颜读（23）：《平台供应链渠道模式选择与运营》零售市场入侵决策

摘要：Today, the editor will introduce Chapter 2: Decision-Making on Retail Market Entry by a Platform Supply Chain Considering Multiple

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“颜读（23）：精读博士论文《选择增值服务下平台供应链渠道模式选择与运营决策》第2章考虑多个零售商的平台供应链零售市场入侵决策（1）”

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"Yan Du (23): Intensive Reading: the Doctoral Dissertation Channel Mode Selection and Operational Decision-Making in Platform Supply Chains under the Selection of Value-Added Services Chapter 2: Decision-Making on Retail Market Entry by a Platform Supply Chain Considering Multiple Retailers (1)"

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今天小编将从思维导图、精读内容、知识补充三个板块为大家带来《选择增值服务下平台供应链渠道模式选择与运营决策》第2章考虑多个零售商的平台供应链零售市场入侵决策（1）的介绍。

Today, the editor will introduce Chapter 2: Decision-Making on Retail Market Entry by a Platform Supply Chain Considering Multiple Retailers (1) to Channel Mode Selection and Operational Decision-Making in Platform Supply Chains under the Option of Value-Added Services from three sections: mind mapping, in-depth content reading, and supplementary knowledge.

一、思维导图（Mind Mapping）

二、精读内容（Conduct in-depth reading of the material）

（1）引言（Introduction）

平台供应链的一个典型特征是拥有众多零售商。中国电商销售额在整个零售市场的占比较高，这也直接导致了平台供应链上的利益相关方开始入侵其零售市场。一方面，供应商入侵零售市场，即供应商除了为零售商提供产品外，其本身也作为零售商之一在电商平台上直接销售产品，同时，又将旗下产品批发给众多的线上零售商。另一方面，电商平台入侵零售市场，即电商平台不仅为零售商提供在线市场，其自身也是零售商之一。在线零售市场有无入侵以及不同的入侵者，都会导致平台供应链运营决策的变化，进一步影响供应链个体和整体的绩效。

A typical characteristic of platform supply chains is the presence of numerous retailers. Given the high proportion of e-commerce sales in China's overall retail market, stakeholders within platform supply chains have begun to encroach upon this retail sector. On one hand, suppliers are infiltrating the retail market by not only supplying products to retailers but also acting as retailers themselves, directly selling products on e-commerce platforms while simultaneously wholesaling their products to numerous online retailers. On the other hand, e-commerce platforms are also invading the retail market by not only providing an online marketplace for retailers but also functioning as retailers in their own right. The presence or absence of such encroachment, as well as the identity of the encroacher, can lead to changes in the operational decisions of platform supply chains, further influencing the performance of individual supply chain members and the supply chain as a whole.

本章具体研究以下三个问题：①在零售市场无入侵和面对不同入侵者时，供应链成员应当如何制定运营决策？②供应商和电商平台应何时入侵零售市场以及入侵行为如何影响其他成员的绩效？③影响供应链成员线上零售市场入侵决策的因素有哪些？

This chapter specifically investigates the following three questions: ① How should supply chain members formulate operational decisions in scenarios where there is no encroachment in the retail market and when facing different types of encroachers? ② When should suppliers and e-commerce platforms encroach upon the retail market, and how does such encroachment affect the performance of other supply chain members? ③ What are the factors influencing the decisions of supply chain members regarding encroachment into the online retail market?

（2）模型构建（Model construction）

首先论文中给出一张表，表格总结了第二章使用的参数和符号。

Firstly, the paper presents a table summarizing the parameters and symbols used in Chapter 2.

