four out of 10 bills were introduced by Republicans, which also corresponds to long-standing practice—on the Chinese front, Republicans are more active. On Iran, three out of seven bills are purely Republican. But it should be noted that Republicans are generally much more active than Democrats on sanctions issues. Democrats introduce such bills alone much less often. Since the new year, there have been only four of them, while the Republicans have 20.
The most notable bill on Russia is H.R. 2548, which proposes sanctions for refusing to negotiate on Ukraine. A similar bill, S.1241, has been introduced in the Senate. Despite the volume and range of proposed sanctions, it contains little that’s new. For example, Article 5 proposes sanctions against senior Russian officials. But they are already under blocking financial sanctions. The same article proposes sanctions against foreign individuals who interact with the Russian armed forces, harm Ukraine, work in strategic sectors of the Russian economy, are “oligarchs,” are associated with the Russian government, are involved in causing harm to US citizens, undermine the integrity of the US, circumvent US sanctions, as well as individuals associated with the aforementioned individuals. But the Administration has long had mechanisms for all of these points. The same can be said about sanctions against Russian financial institutions (Article 6). Most Russian banking assets are already under blocking sanctions. The same applies to organisations associated with the Russian government (Article 7). The existing mechanisms already allow them to be blocked. The same applies to bans on the movement of funds to and from Russia (Article 8). In the draft, this norm is more fundamental than in the mechanisms of the executive branch, but in fact, the movement of funds is already significantly blocked due to sanctions against banks. The ban on the listing of Russian companies in the United States is clearly excessive (Article 9), given that it is simply impossible to imagine it in the current conditions. The ban on investments (Article 10) has been in effect in the mechanisms of the executive branch since 2022. The same applies to the energy sector (Article 11). In its case, there are bans at the legislative level. The same applies to bans on transactions with Russian sovereign debt (Article 12), to some extent—the transfer of financial messages (Article 13)—SWIFT's activities have long been transparent to the US authorities and the main provider of such services is unlikely to bypass sanctions. The ban on uranium imports is already enshrined in law (Article 14). The ban on import duties on Russia (Article 15) is clearly excessive given the sanctions already in force. The call to impose sanctions from the list in Article 235 of the CAATSA Act is equally excessive. The threat of duties on countries buying Russian oil, oil products and uranium (Article 17) stands out from this series. The White House has not yet used such a ban, apparently out of fear of destabilizing international markets and harming the United States itself. In the end, most of these mechanisms have long existed in the decrees of the US President. Their codification will complicate the de-escalation of sanctions, but will not provide a noticeable increase in escalation.
The remaining projects are less remarkable. Bill S. 1490 proposes sanctions against the Russian "shadow" tanker fleet. Such sanctions were actively used by the White House until Trump returned to office in 2025. The H.R. 476 bill threatens sanctions for participation in the construction of the Crimean Bridge and Tunnel. But here, too, the White House has long been ahead of the game. Even the 2014 mechanisms are applicable here. The H.R. 475 bill proposes sanctions for damage to the safety of the Zaporizhzhya NPP. But it is very difficult to imagine what new features the proposed restrictions could provide against the background of those already introduced against a wide range of Russian government organizations and officials. As in the above-described bills, these bills will not bring anything fundamentally new to the sanctions regime, although they will complicate possible de-escalation.
In conclusion, it is worth noting that the percentage of passage of sanctions bills is usually very low. Of the 55 bills in 2025, not a single one has been signed into law. Only one passed the House of Representatives—on sanctions against officials of the International Criminal Court. The rest have not gone beyond introduction in one of the chambers. More extensive data shows that less than 5% of sanctions bills pass. The likelihood of current projects passing seems low. However, it should be remembered that it is not only the issue of passing that is important, but also the inclusion of individual topics in the political agenda. They can begin to live their own life and be developed in new bills. In any scenario of Russian-American relations during the presidency of Donald Trump, the legislative framework of the sanctions policy towards Moscow will outlast the tenure of the current president by decades.
来源：非 常道