然后阐述了问题描述：本章构建由一个电商平台、一个供应商和众多线上零售商组成的平台供应链。根据是否入侵零售市场以及谁是入侵者，依次考虑了三种入侵情景：零售市场无入侵（情景 N），供应商入侵零售市场（情景 S）和电商平台入侵零售市场（情景 P）。之后对价格-需求刻画。最后阐述博弈顺序：首先，电商平台制定佣金（和仅在情景 P时制定其订货量）；其次，供应商制定批发价格（和仅在情景 S 时制定其订货量）；最后，各零售商同时决定其订货量。

Then, the problem description is elaborated: This chapter constructs a platform supply chain consisting of one e-commerce platform, one supplier, and numerous online retailers. Based on whether there is retail market encroachment and who the encroacher is, three encroachment scenarios are considered sequentially: no encroachment in the retail market (Scenario N), supplier encroachment in the retail market (Scenario S), and e-commerce platform encroachment in the retail market (Scenario P). Subsequently, the price-demand relationship is characterized. Finally, the sequence of the game is explained: First, the e-commerce platform sets the commission rate (and determines its order quantity only in Scenario P); second, the supplier sets the wholesale price (and determines its order quantity only in Scenario S); lastly, each retailer simultaneously decides on its order quantity.

（3）三种入侵场景（The three encroachment scenarios ）

在情景 N 时，供应商生产产品并以批发价w转卖给众多在线零售商，零售商在电商平台上将产品以零售价p卖给消费者，零售商之间相互竞争。为获得在电商平台上的销售资格，零售商需要支付一定比例（γ）的销售额作为佣金给电商平台，零售商则获得剩余部分（1−γ）的销售额。

In Scenario N, the supplier produces products and resells them to numerous online retailers at a wholesale price w. Retailers then sell these products to consumers on the e-commerce platform at a retail price p, with competition existing among the retailers. To gain the qualification to sell on the e-commerce platform, retailers are required to pay a certain proportion (γ) of their sales revenue as a commission to the platform, while retaining the remaining portion (1−γ) of the sales revenue for themselves.

在情景 S 时，供应商在生产产品的同时也作为零售商之一入侵在线零售市场。一方面，供应商将生产的产品以批发价w转卖给众多零售商；另一方面，供应商预留部分产品直接在电商平台上出售。供应商和零售商均需要支付一定比例（γ）的销售额给电商平台作为佣金，在整个在线市场上，产品的零售价格均为p。

In Scenario S, the supplier not only produces products but also encroaches upon the online retail market by acting as a retailer. On one hand, the supplier sells the produced products to numerous retailers at a wholesale price w; on the other hand, the supplier reserves a portion of the products for direct sale on the e-commerce platform. Both the supplier and the retailers are required to pay a certain proportion (γ) of their sales revenue to the e-commerce platform as a commission. Throughout the entire online market, the retail price of the products is uniformly set at p.

在情景 P 时，电商平台作为零售商之一入侵线上零售市场。供应商将生产的产品同时以批发价w转卖给多个零售商和电商平台，零售商和电商平台呈竞争关系。产品在线销售价格为p，同样,零售商需要支付一定比例（γ）的销售额给电商平台作为佣金。

In Scenario P, the e-commerce platform encroaches upon the online retail market by acting as one of the retailers. The supplier sells the produced products simultaneously to multiple retailers and the e-commerce platform at a wholesale price w, with retailers and the platform being in a competitive relationship. The online sales price of the products is p. Similarly, retailers are required to pay a certain proportion (γ) of their sales revenue to the e-commerce platform as a commission.

三、知识补充（supplementary knowledge）

Stackelberg-Cournot一般是指在产量竞争（Cournot框架）下引入 Stackelberg 的先后顺序结构。Cournot 博弈背景发生在多个厂商生产同质产品，价格由市场总产量决定。Stackelberg 博弈背景发生在一个厂商先决策，另一个厂商后决策。Stackelberg-Cournot的求解步骤为：①求跟随者的反应函数；②代入领导者的利润函数；③求最大化领导者利润；④得到均衡产量与价格。

Stackelberg-Cournot generally refers to the integration of the sequential decision-making structure of Stackelberg into a quantity competition framework (Cournot framework). The Cournot game occurs in a context where multiple firms produce homogeneous products, and the market price is determined by the total market output. In contrast, the Stackelberg game takes place in a setting where one firm makes its decision first, followed by another firm. The steps for solving a Stackelberg-Cournot model are as follows: ① Derive the reaction function of the follower; ② Substitute it into the leader's profit function; ③ Maximize the leader's profit; ④ Obtain the equilibrium output and price.

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翻译：文心一言

参考资料：ChatGPT